Monitor Finance, L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 45517 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-17-2018 
Monitor Finance, L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC Clerk's Record 
Dckt. 45517 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Monitor Finance, L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC Clerk's Record Dckt. 45517" (2018). Idaho Supreme 
Court Records & Briefs, All. 7253. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7253 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
1 of 325
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited) 
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL ) 





WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company; 
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, 
and 
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho 




















Supreme Court No. 
CLERK'S RECORD 
45517-2017 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock. 






A. Bruce Larson 
Richard A. Hearn 
HEARN LAW PLC 
P.O. Box 70 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
Ron Kerl 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229 
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Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0003588-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Monitor Finance, LC, etal. vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, etal. 
User: OCANO 















































IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Diane's Desk 
New Case Filed-other Claims 
Complaint Filed 
Summons Issued 
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District 
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F 
and H(1) Paid by: Cooper & Larsen, Chtd. 
Receipt number: 0031772 Dated: 101712016 
Amount: $221 .00 (Check) For: 
Judge 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert c Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Plaintiff: Monitor Finance, LC Attorney Retained Robert C Naftz 
Ron Kerl 
Plaintiff: First Capital Funding, LC Attorney 
Retained Ron Kerl 
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of 
Trust-by Monitor Finance and First Capital 
Funder thru atty Ron Kerl 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Affidavit Of Service Of Another Summons And Robert C Naftz 
Complaint To Judicially Forclose Deed Of Trust; 
served docs on M & S Developement, LLC on 
10113116 
Affidavit Of Service Of Summons And Complaint Robert C Naftz 
To Judicially Forclose Deed Of Trust ; served 
docs on Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC on 10/16/16 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Robert C Naftz 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: A. Bruce 
Larson Receipt number: 0034591 Dated: 
1114/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: 
Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, (defendant) 
Answer To Complaint And Counterclaim; atty for Robert C Naftz 
dfdts 
Defendant: Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Attorney Robert C Naftz 
Retained A Bruce Larson 
Defendant: M&S Development, LLC Attorney 
Retained A Bruce Larson 
Order For Submission Of Information For 
Scheduling Order Isl J Naftz 11108/16 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Joint Submission Of Information For Scheduling Robert C Naftz 
Order; Ron Kerl, atty for plaintiff 
Amended Joint Submission of Information for 
Scheduling Order 
Robert C Naftz 
Order Setting Jury Trial ; Primary Setting Robert C Naftz 
September 6-8, & 12, 2017, Secondary Setting 
December 5-8, 2017 Isl J Naftz 12129116 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 0910612017 09:00 Robert C Naftz 
AM) Primary Setting 
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Case: CV-2016-0003588-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Monitor Finance, LC, etal. vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, etal. 
User: OCANO 
Monitor Finance, LC , First Capital Funding, LC vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, M&S Development , LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
12/30/2016 HRSC KERI Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/12/2017 09:00 Robert C Naftz 
AM) Primary Setting (Day 4) 
HRSC KERI Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/05/2017 09:00 Robert C Nanz 
AM) Secondary Setting 
1/5/2017 HRSC KERI Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Robert C Naftz 
Judgment 02/21/2017 02:00 PM) 
ANSW KERI Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding , Robert C Naftz 
L.C.'s Answer To Counterclaim ; Ron Kerl, atty for 
Monitor Finance L.C. and First Capital Funding 
L.C. 
1/6/2017 MOTN KERI Motion For Summary Judgment By Monitor Robert C Naftz 
Finance, L.C. And First Capital Funding, L.C.; 
Ron Kerl, atty for Monitor Finance L.C. and First 
Capital Funding L.C. 
MEMO KERI Memorandum In Support Of Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz 
Motion Filed By Monitor Finance, L.C. And First 
Capital Funding, L.C.; Ron Kerl, atty for Monitor 
Finance L.C. and First Capital Funding L.C. 
AFFD KERI Affidavit Of Ron Kerl In Support Of Summary Robert C Naftz 
Judgment Motion Filed By Monitor Finance, L.C. 
And First Capital Funding , L.C. ; Ron Kerl , atty for 
Monitor Finance L.C. and First Capital Funding 
L.C. 
NOTC KERI Notice Of Hearing By Monitor Finance L.C. and Robert C Naftz 
First Capital Funding, L.C.; Ron Kerl, atty for 
Monitor Finance L.C. and First Capital Funding 
L.C. 
2/6/2017 KERI Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge's Robert C Naftz 
Response To Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
Monitor Finance, L.C.'s And First Capital , L.C.'s 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment; A Bruce 
Larson, atty for dfdt 
AFFD KERI Affidavit Of Richard A Hearn; A Bruce Larson , Robert C Naftz 
atty for dfdt 
2/7/2017 MOTN KERI Motion To Amend To Add Additional Defendant , Robert C Naftz 
To Wit: Pioneer Title Company; Ron Kerl , atty for 
plaintiff 
2/8/2017 HRSC KERI Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/27/2017 02:00 Robert C Naftz 
PM) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend to Add 
Additional Defendant 
2/14/2017 MEMO KERI Reply Memorandum In Support Of Summary Robert C Naftz 
Judgment Motion Filed By Monitor Finance, L.C. 
And First Capital Funding , L.C., Ron Kerl , atty for 
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211412017 AFFD KERI Second Affidavit Of Ron Kerl In Support Of Robert C Naftz 
Summary Judgment Motion Filed By Monitor 
Finance, L.C. And First Capital Funding, L.C .; 
Ron Kerl, atty for Monitor Finance, L.C. And First 
Capital Funding, L.C. 
212112017 HRVC KERI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Robert C Naftz 
02127/2017 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend to Add Additional 
Defendant 
DCHH KERI Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz 
scheduled on 0212112017 02:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: More than 100 pages 
212212017 MEOR KERI Minute Entry and Order; Court heard argument Robert C Naftz 
on Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint and 
add additional defendant, with no objection from 
defendants, motion was granted, plaintiff atty will 
prepare order and submit to the Court, hearing 
scheduled on 02127117 at 2:00 p.m. to hear the 
motion is vacated , Court next heard argument on 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the 
Court took the matter under advisement Isl J 
Naftz 02121117 
212312017 ORDR KERI Order Granting Leave To File Amended Robert C Naftz 
Complaint; pursuant to the parties having 
stipulated in open court , plaintiffs motion was 
granted Isl J Naftz 02123117 
212812017 LOCT TAMILYN File #2 started Robert C Naftz 
31112017 TAMILYN First Amended Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Robert C Naftz 
Deed of Trust-by plaintiff thru atty Ron Kerl 
311312017 STIP TAMILYN Stipulation Consenting to Sale of Real Property Robert C Naftz 
and Deposit of Proceeds into Trust 
312712017 MEMO KERI Memorandum Decision And Order; Plaintiffs Robert C Naftz 
motion for partial summary judgment is granted, 
all affirmative defenses listed in the defendant's 
answer, as well as the defendant's counterclaim 
for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed Isl J 
Naftz 03127117 
MEMO KERI Memorandum Decision And Order; Plaintiff's Robert C Naftz 
motion for partial summary judgment is granted , 
and the affirmative defenses and counterclaim 
filed by defendant are hereby dismissed Isl J 
Naftz 03127117 
312912017 APPL TAMILYN Application for Entry of Default Against M & S Robert C Naftz 
Development, . LLC-thru atty Ron Kerl 
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Motion for Summary Judgment by Monitor Robert C Naftz 
Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding , L.C.-thru 
atty Ron Kerl 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz 
Motion Filed by Monitor Finance, L.C. and First 
Capital Funding, l.C.-by atty Ron Kerl 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Foreclosure Robert C Naftz 
Decree-by Miles Pitcher thru atty Ron Kerl 
Notice of Hearing-Hearing Scheduled (Motion Robert C Naftz 
for Summary Judgment 05/15/2017 02:00 
PM)-by atty Ron Kerl 
Summons Issued Robert C Naftz 
Plaintiffs' Witness Disclosure-thru atty Ron Kerl Robert C Naftz 
Supplemental Stipulation Consenting to Sale of Robert C Naftz 
Real Property and Deposit of Proceeds into Trust 
Stipulated Order Approving Stipulations Robert C Naftz 
Consenting to Sale of Real Property-stipulation 
and supplemental stipulation are approved 
s/Naftz 04/28/2017 
Motion for Reconsideration-by defendant th ru 
atty Bruce Larson 
Robert C Naftz 
Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiff's Motion Robert C Naftz 
for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration-thru atty 
Bruce Larson 
Notice of Hearing-Hearing Scheduled (Motion Robert C Naftz 
for Reconsideration 05/15/2017 02:00 PM)-by 
atty Bruce Larson 
Acknowledgment of Service-summons and first Robert C Naftz 
amended complaint accepted by Jesse Hamilton 
Waiver of Right to Respond to Complaint and 
Consent to Entry of Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure-by Jesse Hamilton thru atty Ron 
Kerl 
Affidavit of Mailing-by Ron Kerl 
Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl in Support of 
Summary Judgment Motion and Opposing 
Motion for Reconsideration 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Memorandum Opposing Motion for Robert C Naftz 
Reconsideration and Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment Motion-by atty 
Ron Kerl 
Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Robert C Naftz 
Foreclosure Decree-by Miles Pitcher 
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Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz 
scheduled on 0511512017 02:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated : More than 100 pages 
and Motion for Reconsideration 
Minute Entry and Order; the Court heard Robert C Naftz 
argument on the Defendant's motion for 
reconsideration and Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, at the conclusion, the Court 
took the matter under advisement Isl J Naftz 
05115117 
Memorandum Decision And Order; Plaintiffs Robert C Naftz 
Motion for summary judgment was granted, 
counsel for the plaintiffs shall submit a proposed 
judgment and decree of foreclosure and may 
also submit a memorandum detailing the 
grounds for any claimed award of litigation costs 
& attorney fees Isl J Naftz 06113/17 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Robert c Nanz 
1210512017 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Secondary Setting 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Robert C Naftz 
0911212017 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Primary Setting (Day 4) 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Robert C Naftz 
0910612017 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Primary Setting 
Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Robert C Naftz 
Sale slNaftz 0612012017; Recorded 6-26-17 
Instrument No. 21708981; record book 1016 
Case Status Changed: Closed Robert C Naftz 
judgment, decree of foreclosure and order of sale Robert C Naftz 
instrument #21708981 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Taking 
Acknowledgments, Including Seal Paid by: 
Cooper & Larsen Receipt number: 0019714 
Dated : 6/26/2017 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
Robert C Naftz 
Writ of Execution in Foreclosure and Notice of Robert C Naftz 
Levy issued; sent back to counsel for Plaintiff, 
Ron Kerl ; Instrument No. 21709079 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Robert C Naftz 
by: First Capital Funding, LC Receipt number: 
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Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Robert C Naftz 
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid 
by: Hearn Law, PLC Receipt number: 0021269 
Dated: 7/11/2017 Amount: $37.00 (Check) 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Robert C Naftz 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Hearn Law, PLC 
Receipt number: 0021291 Dated: 7/11/2017 
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Wildlife Ridge 
Estates, LLC, (defendant) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Richard A. Hearn, 
Attorney for Appellant Wildlife Ridge Estate, LLC 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Received check# 1161 in the amount of $100.00 Robert C Naftz 
for deposit of Clerk's Record . 
Respondents' Designation of Additional Record Robert C Naftz 
on Appeal-by atty Ron Kerl 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed Robert C Naftz 
and Mailed to Counsel and SC on 7-21-17 . 
Notice of sheriff's Sale in Foreclosure-by atty Robert C Naftz 
Ron Kerl 
Affidavit of Mailing-notice of sheriff's sale in Robert C Naftz 
foreclosure-by atty Ron Kerl 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Notice of Robert C Naftz 
Appeal, No Transcripts Requested . Filed 
Respondent's Designation of Additional Record 
on Appeal. Idaho Supreme Court entered Order 
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal as it appears not 
to be from a final District Court Judgment. 
*Suspended for (21) days for entry of Final 
Judgment in the District Court . 
Writ of Execution in Foreclosure and Notice of Robert C Naftz 
Levy Returned 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Order Dimissing Robert C Naftz 
Appeal : An Order Conditionally Dismissing 
Appeal was issued by this Court on August 22, 
2017. as it appeared the JUDGMENT, DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE 
entered by Dist. Judge Robert C. Naftz and filed 
on 6-20-17 did not comply with IRCP 54(a). This 
appeal was suspended for entry of a final 
judgment in the District Court. Whereas, there 
having been no final judgment entered in the 
District Court, pursuant to IRCP 54(a), and 
Appellant having filed no Response with this 
Court to the Order Conditionally Dismissing 
Appeal entered by this Court on 8-22-17. It 
hereby is Ordered that this appeal be, and 
hereby is DISMISSED. Signed Karel A. 
Lehrman, Clerk for Supreme Court on 9-18-17. 
9 of 325
Date: 1/8/2018 
Time: 04:56 PM 
Page 7 of 8 
Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0003588-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Monitor Finance, LC, etal. vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC , etal. 
User: OCANO 




































Notice of Hearing-Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Robert C Naftz 
Scheduled 10/10/2017 03:00 PM) Deficiency 
hearing-by atty Ron Kerl 
Case Status Changed : Closed pending clerk Robert C Naftz 
action 
Motion for Deficiency Judgment Against M&S Robert C Naftz 
Development, LLC-by plaintiff thru atty Ron Kerl 
Judgment-against M&S Development, LLC in the Robert C Naftz 
amount of $6,728,907.39 s/Naftz 10/10/2017 
Case Status Changed: closed Robert C Naftz 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT: Remittitur. Robert C Naftz 
Signed and Mailed back to SC on 10-16-17 
Remittitur: The Court having entered an Order Robert C Naftz 
dismissing this appeal 9-9-17 therefore, it is 
hereby Ordered that the appeal herein is 
DISMISSED. 10-11-17. 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Robert C Naftz 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Hearn Law Receipt 
number: 0032040 Dated: 10/23/2017 Amount : 
$129.00 (Check) For: Wildlife Ridge Estates, 
LLC, (defendant) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Robert C Naftz 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Richard A. Hearn, Robert C Naftz 
Attorney for Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, 
Defendant/Appellants. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed Robert C Naftz 
and Mailed to Counsel and Supreme Court on 
10-23-17. 
Respondents' Designation of Additional Record Robert C Naftz 
on Appeal-third affidavit of Ron Kerl in Support 
of Summary Judgment and opposing motion for 
reconsideration AND memorandum oppositing 
motion for reconsideration and reply 
memorandum in support of summary judgment 
motion; to be included in appeal-by atty Ron Kerl 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Filed Notice of Robert C Naftz 
Appeal with attachments. No Transcripts 
Requested. Filed Respondent's Designation of 
Additional Record on Appeal. Entered Order 
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal as it appears it 
was not filed from a final , District Court judgment 
as to all parties or, a final Judgment with IRCP 
54(b). Suspended for Twenty-one Days from the 
Date of this Order. 
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Date Code User Judge 
11/22/2017 OCANO Rule 54(b) Certificate: Final Judgment upon Robert C Naftz 
which execution may issue and an appeal may 
be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules : Signed Judge Naftz on 11-22-17. Emailed 
Cert. copy to SC on 11-22-17. 
11/27/2017 MISC OCANO IDAHO SUPEME COURT; Entered Order Robert C Naftz 
withdraw Coniditonal Dismissal and Reinstating 
Appeal. Set Due Date - Clerk's Record only due 
to Counsel on 12-25-17. Due in SC on 1-29-18. 
1/8/2018 OCANO CLERK'S RECORD ONLY received in Court Robert C Naftz 
Records on 1-8-18. 
11 of 325
.-
I11 the Supreme Court of the State of ldah9 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 















WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA1ES, LLC. an Idaho ) 




M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho 












ORDER WlTHDRA WING 
COND1TIONAL DISMI ·, AL 
AND REINSTATI G APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 45517-2017 





An ORDER CO DITJONALL Y DISMISSING APPEAL was issued by this Court on 11 
1 ovember 17. 2017, as the JUDGMENT entered by District Judge Robert C. 1 artz and filed on 
October I 0, 2017, was not a fin al, District Court judgment as to all parties nor was it accompanied 
by any I.R.C.P. 54(b) Certificate. Thereafter, a RULE 54(b) CERTIFJCATE was entered by 
District Judge Robert C. Naftz and filed on November 22, 20 17. Therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMI SSING APPEAL 
shall be WITHDRAW and proceedings in this appeal shall be REINSTATED. The due date for 
filing the CLERK'S RECORD with this Court is set for January 29, 2018. 
DATED this J. ~_day of November, 20 17. ~;~;~ourt , -· /11(/!ti; -f: . ·12.,......W: ___ . --c _ 
· "tJ ( Karel A. Lehr n. 'le / 
cc: Counsel or Record 
District Court Clerk 
District llldge Robert C. Naftz 
ORDER WITHDRAWING CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL AND REINSTATING APPEAL 
•P • :~~·:.: •• < • • -::;..;:.'.:!. ''",. ... -• : •••• ••••·· • ,.._ :::::~~ .. -..:.. ·.-:.::::- • .:,._, • O' •;• '";", ' •• 
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB #1768 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 ROBERT C. NAFTZ 
Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com 
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C and First Capital Funding, L. C 
r!LED 
B ·. -J ~·!(JC;t< Ct.)i,l~.; ·ry 
CLE if' C' r THE:: CC ' iHT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 
. " 
' 
Utah limited liability company, ) 





WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 








DEED OF TRUST 
Plaintiffs, for cause of suit against the above named Defendant, complains and alleges as 
follows: 
1. 
STATUS OF PLAINTIFFS. At all times herein mentioned Monitor Finance, L.C. 
("Monitor") has been and now is a limited liability company organized under the state of Utah. 
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust 
Page- 1 
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Monitor has its place of business in Provo, Utah, and is autho1ized, among other things, to loan 
money and to take notes and deeds of trust as security therefore in the State ofldaho. 
At all times herein mentioned First Capital Funding, L.C. ("Capital") has been and now is 
a limited liability company organized under the state of Utah. Capital has its place of business in 
Provo, Utah, and is authorized, among other things, to loan money and to take notes and deeds of 
trust as security therefore in the State of Idaho. 
Monitor and Capital will be referred to herein collectively as the Plaintiffs. 
2. 
STATUS OF DEFENDANTS. The Defendant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife 
Ridge") is now a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Idaho, first 
organized in on May 12, 2006. However, between August 6, 2007 and August 27, 2007, between 
August 7, 2008 and October 5, 2009 and between August 5,2010 and September 18, 2015 Wildlife 
Ridge was administratively dissolved as an Idaho limited liability c.;ompany and did nut legally exist. 
Wildlife Ridge is the current owner of the premises herein sought to be foreclosed, having acquired 
the property subject to the 1ights of the Plaintiffs. 
Michael J. Millward, a married man ("Millward") and M&S Development LLC ("M&S"), 
an Idaho limited liability company, are the makers of the Trust Deed Note hereinafter described, and 
M&S was the grantor of the Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Secmity Agreement and Fixture 
Filing herein sought to be foreclosed and owner in fee simple of the premises. 
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust 
Page - 2 
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3. 
INFERIOR INTERESTS. The above named Defendants, and each of them, claim some right, 
title, lien or interest in the property desc1ibed in Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust desc1ibed herein, but their 
interest, if any, in and to said prope1ty is junior, subordinate, and subsequent to the right and lien of 
the Plaintiffs. 
4. 
TRUST DEED NOTE. On the 30th day of December, 2005, Plaintiffs jointly loaned to 
Millward and M&S the sum of $244,000, and as evidence of said loan Millward and M&S, made, 
executed and delivered to the Plaintiffs their Trust Deed Note in w1iting, which Note was dated the 
30th day of December, 2005, in the principal sum of $244,000, both principal and interest being 
payable in words and figures as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, which is a tiue and correct 
copy of the Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005 and it is hereby incorporated herein by this 
reference as if set forth in full at this place. 
5. 
MODIFICATION OF TRUST DEED NOTE. By an agreement dated March 3, 2008, 
Millward, M&S, the Plaintiffs and Wildlife Ridge entered into a Modification of Trust Deed Note 
to provide for additional sums loaned by Plaintiffs to Millward and M&S to become patt of the 
unpaid principal balance of the Trust Deed Note ("Modification"). A True and correct copy of the 
Modification is attached hereto as Exhibit "B," which is hereby incorporated herein by this reference 
as if set forth in full at this place 




BANKRUPTCY FILING OF MILLWARD. On September 10, 2012, Millward filed for 
relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 12-41260 pending in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay 
commenced on September 10, 2012 which prohibited Plaintiffs from taking any action to enforce 
the Trust Deed Note, as amended. That automatic stay existed until Millward' s bankrnptcy case was 
closed on June 23, 2016. 
7. 
DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY SECURITY. As security for the repayment 
of the Trnst Deed Note, together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees, M&S made, executed and 
delivered to Plaintiffs that ce1iain Trust Deed, Assignment ofRents, Secmity Agreement and Fixture 
Filing dated December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") on the following desc1ibed real property situated 
in Bannock County, State ofldaho, to-wit: 
A Tract of land in the South Vi of the South Yl Section 31, Township 6 South, Range 3 S East, Boise 
Meridian, Bannock County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at lhe South quarter comer of Section 31; thence South 89°36 '40" East, 82 .68 feet; thence 
North 53°44' 13" East, 88.1 feet; lhence North 26°44 '09" West, 320 feet; thence North 63° 15'5 I" East, 
260 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West 495.62 feet, more or less, to the Southerly right of way line of 
Barton Road; thence South 72°27'20" West along the Southerly right of way of Barton Road 472.74 feet; 
thence continuing along the Southerly right of way line of Barton Road, South 83°18'20" West, 389.3 
feet, more or less, to the Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail; thence South 26°44 '40" East along the 
Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail 791.56 feet, more or less, to the South line of said Section 31; thence 
South 89°44' East, 462.23 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
The Deed of Trnst was recorded on the 301h day of December, 2005, under Recorder's 
Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, and contains covenants, 
conditions and agreements of the mortgagor as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto, which is a 
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hue and co1Tect copy of the Deed of Trust, and it is hereby incorporated by this reference herein as 
if set fo1ih at length. The Deed of Trust has never been satisfied or discharged or the rights 
thereunder reconveyed. 
8. 
PARTIAL RELEASES. After the recording of the Deed ofTrnst, there was released from 
the Deed ofTrnst certain portions of the Property, and as of the date of this Complaint the Deed of 
Trust applies only to the following desc1ibed po1iion of the Deed of Trnst prope1iy: 
Lot 2, Block 3. \Vild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase L according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument 
No. 97000607, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
Lot 6, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 1, according to the plat thereof. filed as Instrument 
No. 97000607, records ofBam1ock County, Idaho. 
Lot 1, Block 2. Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof. filed as Instrument 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
Lot 2, Block 2, ·wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof filed as Instrument 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
Lot 4, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat the.reof filed as Instnunent 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County. Idaho. 
Lot 5, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof. filed as Instrnment 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
Lot 7, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
Lot 9, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instmrnent 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock ColUlty. Idaho. 
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9. 
DEFAULT. Plaintiffs are the owners and holders of said Trnst Deed Note and the joint and 
several beneficiaries of the Deed of Trnst. 
In order to protect their interest in the Property, Plaintiffs paid attorney's fees and costs in 
the amount of $4,546.19 to defend Wild Life Ridge's Quiet Title Action brought against the 
Plaintiffs in Bannock County Case No. CV 14-7483. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover said fees and 
costs by virtue of the attorney fees provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Deed ofTrnst. 
General taxes were duly levied against and constituted a first lien upon the property described 
in the Deed of Trust and to protect the lien of their Deed of Trust, Plaintiffs have paid taxes in the 
amount of $22,136.63. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reimbursement for the amount of the taxes 
they paid on behalf of Wild Life Ridge by virtue of the provisions contained in the Deed of Trnst. 
As of the 1st day of October, 2016, there is due, owing and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note 
the sum of $6,812,821.71, together with interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per 
annum until date of Judgment herein, together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and 
expenses necessary to preserve Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter 
accrumg. 
10. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. Plaintiffs have had to employ counsel to represent it in this action 
and has obligated itself to pay a reasonable fee for such services. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney fees by virtue of the attorney fee provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note 
as amended and Deed of Trust herein above desc1ibed. Plaintiffs allege that $5,000.00 is a 
reasonable sum to be allowed as attorney's fees herein if this action is uncontested, plus such 
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additional sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable attorney's fees in the event of contest, tiial 
or appeal. 
11. 
REASONABLE VALUE. The Plaintiffs, upon infonnation and belief, allege that the 
reasonable value of the Deed ofTrnst Property and its appmienances is the sum of$50,000.00 per 
lot, or a total of $400,000.00. 
12. 
NO OTHER ACTION. The Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law, and 
no other proceedings at law or in equity have been commenced or are pending to collect the Trnst 
Deed Note as amended or any portion thereof or to foreclose the Deed of Trnst. All conditions 
precedent to the initiation and prosecution of this action and the foreclosure of the Deed of Trnst 
have been satisfied. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs receive the Decree of this Court foreclosing the Deed ofTrnst so that 
the amounts due Plaintiffs under the Trnst Deed Note as amended, which as of October 1, 2016 
totaled $6,812,821.71, plus interest accrning thereafter, together with any additional sums advanced 
by Plaintiffs or which Plaintiffs become obligated to advance for the payment of taxes or assessments 
and/or attorney fees and costs during the pendency of this action, including interest on such advances 
from date of advance; for the sum of $5,000.00 as attorney's fee if this action is uncontested, plus 
such additional sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable in the event of contest, trial or appeal; 
for Plaintiffs' taxable costs and disbursements herein; and for interest on the entire amount of said 
judgment at the maximum rate allowed by law; 
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2. That the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein be adjudged a first and p1ior lien 
upon the property described in the Deed of Trust superior to any right, title, claim, lien or interest 
on the part of the named Defendants or persons claiming by, through or under said Defendants; 
3. That the Comi, in the Decree, establish the reasonable value of the property herein 
described at $400,000.00; 
4. That the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein be foreclosed and said real 
property be sold in separate parcels in accordance with and in the maimer provided by law; that 
Plaintiffs be pe1mitted to be a purchaser at sale; that the net proceeds of said sale be applied first 
toward the payment of the costs of said sale and then towards the payment of Plaintiffs Trust Deed 
Note as amended; 
5. That the Decree provide that after the sale of said property all tight, title, claim, lien 
or interest of the named Defendants and eve1y person claiming by, through or under said Defendants, 
in or to said property, including the tight of possession thereof from and after said sale, be forever 
baned and foreclosed and that the purchaser at said sale be entitled to immediate possession of the 
premises as allowed by law subject only to such statutory right of redemption as said Defendants 
may have by law; 
6. That in the event the Plaintiffs become the purchasers at the sale and possession of 
the premises is not smTendered to the Plaintiffs, a writ of assistance be issued directing the Sheriff 
of Bannock County, Idaho, to deliver possession of the premises to the Plaintiffs; 
7. That after the conclusion of any foreclosure sale, upon proper motion of the Plaintiffs, 
that a deficiency judgment be entered against M&S in the event the net proceeds of the foreclosure 
sale are insufficient to fully satisfy the sums due and owing to the Plaintiffs; and 
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8. Tiiat Plaintiffs may have such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in 
the premises. 
DATED this°1:~dayof C2cJt)be.r , 2016. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Utah ) 
Miles Pitcher, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the authorized agent of Monitor Finance, L.C., one of the Plaintiffs in the above 
entitled and foregoing action; that he has read the foregoing Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed 
of Trust, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein stated are true as be verily believes. 
, 2016. 
Miles~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _J_ day of De ,o l,e ...-. , 2016. 
(SEAL) 
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of'frnst -
Page- 9 
NOTARY PU~~ for Utah 
Residing at: 'fYJ!JD •• CIT 
Commission Expires: ~ -l... 2.. - 2 o Ii 
21 of 325
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Utah ) 
Derek Ollivier, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the authorized agent of First Capital Funding, L.C., one of the Plaintiffs in the 
above entitled and foregoing action; that he has read the foregoing Complaint to Judicially Foreclose 
Deed of Trust, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein stated are tme as he verily 
believes. 
rJ 
DATED this~_ day of CJ v 'to~• .r , 2016. 
t:d~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _J_ day of OC-70 ~ - , 2016. 
(SEAL) 
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TRUST DEED NOTE 
$244,000.00 Dated: December 30, 2005 
I. Promise to Pay. For value received, Michael J. Millward, a married man, and M & S 
Development, LLC, a Idaho Limited Liability Company (hereinafter individually referred to as 
"Mak.er" and collectively referred to as "Makers") each promise to pay to the order of Monitor 
Finance, L.C., a Utah limited liability company as to an undivided 50% interest and First Capital 
Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company as to an undivided 50% interest ("Holder(s)"), at 
3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604, or at such other place as Holder may from time to 
time designate, in lawful money of the United States of America, the principal sum of TWO 
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($244,000.00), or so much of that sum 
as may be advanced under this Trust Deed Note by the Holder, together with any other advances 
made pursuant to this Trust Deed Note ( collectively the "Principal Indebtedness"), plus interest 
as computed below along with any other cost, fee or expenditure contemplated herein (the "Total 
Indebtedness"). All of the terms and conditions of that certain Trust Deed, of even date which 
secures this obligation are hereby incorporated and made a part of this Trust Deed Note. 
2. Tenn. The term of this Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This 
Trust Deed Note shall fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the "Maturity Date"). 
3. Interest. The outstanding balance of the Principal Indebtedness shall bear interest 
from December 30, 2005 until fully paid at a fixed interest rate of fifteen percent (15%) per 
annum. Interest shall accrue daily on the outstanding balance of the Principal Indebtedness both 
before and after judgment, and shall be calculated on the basis of a 360-day year. Interest is 
compounded on a 360-day year simple interest basis by applying the ratio for the annual interest 
rate over a year of 360 days (365/360), multiplied by the outstanding principal balance, 
multiplied by the actual number of days the principal balance is outstanding. 
4. Payments. Monthly interest payments will be made by Makers beginning February 1, 
2006 and the first of the month thereafter. This Trust Deed Note calls for a balloon payment to 
become due and payable on the Maturity Date. On the Maturity Date the Total Indebtedness 
shall be due and payable in full. Checks will constitute payment only when collected. If any 
installment or interest payment is not made within five (5) calendar days of the due date, a late 
penalty equal to twenty percent (20%) of any such installment or interest payment owed 
hereunder shall automatically be assessed. If any balloon payment is not made within five (5) 
calendar days of the due date, a late penalty equal to ten percent (10%) of any such balloon 
payment owed hereunder shall automatically be assessed. There shall be no grace period and no 
further notice shall be required. In the event that a payment date falls on a weekend, or public 
holiday, payment shall be due and payable the following business day. 
5. Origination and Document Fees. As part of this transaction, Makers agree to pay to 
Holder the amount of $12,200.00 as an origination fee (the "Origination Fee"). Said Origination 
Fee shall be due and paid by the Makers on December 30, 2005. Makers also agree to pay all of 
the costs incurred in documenting, recording and closing this transaction (the "Documentation 
EXHIBIT 
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Fee"). Makers agree that both the Origination Fee and Documentation Fee may be subtracted 
directly from the principal amount at closing. 
6. Holder's Expenditures. Makers agree to pay on demand any expenditures made by 
Holder in accordance with the Trust Deed and this Trust Deed Note, including, but not limited 
to, the payment of taxes, insurance premiums, costs of maintenance and preservation of the 
collateral, common expense and other assessments relating to the collateral, and attorney fees 
and costs incurred in connection with any matter pertaining hereto or to the security pledged to 
secure the Principal Indebtedness or any portion thereof (collectively the "Holder 
Expenditures"). At the election of Holder, all Holder Expenditures may be added to the unpaid 
balance of this Trust Deed Note and become a part of and on a parity with the Principal 
Indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed and shall accrue interest at such rate as may be 
computed from time to time in the manner prescribed in this Trust Deed Note. 
7. Prepayment. Makers shall have the right, from time to time and at any time, to prepay 
all, or any part, of this Trust Deed Note at any time or times prior to the Maturity Date of this 
note without payment of any premium or penalty. Prepaid Interest will be pro rated if this Note is 
paid off early. 
8. Default. Makers will be in default if any of the following happens: (a) Makers fail to 
make any payment when due; (b) any Maker breaks any promise Maker has made to Holder, or 
any Maker fails to comply with or to perform when due any other term, obligation, covenant, or 
condition contained in this Trust Deed Note or any agreement related to this Trust Deed Note; (c) 
any Maker defaults under any loan, extension of credit security agreement, purchase or sales 
agreement, or any other in favor of any other creditor or person that may materially affect any 
Maker's property or any Maker's ability to repay this Trust Deed Note or perform Makers' 
obligations under this Trust Deed Note or any of the Related Documents; (d) any representation 
or statement made or furnished to Holder by any Maker or on any Maker's behalf is false or 
misleading in any material respect either now or at the time made or furnished; ( e) any Maker 
dissolves (regardless of whether election to continue is made), any member withdraws from any 
Maker, any member dies, or any of the members of any Maker becomes insolvent, a receiver is 
appointed for any part of any Maker's property, any Maker makes an assignment for the benefit 
of creditors, or any proceeding is commenced either by any Maker or against any Maker under 
any bankruptcy or insolvency laws; (f) any creditor tries to take any of any Maker's property on 
or in which Holder has a lien or security interest; (g) a material adverse change occurs in any 
Maker's financial condition, or Holder believes the prospect of payment or performance of the 
Indebtedness is impaired; (h) Holder in good faith deems itself insecure. 
9. Default Interest Rate. Notwithstanding anything above to the contrary, if default 
occurs in the payment of any principal, interest, fee or cost, when due, or if any Event of Default 
occurs hereunder, time being of the essence hereof, if said default remains uncured for five (5) 
calendar days, thereafter, all outstanding Principal Indebtedness shall bear interest at a default 
rate of thirty-five percent (35%) until paid, both before and after judgment. If this Trust Deed 
Note becomes in default or payment is accelerated, Makers agree to pay to the Holder of the 
Trust Deed Note all collections costs, including reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses 
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incurred both before and after judgment, including any bankruptcy proceeding or appeal, in 
addition to all other sums due under this Trust Deed Note. 
10. Application of Payments. Any and all payments by any Maker under this Trust Deed 
Note shall be applied as follows: first, to the repayment of any Holder Expenditures advanced by 
Holder under this Trust Deed Note; second, to the payment of any late charges; third, to the 
payment of accrued interest on the Principal Indebtedness; and fourth, to the payment of the 
Principal Indebtedness. 
11. Extension. The time for any payment required under this Trust Deed Note may be 
extended from time to time at the sole discretion of the Holder. Makers agree to pay to Holder 
an extension fee in the sum of ten percent (10%) of the Total Indebtedness then outstanding 
under this Trust Deed Note (the "Extension Fee"). The Extension Fee shall be paid to Monitor 
Finance, L.C./First Capital Funding, L.C., at 3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. In 
addition to the Extension Fee, Makers further agree to pay any and all documentation and 
recording costs incurred in the preparation of said extension. Both the Extension Fee and the 
extension documentation costs shall be due and payable at the time the extension is executed. 
Acceptance by Holder of any additional security or guarantees for the performance of the terms 
and provisions contained in this Trust Deed Note shall not in any way affect the liability of an 
individual Maker. 
12. Governing Law. This Trust Deed Note has been delivered to Holder in the State of 
Utah. Ifthere is a lawsuit, Makers agree upon Holder's request to submit to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of Utah County, the State of Utah. This Trust Deed Note shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
13. Joint and Several Liability. In the event this Trust Deed Note is executed, endorsed, 
guaranteed or assumed by more than one person, corporation, or any other entity, all of the 
parties shall be jointly and severally liable and do hereby waive presentment, demand, protest 
and notice of non-payment and of protest. Furthermore, each of the parties hereto agrees that 
his, her or its obligation shall continue in full force and effect notwithstanding the death, 
bankruptcy ( or commencement thereof), dissolution or release of any other party and 
notwithstanding the taking or release of other or additional security and notwithstanding any 
waiver, amendment or modification (including, but not limited to, extensions of time or 
performance) by the holder of this Trust Deed Note as to the obligations under this Trust Deed 
Note or under any other Loan Document of any of the other parties, with or without notice. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, each of the parties to this Trust Deed Note agree 
that a separate action or actions may be brought against him, her or it, whether or not such action 
is brought against any of the other parties to this Trust Deed Note. 
14. Interest Limitation. All agreements between the parties to this Trust Deed Note and 
the Holder of this Trust Deed Note are hereby expressly limited so that in no contingency or 
event whatsoever, whether by reason of deferment or advancement of the proceeds of the loan 
evidenced by this Trust Deed Note, acceleration of maturity of the Loan, or otherwise shall the 
amount paid or agreed to be paid to Holder for the use, forbearance or detention of the money to 
be loaned under this Trust Deed Note exceed the maximum interest rate permissible under 
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applicable law. If, from any circumstance whatsoever, fulfillment of any provision of this Trust 
Deed Note or of any other agreement between the parties to this Trust Deed Note and the Holder, 
at the time perfonnance of such provision shall be due, shall involve transcending the limit of 
validity prescribed by law, then, ipso facto, the obligation to be fulfilled shall be reduced to the 
limit of such validity. In the event that any payment is received by the Holder of this Trust Deed 
Note which would otherwise be deemed to by a payment of interest in excess of the maximum 
allowed by law, such payment shall be deemed to have been paid on account of principal at the 
time of receipt. This provision shall never be superseded or waived and shall control every other 
provision of the Trust Deed Note and all agreements between the paiiies and the holder of this 
Trust Deed Note. 
15. General Provisions. Both Holder and Maker acknowledge and agree that any and all 
monies provided by Holder to Maker pursuant to the terms hereof are for a business purpose. 
Holder may delay or forego enforcing any of its 1ights or remedies under this Trust Deed Note 
without losing them. Upon any change in the tem1s of this Trust Deed Note, and unless 
otherwise expressly stated in writing, no paiiy who sign this Trust Deed Note, whether as maker, 
guarantor, accommodation maker or endorser, shall be released from liability. All such parties 
agree that Holder may renew or extend (repeatedly and for any length of time) this loan, or 
release any party or guarantor or collateral; or impair, fail to realize upon or perfect Holder's 
security interest in the collateral; and take any other action deemed necessary by Holder without 
the consent of or notice to anyone. All such parties also agree that Holder may modify this Trust 
Deed Note without the consent of or notice to anyone other than the party with whom the 
modification is made. 
DA TED thls ~ day of Dot m./pjft. , 2005. 
MAKERS: 
Michael J. Millw 
M & S Developm , LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
By: ---------
Its: ----------
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. ·. 'if~ct1Ilcittibn·or'Ti·ctst·rie~d·Note .... . 
On Dec~mber 30, 2005, Michael Millward and M&S Development, executed a 
Note and Trust Deed in favor of Monitor Finance, L.G. and First Capital Funding, L.C. in 
the amount of $244,000.00, The Trnst Deed was i·ecorded as Entry No .. 20528398 in the 
records of the Bannock County, Idaho, Recorder. · 
The pa1iies hereby modify said Trust Deed Note as follows: 
• The Note will be expanded to include the following draws: 
I 
q 8/14/07 $75,000.00 
o 9/4/07 $25,000.00 
o 9/19/07 $7,400.00 
o 10/25/07 $100,000.00 
o ·3/1/08 $10,000.00 
The pru.iies acknowledge that the same terms and conditions of the original Note and · 
Trust Deed will apply to the amended amount .?Jld terms. 
Monitor Fi ce, L,C: 
By: Miles C. Pitcher 
Its: ~1au~ging Member 
') ~ ·. ...,--.),~ " ,/~ul .. -~>" .--C. _  
L.91'St Capital Funding, L.C. 
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TRUST DEED, ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, 
SECURITY AGREEMENT AND 
FIXTURE FILING 
20SZ8398 
This Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing (the "Trnst 
Deed") is made and executed this 30th day of December, 2005 (the "Closing Date"), by M&S 
Development, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company ( "Trnstor") whose address is 1801 N. ARTHUR 
STE c, POCATELLO, ID 83204 , and Pioneer Title Company as Trnstee ("Trustee"), in 
favor of Monitor Finance, L.C. as to an undivided 50% interest whose address is 3191 North 
Canyon Road, Provo, UT 84604, and First Capital Funding, L.C. as to an undivided 50% 
interest whose address is 3191 No11h Canyon Road, Provo, UT 84604 ("Beneficiary"). 
Beneficiary has loaned monies to Trustor and the transaction is memorialized by that 
certain Promissory Note dated December 30, 2005 executed by Trustor in favor of Beneficiary in 
the amount of Two Hundred Forty Four Thousand Dollars ($244,000.00) (the ''Note"). 
See attached "Exhibit A" 
In exchange for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and legal sufficiency of 
which are hereby aclmowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I GRANT AND CONVEYANCE 
1.1 General Grant. Trustor hereby assigns, grants, bargains, sells, conveys, wanants, 
and transfers to Trustee in trust, for the Benefit of Beneficiary, with power of sale, 
and right of entry and possession, the following described property (the "Real 
Property"): 
1.1.1 Real Property. All right, title, interest and estate of Truster, now 
owned or hereafter acquired, in and to the real property located in 
Bannock County, State of Idaho (the "Real Property'') as more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
1.1.2 Buildings, Improvements and Interests. All right, title, interest and 
estate of Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All 
buildings, improvements, works, structures, facilities and fixtures, 
including any future additions to, and improvements and betterments now 
or hereafter constructed upon, and all renewals and replacements of, any 
of the foregoing, which are now or hereafter shall be constructed or 
affixed or constructively affixed to the Property, or to any portion of the 
Real Property (the "Improvements"). (b) All easements, licenses, streets, 
ways, alleys, roads, passages, rights-of-way, minerals, oil, gas and other 





courses, water rights, and water stock (whether now owned or hereafter 
acquired by Trustor and whether arising by virtue of land ownership, 
contract or otherwise), of any kind and nature, relating to or in any way 
appurtenant or appertaining to the Real Property or to any portion of the 
Real Property. 
1.1.3 Tenements. Hereditaments. AH right, title, interest and estate of 
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to all of the tenements, 
hereditaments, rights, privileges, and appurtenances belonging, relating, or 
in any way appertaining to any of the Real Property or the Improvements, 
or any portion of the Real Property or the Improvements, or which shall 
hereafter in any way belong, relate, or in any way appertain thereto, 
whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and the reversion and 
reversions, remainder and remainders, and estates, rights, titles, interests 
possessions claims, and demands of every natures whatsoever, at law or in 
equity, which Trustor may have or may hereafter acquire in and to the 
Real Property, the Improvements, or any portion thereof. 
1.1.4 Leases, Rents. Issues. Etc. All right, title, interest and estate of 
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to all leases and 
subleases of all or any portion of the Real Property or the Improvements 
now or hereafter existing or entered into, and all lease agreements and 
documents evidencing the same, including without limitation, any tenant 
leases for all or a portion of the Real Property; and all right, title and 
interest of Trustor thereunder, including without limitation, all rents, sub-
rents, room rents and other amounts received for use of any portion of the 
Real Property, including the Improvements, and any and all room rental 
agreements and arrangements now owned or hereafter acquired, and all 
proceeds from such room rents, issues, royalties, security deposits, income 
and profits of and from the Real Property, the Improvements, or any 
portion thereof. 
1.2 Security Interest. Trustor hereby assigns and grants to Beneficiary a 
security interest in the following described property ( collectively the 
"Personalty"), whether now or hereafter existing, and in which Trustor now has or 
hereafter obtains any right, title, estate or interest, together with all additions and 
accessions thereto and all rents and·proceeds thereof: 
1.2. l Tangible Personal Property. All right, title, interest, and estate of 
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All furniture, 
fixtures and equipment and inventory as equipment inventory are defined 
in the Uniform Commercial Code, wherever located, and all related right, 
title and interest ofTrustor, now owned or hereafter acquired or created, 
all proceeds and products of the foregoing and all additions and accessions 
to, replacements of. insurance or condemnation proceeds of. and 




foregoing, and all rents, revenues, issues, profits and proceeds arising from 
the sale, lease, license, encumbrance collection, or any other temporary or 
permanent disposition of any of the foregoing or any interest therein. 
1.2.2 Awards. All right, title, interest and estate of Trustor, now owned 
or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All awards made for the taking by 
eminent domain or by any proceeding or purchase in lieu thereof of the 
Real Property or Personalty or any portion of the Real Property or 
Pesonalty, the Improvements or any portion of the Improvements, or of 
any other Improvements now or hereafter situate thereon or any estate or 
easement in the Property (including any awards for change of grade of 
streets); (b) All insurance policies and all proceeds or insurance paid on 
account of any partial or total destruction of the Improvements or any 
portion thereof; ( c) All causes of action and recoveries for any loss or 
diminution in the value of the Real Property or Personalty or the 
Improvements; and ( d) All proceeds of each of the foregoing. 
1.2.3 General Intangibles. All general intangibles of Trustor, presently 
existing or hereafter arising, including general intangibles as defined in the 
Uniform Commercial Code, choses in action, proceeds, contracts, 
distributions, dividends, refunds, security depos_its, judgments, insurance 
claims, any right to payment of any nature, intellectual property rights or 
licenses, any other rights or assets oftrustor customarily or for accounting 
purposes classified as general intangibles, and all documentation and 
supporting information related to any of the foregoing all rents, profits and 
issues thereof, and all proceeds thereof. 
1.3 Security Agreement. This Trust Deed constitutes a Secmity 
Agreement with respect to the Personalty, and Beneficiary shall have all the rights 
and remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code of Utah as 
well as all other rights and remedies available at law or in equity. Trustor and 
Beneficiary acknowledge their mutual intent that all security interests 
contemplated herein are given as a contemporaneous exchange for new value to 
Trustor, regardless of when advances to Trustor are actually made or when the 
Trust Estate is acquired. 
1.4. Fixture Filing. This Trust Deed is intended to be a fixture filing 
under Utah Code Annotated; Section 70A-9-402. The addresses of the Secured 
Party (Beneficiary) and the debtor (Trustor) from which information may be 
obtained concerning this security interest granted hereunder are set forth in 
Section 12.1 herein. This Trust Deed is to be recorded in the real estate records 
in the County Recorder's office of the county in which the Real Property is 
located. Trustor is the record owner of the Real Property. 
1.5 Trust Estate. The Real Property, the Improvements and the 




ARTICLE II OBLIGATION SECURED 
2.1 Obligations. This Trust Deed is given for the purpose of securing 
the following obligations (collectively the "Obligations") of Truster: 
2.1.1 Note. The payment and perfonnance of each and every 
agreement and obligation under the Note, including without limitation, the 
payment of principal and interest under the Note. 
2.1.2 Other Loan Documents. The payment and perfonnance of 
each and every agreement and obligation cifTrustor under this Trust Deed, 
the Note, and any other Loan Document. 
2.1.3 Advances by Trustee or Beneficiary. The payment of all 
sums expended and advanced by Trustee or Beneficiary pursuant to the 
tem1s of this Trust Deed, together with interest thereon as provided in this 
Trust Deed. 
2.1.4 Extensions, Etc. The payment and perfonnance of any 
extensions of, renewals of, modifications of, or additional advances under 
the Note, or any of the obligations evidenced by the Note, regardless of 
the extent of or the subject matter of any such extension, renewal, 
modification or additional advance. 
2.1.5 Other Obligations. The payment and performance of any 
other note or obligation reciting that it is secured by this Trust Deed. 
Trustor expressly aclmowledges its mutual intent with Beneficiary that the 
security interest created by this Trust Deed secure any and all present and 
future debts, obligations, and liabilities of Trustor to Beneficiary without 
any limitation whatsoever. 
ARTICLE III REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES 
3.1 Property. Trustor represents and wanants to Beneficiary as 
follows: 
3 .1.1 Fee Title. Trustor is the owner of fee simple marketable 
title in and to the Real Property. 
J.1.2 Defense of Title. Trustor shall defend title to the Real 
Property and the Improvements against all claims and demands 
whatsoever. 
3.1.3 Hazardous Material. No Hazardous Materials have been 




by any person or entity on, in or under the Real Property or the 
Improvements in violation of any Environmental Laws. Truster has 
complied with all applicable federal, state and local laws, rules, ordinances 
and regulations relating to the storage, transportation, and disposal of 
Hazardous Materials on, in or under the Real Property or the 
Improvements. 
3.2 Personalty. Truster further represents and warrants to Beneficiary 
as follows: 
3.2.1 Owner of Personalty. Truster is the owner, or upon 
acquisition thereof, will be the owner of the Personalty. 
3.2.2 Location of Personalty. The Personalty will be located in 
the State of Utah, will not be removed from that state without the prior 
written consent of Beneficiary. 
ARTICLE IV MAINTENANCE OF TRUST ESTATE 
4.1 Maintenance. Truster shall do each of the following: (a) maintain 
the Trust Estate at all times in good condition and repair; (b) not commit any 
waste of the Trust Estate, or remove, damage, demolish, or structurally alter any 
of the Improvements; (c) complete promptly and in good and workmanlike 
manner any Improvement on the Real Property; (d) except to the extent that 
insurance proceeds are applied by Beneficiary to the satisfaction of the 
Obligations in accordance with Article V, restore promptly and in good and 
workmanlike manner any of the Improvements or any portion thereof, which may 
for any reason be damaged or destroyed; ( e) comply at all times with all laws, 
ordinances, regulations, covenants, and restrictions in any manner affecting the 
Trust Estate; (f) not commit or permit any act upon the Trust Estate in violation of 
law; and (g) do all acts which by reason of the character or use of the Trust Estate 
may be reasonably necessary to maintain and care for the same, the specific 
enumeration herein not excluding the general. 
AR TI CLE V INSURANCE 
5.1 Insurance. Trustor shall secure and maintain in force on the Trust 
Estate commercial general liability insurance. All such insurance policies must 
cover all risks required to be covered by Beneficiary, comply with any 
requirements set forth in the Sales Agreement and be approved by Beneficiary as 
to amount, form, terms, deductibles and insurer. All such policies of insurance 
shall name Beneficiary as an additional insured or loss payee, as appropriate. All 
such insurance policies shall contain a provision that such policies will not be 
cancelled or amended, which term shall include any reduction in the scope or 





5.2 Notice of Casualty. In the event of loss or damage to the Trust 
Estate, or any portion of the Trust Estate, Trustor shall immediately give notice 
thereof to Beneficiary. 
5 .3 Proceeds of Insurance. All proceeds of insurance on the Trnst 
Estate, and all causes of action, claims, compensation, awards and recoveries for 
any damage, condemnation or taking of all or any part of the Trust Estate, or for 
any damage or injury to it or for any loss or diminution in the value of the Trnst 
Estate, are hereby assigned to and shall be paid to Beneficiary, except as 
otherwise provided in the Sales Agreement. Beneficiary may participate in any 
suits or proceedings relating to any such proceeds, causes of action, claims, 
compensation, awards or recoveries. 
5.4 Disposition of Policies on Foreclosure. In the event Beneficiary 
exercises the power of sale or foreclosure provisions of this Trust Deed or makes 
any other transfer of title or assignment of the Trust Estate in extinguishment in 
whole or in part of the Obligations, all right, title and interest of Truster in and to 
the policies of insurance required by Section 5.1 shall inure to the benefit of and 
pass to the transferee of the interests conveyed under this Trust Deed or to the 
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, as the case may be. 
ARTICLE VI INDEMNIFICATION AND OFF-SET 
6.1 Indemnification. Trustor hereby indemnifies and holds 
Beneficiary haimless in accordance with the following: 
6.1.1 General Indemnification. Trustor shall indemnify and hold 
Beneficiary harmless from any and all losses, damages, claims, causes of 
action, suits, debts, obligations, or liabilities which arise from or relate to, 
the Note, this Trust Deed, but excluding any such claims based upon 
breach or default by Beneficiary or gross negligence or wilful misconduct 
of Beneficiary. If Beneficiary commences an action against Truster to 
enforce any of the terms, covenants or conditions of this Trust Deed or 
because of the breach by Truster of any of the terms, covenants, or 
conditions, or for the recovery of any sum secured-hereby, Truster shall 
pay to Beneficiary reasonable attorneys fees and costs actually incurred by 
Beneficiary. The right to such attorneys fees and costs shall be deemed to 
have accrued on the commencement of such action, and shall be 
enforceable whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment. If 
Truster breaches any term, covenant or condition of this Trust Deed, 
Beneficiary may employ an attorney or attorneys to protect Beneficiary's 
rights hereunder and in the event of such employment following any 
breach of Truster, Truster shall pay Beneficiary reasonable attorneys fees 
and costs actually incurred by Beneficiary, whether or not action is 




6.1.2 Mechanics Liens. If Beneficiary or the Real Property is 
held liable or could be held liable for, or is subject to any losses, damages, 
costs, charges or expenses, directly or indirectly on account of any claims 
for work, labor, or material furnished in connection with or arising from 
the construction of any building, fixture and improvements, then Trustor 
shall indemnify, defend and hold Beneficiary harmless from all liability or 
expense arising therefrom including reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 
6.1.3 Hazardous Materials. Trustor hereby agrees to indemnify, 
hold harmless and defend (by counsel of Beneficiary's choice) 
Beneficiary, its directors, officers, employees, agent, successors and 
assigns from and against any and all claims, losses, damages, liabilities, 
fines, penalties, charges, administrative and judicial proceedings and 
orders, judgments, remedial action requirements, enforcement actions of 
any kind, and all costs and expenses incurred in connection therewith 
(including but not limited to attorneys' fees and expenses), arising directly 
or indirectly, in whole or in part, out of (a) the presence on or under the 
Real Property of any Hazardous Materials, or any releases or discharges of 
any Hazardous Materials on, under or off the Real Property, or (b) any 
activity carried on or undertaken on or off the Real Property, whether prior 
to or during the term of the Note, and whether by Trustor or any 
predecessor in title or any employees, agents, contractors or 
subcontractors of Trustor or any predecessor in title, or any third persons 
at any time occupying or present on the Real Property, in co1U1ection with 
the handling, treatment, removal, storage, decontamination, clean-up, 
transport or disposal of any Hazardous Materials at any time located or 
present on or under the Real Property. The foregoing indemnity shall 
further apply to any residual contamination on or under the Real Property, 
or affecting any natural resources, and to any contamination of any 
property or natural resources arising in connection with the generation, 
use, handling, storage, transport or disposal of any such Hazardous 
Materials, and irrespective of whether any of such activities were or will 
be undertaken in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, codes and 
ordinances. Trustor hereby acknowledges and agrees that, 
notwithstanding any other provision of this Trust Deed or any of the other 
Purchase Documents to the contrary, the obligations ofTrustor under this 
Section 6.1.3 shall be unlimited personal obligations of Truster and shall 
survive any foreclosure under this Trust Deed, any transfer in lieu thereof, 
and any satisfaction of the obligations of Trustor in connection with the 
Note. Trustor acknowledges that Beneficiary's appraisal of the Real 
Property is such that Beneficiary would not extend the Note but for the 





6.2 Off-Set. All sums payable by Trustor under the Note and this 
Trust Deed shall be paid without notices, demand, counterclaim, set-off, 
deduction or defense and without abatement, suspension, deferment, diminution 
or reduction. The Obligations and liabilities of Truster hereunder shall in no way 
be released, discharged or otherwise affected ( except as expressly provided 
herein) by reason of: (a) any damage to or destruction of, or any condemnation or 
similar taking of the Trust Estate or any part thereof; (b) any destruction or 
prevention of or interference with any use of the Trust Estate or any part thereof; 
(c) any title defect or encumbrance or any eviction from the Trust Estate or any 
part thereof by title paramount or otherwise; (d) any bankruptcy, insolvency, 
reorganization, composition, adjustment, dissolution, liquidation or other like 
proceeding relating to Beneficiary, or any action taken with respect to this Trust 
Deed by any trustee or any action taken with respect to this Trust Deed by any 
trustee or receiver of Beneficiary, or by any court, in any such proceeding; (e) 
any claim which Truster has or might have against Beneficiary; (f) the occurrence 
of an Event of Default or any default or failure on the part of Beneficiary to 
perform or comply with any of the terms, covenants or conditions of this Trust 
Deed or of any other agreement with Truster; or (g) any other occurrence 
whatsoever, whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing. 
ARTICLE VII TAXES AND IMPOSITIONS 
7.1 Payment of Taxes and Impositions. Trustor shall pay, prior to 
delinquency, all real property taxes and assessments, general and special, and all 
other taxes, assessments and other governmental, municipal, or other charges or 
impositions of any kind or nature whatsoever (including without limitation, 
charges and assessments on water or water stocks used on or with the Real 
Property and levies or charges resulting from covenants, conditions and 
restrictions affecting the Trust Estate) which are assessed or imposed upon the 
Trust Estate, or become due and payable, and which create, may create, or appear 
to create, a lien upon the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust Estate, or upon 
any equipment or other facility used in the construction, operation or maintenance 
of the Trust Estate (all of which taxes, assessments and other governmental 
charges of like nature are referred to as the "Impositions"); provided, however, 
that if, by law, any such Imposition is payable, or may at the election of the 
taxpayer be paid in installments, Trustor may pay the same together with any 
accrued interest on the unpaid balance of such Imposition in installments as the 
same become due and before any fine, penalty, interest or cost may be added 
thereto for the nonpayment of any such installment and interest. 
7.2 Evidence of Payment. Unless such Imposition is paid directly by 
Beneficiary pursuant to Section 8.3, Truster shall furnish Beneficiary, within 
thirty (30) days after the date upon which such Imposition is due and payable by 
Truster, official receipts of the appropriate taxing authority, or other proof 




7.3 Right to Contest. Trustor shall have the right before any 
delinquency occurs to contest or object to the amount or validity of any 
hnposition by appropriate legal proceedings, but such contest shall not be deemed 
or construed in any way as relieving, modifying or extending Trustor's covenant 
to pay any such Imposition at the time and in the manner provided in Section 7. l 
unless Trustor has given prior written notice to Beneficiary ofTrustor's intent to 
so contest or object to an Imposition, and unless, at Beneficiary's option, (a) 
Trustor shall demonstrate to Beneficiary's satisfaction that the legal proceedings 
shall conclusively operate to prevent the sale of the Trust Estate, or any part 
thereof, to satisfy such Imposition prior to final determination of such 
proceedings; or (b) Trustor shall furnish a good and sufficient undertaking and 
sureties as may be required or permitted by law to accomplish a stay of such 
proceedings. 
ARTICLE VIII ADDITIONAL COVENANTS 
8.1 Payment of Utilities. Trustor shall pay when due all utility charges 
incurred by Trustor for the benefit of the Trust Estate or which may become a 
charge or lien against the Trust Estate for gas, electricity, water or sewer services 
furnished to the Trust Estate and all assessments or charges of a similar nature, 
whether public or private, affecting the Trust Estate or any portion thereof, 
whether or not such assessments or charges are liens thereon. 
8.2 Reserves for Taxes and Insurance. In furtherance of Article V and 
Article VII of this Trust Deed and anything to the contrary herein 
· notwithstanding, if any Event of Default shall occur and be continuing, and at 
Beneficiary's written request, Trustor shall deposit with Beneficiary in a non-
interest bearing account, on the first day of each month, until the Note is paid in 
full, an amount equal to one-twelfth of the annual Impositions, as defined in 
Article VII, as reasonably estimated by Beneficiary to pay the installment of 
hnpositions next due on the Trust Estate, and one-twelfth of the estimated annual 
aggregate insurance premiums on all policies of insurance required in Article V. 
In such event, Trustor shall cause all bills, statements or other documents relating 
to the Impositions and insurance premiums to be sent to Beneficiary. Providing 
Trustor has deposited sufficient funds with Beneficiary pursuant to this Section 
8.2, Beneficiary shall pay such amounts as may be due thereunder out of the funds 
so deposited with Beneficiary. If at any time and for any reason the funds 
deposited with Beneficiary are or will be insufficient to pay such amounts as may 
then or subsequently be due, Beneficiary shall notify Trustor and Trustor shall 
immediately deposit an amount equal to such deficiency with Beneficiary. 
Nothing contained herein shall cause Beneficiary to be deemed a trustee of such 
funds deposited with Beneficiary pursuant to this Section 8.2. Beneficiary shall 
not be obligated to pay any interest on any sums held b y Beneficiary pending 
disbursement or application hereunder, and Beneficiary may impound or reserve 
for future payment of Impositions and insurance premiums such portion of such 





applying the balance on the principal of or interest on the Obligations secured 
hereby. Should Truster fail to deposit with Beneficiary ( exclusive of that portion 
of the payments which has been applied by Beneficiary on the principal of or 
interest on the Note) sums sufficient to fully pay such Impositions and insurance 
premiums at least thirty (30) days before delinquency thereof, Beneficiary, at 
Beneficiary's election, but without any obligation to do so, may advance any 
amounts required to make up the deficiency, which advances, if any, shall be 
secured by this Trust Deed and shall bear interest and be repayable to Beneficiary 
in the manner specified in Section 8.4 of this Trust Deed. 
8.3 Performance in Trustor's Stead. Should Trust~r fail to make any 
payment or to do any act as provided in this Trust Deed, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without any obligation to do so, and without notice to or demand 
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: (a) 
make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem 
necessary to protect the security hereof (Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized 
to enter upon the Trust Estate for such purposes); commence, appear in and 
defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the 
rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; or (b) pay, purchase, contest, or 
compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either 
appears to be superior to the lien of this Trust Deed; and in exercising any such 
powers, incur any liability, or expend such reasonable amounts as Beneficiary 
may deem necessary therefor, including costs of evidence of title, employment of 
attorneys, and payment of reasonable attorney fees and costs. All such amounts 
expended by either or both Trustee or Beneficiary shall, at the election of 
Beneficiary, be added to the principal indebtedness secured by this Trust Deed 
and shall accrue interest in accordance with the terms of the Note. Truster hereby 
waives and releases all claims or causes of action which may hereafter arise in 
favor ofTrustor against Beneficiary by reason of any action taken by Beneficiary 
pursuant to any power or authority granted in this Section 8.3, except for 
Beneficiary's gross negligence or wilful misconduct. 
8.4 Repayment of Advances. Trustor shall immediately repay to 
Beneficiary sums, with interest thereon as provided in the Note, which at any time 
may be paid or advanced by Beneficiary for the payment of insurance premiums, 
Impositions, title searches, title reports or abstracts, and any other advances made 
by Beneficiary which are reasonably necessary or desirable to maintain this Trust 
Deed as a prior, valid, and subsisting lien upon ;the Trust Estate, to preserve and 
protect Beneficiary's interest in this Trust Deed, or to preserve, repair, or maintain 
the Trust Estate. All such advances shall be wholly optional on the part of 
Beneficiary, and Trustor's obligation to repay the same, with interest, to 
Beneficiary shall be secured by the lien of this Trust Deed. 
8.5 No Removal of Fixtures. Trustor shall not, during the existence of 
this Trust Deed and without the written consent of Beneficiary, remove from the 
Real Property or the Improvements, any fixture, structure, or other improvement 
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at any time affixed or constructively affixed to the Real Property or the 
Improvements or any portion thereof, or any Personalty, except in the ordinary 
course of Trustor's business. 
8.6 Further Assurance. Trustor sha1l execute and deliver to 
Beneficiary such further instrwnents, including without limitation Uniform 
Conunercial Code Financing Statements and Continuation Statements, and do 
such further acts as may be necessary or as may be reasonably required by 
Beneficiary to ca1Ty out more effectively the purposes of this Trnst Deed and to 
subject to the lien, security interest and mortgage created or intended to be created 
hereby any property, rights, or interests covered or intended to be covered by this 
Trust Deed. Trnstor authorizes (to the extent such authorization is valid under 
applicable law) Beneficiary to execute and file, without Truster's signature, such 
Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statements and Continuation Statements as 
Beneficiary may deem necessary in order to perfect, or continue the perfection of 
the security interests created by this Trust Deed. 
8. 7 Attornment. Truster shall assign to Beneficiary, as additional 
security for Truster's performance of the Obligations, any and all existing or 
future lease agreements entered into by Trnstor, as landlord, which pertain to the 
Property or the Improvements, or any portion thereof, and a1l such leases shall 
contain a covenant on the part of the tenant thereunder, enforceable by 
Beneficiary, obligating such tenant upon request of Beneficiary, to attom to and 
become a tenant of Beneficiary, or any purchaser form Trustee or through 
foreclosure of this Trust Deed, for the unexpired term, and subject to the te1ms 
and conditions of such future lease agreements. The assignments of lease shall be 
in form and content satisfactory to Beneficiary. 
8.8 No Further Encumbrances. As an express condition of Beneficiary 
making the loan secured by this Trust Deed, Truster shall not further encumber, 
pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, place any lien, charge or claim upon, or otherwise 
give as security the Trust Estate or nay interest therein, not cause or allow by 
operation of law the encumbrance of the Trust Estate or any interest therein 
without the written consent of Beneficiary even though such encumbrance may be 
junior to the encumbrance created by this Trust Deed. Encumbrance of the Trust 
Estate contrary to the provisions of this Section 8.9 without the express written 
consent of Beneficiary, shall constitute an Event of Default and at Beneficiary's 
option, Beneficiary may declare the entire balance of principal and interest 
immediately due and payable, whether the same be created by Trustor or an 
unaffiliated third party asserting a judgment lien, mechanic's or materialmen's 
lien or any other type of encumbrance or title defect. 
8.9 Due on Sale. Other than (a) a transfer by devise, descent or by 
operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant; (b) a transfer of Personalty in the 
ordinary course ofTrustor's business; or (c) the grant of any leasehold interest of 




convey or otherwise transfer the Trust Estate or any part thereof or interest 
therein, without the prior written consent of Beneficiary. If the Trust Estate, or 
any part thereof, or any interest therein, is sold, conveyed or otherwise transferred 
without the prior written consent of Beneficiary, or ifTrustor be divested of title 
to the Trust Estate, or any part thereof or involuntarily, then the full p1incipal 
indebtedness of the Note and the other Obligations, at the option of Beneficiary 
and without demand or notice, shall immediately become due and payable. It is 
expressly acknowledged and agreed that any transfei; of more than twenty-five 
percent (25%) of the capital stock, partnership or member interests ofTrnstor, as 
the case may be, shall constitute a transfer of the entire Trust Estate within the 
meaning of this Section 8.9. 
8.10 Evidence of Title. Trustor shall deliver to, pay for and maintain 
with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is pain in full, such 
evidence oftitle as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies 
of title insurance and any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements or 
endorsements thereto. 
8.11 Additional Collateral. If, at any time, the value of all of the Trust 
Estate, based on an appraisal acceptable to Beneficiary, is not sufficient to 
establish a ratio between the total amount of the Obligations then due and owing 
and the value of all of the Trust Estate equal to or less than one hundred percent 
(100%), Trustor shall provide Beneficiary with such additional collateral as is 
necessary so that the total value of all collateral securing Trustor's perfonnance of 
the Obligations is sufficient to establish a ratio between the total amount of the 
Obligations due and owing and the value of all such collateral of no more than 
one hundred percent (100%). 
8.12 Compliance With Laws. Trustor shall company with all laws, 
ordinances, regulations, easement agreements, covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions (including laws relating to hazardous wastes and/or protection of the 
envirorunent, or species of plants or animals protected by federal, state, local or 
other law) affecting the Trust Estate. Trustor shall not cause, permit nor suffer 
any violation of any of the foregoing and shall pay all response costs, fees, or 
charges of any kind in connection therewith and defend, indemnify, and hold 
harmless Beneficiary with respect thereto. 
8.13 Financial Statements. Trustor shall keep adequate books and 
records of account of the Trust Estate and its own financial affairs sufficient to 
permit the preparation of financial statements therefrom in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. Beneficiary shall have the right to 
examine, copy and audit Trustor's records and books of account at all reasonable 
times. Trustor shall furnish to Beneficiary copies of its financial statements and 
other financial information satisfactory to Beneficiary at the time and in the 
manner provided in the Loan Agreement. 
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8.14 Inspections. Beneficiary, and its agents, representatives and 
employees, are authorized, but not obligated, to enter at any reasonable time upon 
the Real Property for the purpose of inspecting the same, and for the purpose of 
performing any of the acts it or Trustor is authorized to perfo1m under the terms 
of this Trust Deed or any other Loan Document. 
8.15 No Merger. If the Trust Estate is under any lease or any portion 
thereof which constitutes a part of the Trust Estate shall at any time become 
vested in one owner, this Trust Deed and the lien created hereby shall not be 
destroyed or terminated by application of the doctrine of merger and, in such 
event, Beneficiary shall continue to have and enjoy all of the rights and privileges 
of Beneficiary as to the separate estates. In addition, upon the foreclosure of the 
lien created by This Trust Deed on the Trust Estate pursuant to the provisions of 
this Trust Deed, any leases or subleases then existing and created by Truster shall 
not be destroyed or terminated by application of the law of merger or as a matter 
of law or as a result of such foreclosme unless Beneficiary or any purchaser at 
any such foreclosure sale shall so elect. No act by or on behalf of Beneficiary or 
any such ptrrchaser shall constitute a termination of any lease or sublease unless 
Beneficiary or such purchaser shall give written notice thereof to such tenant or 
subtenant. 
ARTICLE IX CONDEMNATION AWARDS 
9 .1 If the Trust Estate or any portion thereof should be taken or 
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation proceeding, 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or 
relief therefor, and shall be entitled at Beneficiary's option to commence, appear 
in, and prosecute in Beneficiary's own name any action or proceeding, and to 
make any compromise or settlement, in c01mection with such taking. Truster 
shall promptly give notice to Beneficiary of any condemnation proceeding or any 
taking for public improvement. All such compensation, awards, damages, causes 
of action, proceeds, or other payments are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, which 
may; after deducting therefrom all costs and expenses (regardless of the particular -
nature thereof and whether incurred with or without suit or before or after 
judgment), including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by Beneficiary in 
connection with such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action, proceeds, 
or other payments, release any and all moneys so received by Beneficiary or apply 
the same, or any portion thereof, on any of the Obligations (whether or not then 
due) secured by this Trust Deed. Beneficiary shall have no obligation to apply 
proceeds of condemnation to restore or repair damage to the Trust Estate 
regardless of whether such taking has a significant adverse impact on the 
operation of the remaining po1tion of the Trust Estate. Trustor shall execute and 
deliver to Beneficiary such further assignments of such compensation, awards, 
damages, causes of action, proceeds, or other payments as Beneficiary may from 




ARTICLE X ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES, RENTS AND INCOME 
10.1 Assigrunent. Trustor hereby absolutely assigns to Trustee all right, 
title and interest ofTrustor in and to all leases now existing or hereafter entered 
into by Trustor and demising the whole or any part of the Trust Estate, and does 
hereby further assign any and all rents, subrents, room rents and other amounts 
received for the use of any rooms in the Trust Estate, including the Improvements, 
and any and all room rental agreements and arrangements now owned or hereafter 
acquired, and all proceeds from such room rents, covering the Trust Estate or any 
portion thereof, now or hereafter existing or entered into, together with issues, 
royalties, income, profits and security deposits of and from the Trust Estate. Until 
the occurrence of an Event of Default, Trustor may, under a temporary revocable 
license granted hereby, collect and use all such rents, subrents, room rents, issues, 
royalties, income, and profits which become payable prior to default. Upon the 
occurrence of an Event or Default, Truster's license to collect and use any of such 
proceeds shall immediately cease without further action by or on behalf of any 
party, and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession of 
the Trust Estate, and either in person, by agent, or through a court-appointed 
receiver (Trustor hereby consents to the appointment of Beneficiary or 
Beneficiary's designee as such receiver), to sue for or otherwise collect all such 
rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, and profits, including those 
past due and unpaid. Any swns so collected, after the deduction of all costs and 
expenses of operation and collection (regardless of the particular nature thereof . 
and whether incurred with or without suit or before or after judgment), including 
reasonable attorney fees, shall be applied toward the payment of the Obligations. 
Such right of collection and use of such proceeds by Beneficiary shall obtain both 
before and after the exercise of the power of sale provisions of this Trust Deed, 
the foreclosure of this Trust Deed and throughout any period of redemption. The 
rights granted under this Section 10.1 shall in no way be dependent upon and shall 
apply without regard to whether alJ or a portion of the Trust Estate is in danger of 
being lost, removed, or materially injured, or whether the Trust Estate or any 
other security is adequate to discharge the obligations secured by this Trust Deed. 
Beneficiary's failure or discontinuance at any time to collect any of such proceeds 
shall not in any manner affect the right, power, and authority of Beneficiary 
thereafter to collect the same. Neither any provision contained herein, nor the 
Beneficiary's exercise of Beneficiary's right to collect such proceeds, shall be, or 
be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease, sublease, 
option, or other interest in the Trust Estate, or an assumption of liability under, or 
a subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to, any tenancy, lease, 
sublease, option, or other interest in the Trust Estate. All tenants, lessees, 
sub lessees and other persons which have any obligation to make any payment to 
Trustor in connection with the Trust Estate or any portion thereof are hereby 
authorized and directed to pay rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, 
income, and profits payable t\by them with respect to the Trust Estate, or any part 
thereof, directly to Beneficiary on the demand of Beneficiary. Beneficiary's 




shall be a good and sufficient discharge of the obligation of the tenant lessee, 
sub lessee, or other person concerned to make the payment connected with the 
amount so received by the Trustee. 
10.2 Application of Payments. If at any time during the tenn of this 
Trust Deed Beneficiary receives or obtains a payment, installment, or sum which 
is less than the entire amount then due under the Note secured by this Trust Deed 
and under all other instruments finther evidencing or securing the Obligations, 
then Beneficiary shall, except as provided otherwise in the Note and 
notwithstanding any instructions which may be given by Trustor, have the right to 
apply such payment, installment, or sum, or any part thereof, to such of the items 
or obligations then due from Trustor or to Beneficiary as Beneficiary may in 
Beneficiary's sole discretion detennine. 
10.3 No Waiver of Rights by Collection of Proceeds. The entering 
upon and taking possession of the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust Estate 
or the collection of rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, profits, 
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any 
taking or damaging of the Trust Estate, or the application or release thereof as 
aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any Event of Default or notice of default 
hereunder, shall not invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice of default, and 
shall not operate to postpone or suspend the obligation to make, or have the effect 
of altering the size of any scheduled installments provided for in any of the 
Obligations secured by this Trust Deed. 
10.4 Indemnification. Trustor shall indemnify, pay, protect, defend and 
hold Beneficiary harmless from and against all claims, demands, judgments, 
liabilities, actions, costs, and fees (including reasonable attorney fees) arising 
from or related to receipt by Beneficiary of the rents, subrents, room rents, issues, 
royalties, income and profit from the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust 
Estate, except those liabilities arising from Beneficiary's own gross negligence 
and wilful misconduct. 
ARTICLE XI EVENTS OF DEFAULT AND REMEDIES 
11.1 Events of Default. Fifteen (15) days after written notice from 
Beneficiary to Trustor for monetary defaults and thirty (30) days after written 
notice from Beneficiary to Trustor for non-monetary defaults, if such defaults are 
not cured within such fifteen (15) day or thirty (30) day periods, respectively, 
each of the following shall constitute an event of default under this Trust Deed (an 
"Event of Default"): 
11.1 .1 Failure to Make Payment. If Trustor shall fail to make any 




11.1.2 Non-Monetary Default. Except as provided otherwise in 
Section 11.1.1, failure to observe and perform any of the tenns, covenants, 
or conditions to be observed or performed in the Note or this Trust Deed. 
11.1.3 False Warranty. Any material representation or wan-anty 
of the Trustor contained in the Note or this Trust Deed. 
11.1.4 Insolvency, Etc. If (a) Trustor commences any case, 
proceeding, or other action seeking reorganization, arrangement, 
adjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or composition of Trust or or Trustor' s 
debts under any law relating to bankruptcy, reorganization, or relief of 
debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or other 
similar official for Tmstor of for all or any substantial part of Trustor' s 
property; (b) any guarantor of the Note commences any case, proceeding, 
or other action seeking reorganization, arrangement, adjustment, 
liquidation, dissolution, or composition of such guarantor or such 
guarantor's debts under any law relating to bankruptcy, reorganization, or 
relief of debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, 
or other similar official for such guarantor or for any substantial part of 
such guarantor's property; or (c) any such case, proceeding, or other 
action is commenced against either Trustor or any guarantor of the Note. 
11.1.5 Failure to Pay Debts. Trustor fails to pay Trustor' s debts as 
they become due, admits in writing Trustor's inability to pay Trustor's 
debts, or makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. 
11.1.6 Failure to Perform Other Obligations. A default by Trustor 
under the terms of any other promissory note, deed of trust, security 
agreement, undertaking or arrangement between Trustor and Beneficiary 
now existing or entered into hereafter. 
11.2 Acceleration; Notice. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon the 
occurrence of any Event of Default under this Trust Deed and following the 
expiration of any cure period provided for herein, at Beneficiary's option and in 
addition to any other remedy Beneficiary may have under the Note, Beneficiary 
may declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and elect to 
have the Trust Estate sold in the manner provided herein. In the event 
Beneficiary elects to sell the Trust Estate, Beneficiary may execute or cause 
Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause the Trust 
Estate to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such 
notice for record in the office of the County Recorder of the County wherein the 
Trust Estate is located. Beneficiary shall also deposit with Trustee the Note and 
all documents evidencing expenditures secured by this Tmst Deed. 
11.3 Exercise of Power of Sale. Upon receipt of such notice from 





Trustor and each Guarantor such Notice of Default and Election to Sell as then 
required by Chapter 57 of the Utah Code Annotated. Trustee shall, without 
demand on Trustor, after lapse of such time as may be required by law and after 
recordation of such Notice of Default and Election to Sell first give notice of the 
time and place of such sale, in the manner provided by the laws of the State of 
Utah for the sale of real property under execution, and may from time to time 
postpone such sale by such advertisement as it may deem reasonable, or withollt 
further advertisement, by proclamation made to the persons assembled at the time 
and place previously appointed and advertised for such sale, and on the day of 
sale so advertised, or to which such sale may have been postponed, Trustee may 
sell the Real Property so advertised, at public auction, at the time and place 
specified in the notice, either in the county in which the Real Property, or any part 
thereof, to be sold, is situated, or at the principal office of Trustee located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, in its discretion, to the highest cash bidder. Trustee 
shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a Trustee's Deed conveying the Real 
Property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The 
recitals in the Trustee's Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of 
the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. 
Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (a) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of 
Trustee's and attorney's fees and costs; (b) cost of any evidence of title procured 
in connection with such sale; ( c) all sums expended under the terms hereof in 
conjunction with any default provision hereunder, not then repaid, with accrued 
interest at the rate then provided for in the Note; ( d) all sums then secured by this 
Trust Deed, including interest and principal on the Note; and (e) the remainder, if 
any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or Trustee, in Trustee's 
discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the 
County wherein the Trust Estate is located. 
11.4 Surrender of Possession. Trustor shall surrender possession of the 
Trust Estate to the purchaser immediately after the sale of the Trust Estate as 
provided in Section 11.3 above, in the event such possession has not previously 
been surrendered by Trustor. 
11.5 UCC Remedies. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
Sections 11.3 and 11.4 of this Trust Deed, Beneficiary, with regard to all the 
Personalty, shall have the right to exercise, from time to time, any and all rights 
and remedies available to Beneficiary, as a secured party under the Uniform 
Commercial Code of Utah, and any and all rights and remedies available to 
Beneficiary under any other applicable law. Upon written demand from 
Beneficiary, Trustor shall, at Trustor's expense, assemble the Personalty and 
make them available to Beneficiary at a reasonably convenient place designated 
by Beneficiary. Beneficiary shall have the right to enter upon any premises 
where the Personalty or records pertaining to Personalty may be and take 
possession of the Personalty and records relating to the Personalty. Beneficiary 





deducting the reasonable costs and out of pocket expenses incurred by 
Beneficiary, including, without limitation, (a) reasonable attorneys fees and legal 
expenses, (b) transportation and storage costs, ( c) advertising of sale of the 
Personalty, (d) sale commissions, (e) sales tax, (f) costs for improving or repairing 
the Personalty, and (g) costs for preservation and protection of the Personalty, 
apply the remainder to pay, or to hold as a reserve against, the Obligations. 
The rights and remedies of Beneficiary upon the occurrence of one or 
more Events of Default (whether such rights and remedies are conferred by 
statute, by rule oflaw, by this Trust Deed, the Loan Agreement or otherwise) may 
be exercised by Beneficiary, either alternatively, concurrently, or consecutively in 
any order. The exercise of Beneficiary or Trustee at the express direction of 
Beneficiary of any one or more of such rights and remedies shall not be construed 
to be an election of remedies nor waiver of any other rights and remedies 
Beneficiary might have unless, and limited to the extent that, Beneficiary shall 
elect or so waive by an instrument in w1iting delivered to Trustee. Without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, to the extent that this Trust Deed covers 
both the Real Property and the Personalty, Beneficiary may, in the sole discretion 
of Beneficiary, either alternatively, concmTently or consecutively in any order: 
a. Proceed as to the Real Prope1iy, Improvements and the Personalty 
in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to 
real property. 
b. Proceed as to the Real Property and Improvements in accordance 
with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to real property 
and proceed as to the Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's 
rights and remedies in respect to the personal property. 
Beneficiary may, in the sole discretion of Beneficiary, appoint Trustee as 
the agent of Beneficiary for the purpose of disposition of the Personalty in 
accordance with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code - Secured Transactions. 
If Beneficiary should elect to proceed as to the Real Property, 
Improvements and the Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and 
remedies in respect to real property: 
c. All the Personalty may be sold, in the manner and at the time and 
place provided in this Trust Deed, in one lot, or in separate lots 
consisting of any combination or combinations of the Real 
Property, Improvements and Personalty, as the Beneficiary may 
elect, in the sole discretion of Beneficiary. 
d. Truster acknowledges and agrees that a disposition of the 





respect to real property, as hereinabove provided, is a 
commercially reasonable disposition of the Personalty. 
If Beneficiary should elect to proceed as to the Personalty in accordance 
with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to personal property, 
Beneficiary shall have all the rights and remedies conferred on a secured party by 
the Unifonn Conunercial Code as adopted by the State of Utah. 
11.6 Foreclosure as a Mortgage. If an Event of Default occurs 
hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to foreclose this Trust Deed in the 
manner provided by law for the foreclosure ofmo1tgages on real property and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses 
incident thereto, including reasonable attorneys fees and costs in such amounts as 
shall be fixed by the court. 
11.7 Receiver. If an Event of Default occurs, Beneficiary, as a matter 
ofright and without regard to the interest of Trustor therein, shall have the light 
upon notice to Trustor to apply to any court having jurisdiction to appoint a 
receiver or receivers of the Trust Estate and Trustor hereby irrevocably consents 
to such appointment. Any such receiver or receivers shall have all the usual 
powers and duties of a receiver and shall continue as such and exercise all such 
powers until completion of the sale of the Trust Estate or the foreclosure 
proceeding, unless the receivership is sooner terminated. 
11.8 No Remedy Exclusive. No remedy confened upon or reserved to 
Beneficiary under this Trust Deed shall be exclusive of any other available 
remedy or remedies, but each and every such remedy shall be cumulative and 
shall be in addition to every other remedy given under this Trust Deed or any 
other Loan Document, or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by 
statute. No delay or failure to exercise any right or power accruing upon any 
Event of Default shall impair any such right or power or shall be construed to be a 
waiver thereof, but any such right and power may be exercised from time to time 
and as often as may be deemed expedient. 
11.9 Rights upon Default. In making the Note, Beneficiary has relied 
upon the rights available to Beneficiary under this Trust Deed upon the 
occurrence of an Event of Default, including, but not limited to, the rights to 
accelerate the payment of any and all amounts secured by this Trust Deed, to sell 
the Real Property encumbered by this Trust Deed pursuant to the power of sale 
granted hereunder, the right to foreclose this Trust Deed as a mortgage, and the 
right to have a receiver appointed. In addition to any other damages that might be 
recoverable by Beneficiary under the terms of this Trust Deed, Trustor shall be 
liable for any damages incurred by Beneficiary because Beneficiary is, for any 
reason, denied the opportunity to exercise Beneficiary's lights upon the 
occurrence of an Event of Default, including, but not limited to, such damages as 




by Beneficiary, and all oppmtunity costs incurred through the loss of use of any 
funds as would have been received by Beneficiary tlrrough exercise of the power 
of sale or foreclosure, or the appointment of a receiver. 
ARTICLE XII GENERAL PROVISIONS 
12.1 Notices. All noti'ces shall be in writing and shall be deemed to 
have been sufficiently given or served when personally delivered, deposited in the 
United States mail, by registered or certified mail, or deposited with a reputable 
overnight mail carrier which provides delivery of such mail to be traced, 
addressed as follows: 
Beneficiary: 
With copies to : 
Trustee: 
Truster: 
With copies to: 
Monitor Finance, L.C. / 
First Capital Funding, L. C. 
3191 North Canyon Road 
Provo, UT 84604 
John G. Mulliner 
363 North University, Suite 103 
P.O. Box 1045 
Provo, UT 84603 
Such addresses may be changed by notice to the other party given in the 
same manner provided in this Section. 
12.2 Severability. If any provision of this Trust Deed shall be held or 
deemed to be or shall, in fact, be illegal, inoperative, or unenforceable, the same 
shall not affect any other provision or provisions contained in the Trust Deed or 




12.3 Amendments, Changes, and Modifications. This Trust Deed may 
not be amended, changed, modified, altered, or terminated without the written 
consent of Beneficiary. 
12.4 Governing Law. This Trust Deed shall be governed exclusively by 
and construed in accordance with the applicable laws of the State of Utah. 
12.5 hlterpretation. Whenever the context shall include the singular, the 
whole shall include any pati thereof, and the gender shall include both other 
genders. The section headings contained in this Trust Deed are for purposes of 
reference only and shall not limit, expand, or othe1wise affect the construction of 
any provisions hereof. 
12.6 Binding Effect. This Trust Deed shall be binding upon Truster and 
Trustor's successors and assigns. This Trust Deed shall inure to the benefit of 
Beneficiary, and Beneficiary's successors and assigns, and the holders of any of 
the Obligations secured hereby. 
12.7 Waivers. Beneficiary's failure at any time or times hereafter to 
require strict performance by Trustor of any of undertakings, agreements, or 
covenants contained in this Trust Deed shall not waive, affect, or diminish any 
right of Beneficiary hereunder to demand strict compliance and performance 
therewith. Al1y waiver by Beneficiary of any Event of Default under this Trust 
Deed shall not waive or affect any other Event of Default hereunder, whether such 
Event of Default is prior or subsequent thereto and whether of the same or a 
different type. None of the undertakings, agreements, or covenants of Trustor 
under this Trust Deed, shall be deemed to have been waived by Beneficiary, 
unless such waiver is evidenced by an instrument in writing signed by an officer 
of Beneficiary and directed to Trustor specifying such waiver. 
12.8 Successor Trustee. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at 
any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of the county 
wherein the Real Property is located, a substitution of trustee. From the time the 
substitution is filed for record, the new Trustee shall succeed to all the powers, 
duties, authority and title of Trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made in the 
maruier provided by law. 
12.9 Heirs. Successors. Etc .• Definitions. This Trust Deed shall apply 
to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of 
Truster hereunder, if more than one party, are joint and several as between them. 
The term "Beneficiary'' shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, 
of the Note secured hereby. h1 this Trust Deed, whenever the context so requires, 
the masculine gender includes both the feminine and neuter, and the singular 
number includes the plural. 
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12.10 Acceptance of Trust. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust 
Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by 
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of any pending sale under 
any other deed of trust or any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, 
or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
12.11 Attorneys' Fees. Trustor agrees to reimburse Beneficiary for any 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred by Beneficiary with respect 
to any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, or other action involving Trustor or 
any guarantor as a debtor. 
Trnstor additionally agrees to pay all reasonable costs and out of pocket 
expenses, including, without limitation, (a) reasonable attorneys fees and legal 
expenses, (b) transportation and storage costs, ( c) advertising of sale of the Trnst 
Estate, (d) sale conunissions, (e) sales tax, (f) costs for improving or repairing the 
Trust Estate, and (g) costs for preservation and protection of the Trnst Estate, 
incurred by Beneficiary in obtaining possession of Trust Estate, storage and 
preparation for sale, sale or other disposition, and otherwise incwTed in 
foreclosing upon the Trust Estate. Any and all such costs and out of pocket 
expenses shall be payable by Trustor upon demand, together with interest thereon 
from the date of the advance until repaid, both before and after judgment, at the 
rate provided in the Note. 
Regardless of any breach or default, Trustor agrees to pay all expenses, 
including reasonable attorneys fees and legal expenses incurred by Beneficiary in 
any bankruptcy proceedings of any type involving Trnstor, the Trust Estate, or 
this Trnst Deed, including, without limitation, expenses incurred in modifying or 
lifting the automatic stay, determining adequate protection, use of cash collateral, 
or relating to any plan of reorganization. 
12.12 Request for Notice. Trustor requests that a copy of any Notice of 
Default and of any Notice of Sale hereunder be mailed to Trustor at the address 
for Trustor specified in Section 12.1. 
12.13 Limitation on Damages. Beneficiary and its officers, directors, 
employees, representatives, agents, and attorneys, shall not be liable to Trustor or 
any Guarantor for consequential damages arising from or relating to any breach of 
contract, tort, or other wrong in connection with or relating to this Trust Deed or 
the Trust Estate. 
12.14 Preferential Transfers. If the incurring of any debt by Truster or 
the payment of any money or transfer of property to Beneficiary by or on behalf 
of Trustor or any Guarantor should for any reason subsequently be detennined to 
be "voidable" or "avoidable" in whole or in part within the meaning of any state 
or federal law ( collectively "voidable transfers"), including, without limitation, 
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fraudulent conveyances or preferential transfers under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code or any other federal or state law, and Beneficiary is required to 
repay or restore any voidable transfers or the amount or any portion thereof, or 
upon the advice of Beneficiary's counsel in advised to do so, then, as to any such 
amount or property repaid or restored, including all reasonable costs, expenses, 
and attorneys fees of Beneficiary related thereto, the liability ofTrnstor and 
Guarantor, and each of them, and this Trust Deed, shall automatically be revived, 
reinstated and restored and shall exist as though the voidable transfers had never 
been made. 
12.15 Survival. All agreements, representations, warranties and 
covenants made by Trustor shall survive the execution and delivery of this Trust 
Deed, the filing and consummation of any bankruptcy proceedings, and shall 
continue in effect so long as any obligation to Beneficiary contemplated by this 
Trnst Deed is outstanding and unpaid, notwithstanding any termination of this 
Trust Deed. -All agreements, representations, warrarities and covenants in this 
Trnst Deed shall run with the land, shall bind the party ma.king the same and its 
heirs and successors, and shall be to the benefit of and be enforceable by each 
par1y for whom made and their respective heirs, successors and assigns. 
DATED: DECEMBER 30 , 20_Q2_. 
TRUSTOR: 
~-·-n __ _ 
State of IDAJ:{0 




On this 30th day of DECEMBER , 200-2__, before me, a Notary Public in and for 
said State, personally appeared MICHAEL J. MILLWAR.El , known to me to be the 
MANAGER of M&S DEVELOPMENT. LL~- ~~:-{ ~d th::e executed /·ame. 
/ ~ · (___ c---7/. 
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RECORDER 
GAfJNO~K COUNTY 10,'\HO 
A Tract of land in the South Yi of the South Yi Section 31, Township 6 South, Range 35 East, Boise 
Meridian, Bannock County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows: · 
Beginning at the South quarter comer of Section 31; thence South- 89°36'40'' East, 82.68 feet; thence 
North 53°44' 13" East, 88.1 feet; thence North 26°44 '09" West, 320 feet; thence North 63°15 '51" East, 
260 feet; thence North 26°44 '09" West 495.62 feet, more or less, to the Southerly right of way line of 
Barton Road; thence South 72°27'20" West along the Southerly right of way of Barton Road 472.74 feet; 
thence continuing along the Southerly right of way line of Barton Road, South 83°18'20" West, 389.3 
feet, more or less, to the Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail; thence South 26°44'40" East along the 
Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail 791.56 fee.t, more or less, to the South line of said Section 31; thence 
South 89°44' East, 462.23 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
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A. Brnce Larson (ISB#: 2093) 
HEARN & WOOD LLP 
P.O. Box 70 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
Telephone: (208) 497 -0405 
Fax: (208) 932-4380 
Email: bruce@hwlawpro.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 




WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company; M&S 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, and 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterclaimant, 
V 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES, LLC (hereafter "Wildlife Ridge") responds to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust ("the Complaint") as follows: 




Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and should 
therefore be dismissed. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint not specifically 
admitted herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs have failed to join all necessary and indispensable parties to this action. 
ANSWER 
1. Wildlife Ridge denies all of the allegations of the complaint not specifically 
admitted in this Answer. 
2. Wildlife Ridge admits only that First Capital Funding, L.C. is a limited liability 
company that is apparently organized under the laws of the state of Utah, Wildlife Ridge denies 
all other allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Complaint. 
3. Wildlife Ridge, answering the allegations contained m paragraph 2 of the 
Complaint, admits only that it is a limited liability company, in good standing under the laws of 
the state of Idaho and to those facts shown of public record. Wildlife Ridge admits only that 
Millward and M&S appear in the documents relied upon by Plaintiffs as makers of the document 
purported to be a note and that defendant M&S is shown as the "Trustor" on a document purported 
to be a Trust Deed among other things. Wildlife Ridge specifically denies that either Millward or 
M&S are owners or were ever owners in fee simple of the premises. 
4. Wildlife Ridge denies those allegations of paragraph 3 of the Complaint as the same 
relate to Wildlife Ridge. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM 
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5. Wildlife Ridge denies the allegations of paragraph 4 of the Complaint. 
6. Wildlife Ridge denies the allegations of paragraph 5 of the Complaint. 
7. Wildlife Ridge admits that Millward filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, as Case No. 12-41260 and that the filing commenced an automatic stay but 
denies the balance of the allegations contained in the second sentence of paragraph 6 of the 
Complaint. Wildlife Ridge admits the Millward bank.Iuptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016. 
8. Wildlife Ridge admits that a document purporting to be a "Trust Deed" was 
recorded on the 30th day of December, 2005, as Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the 
records of Bannock County, Idaho and denies the balance of the allegations contained in paragraph 
7 of the Complaint. 
9. Wildlife Ridge denies that any Deed of Trust or Trust Deed applies to any real 
property that it owns and denies all other allegations contained in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 , and 12 
of the Complaint. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
10. The relief sought in the Complaint is barred by applicable statutes of limitations 
including by not limited to Idaho Code §§45-1515 and 5-214A. 
11. The relief sought in the Complaint is baned by I aches. 
12. The relief sought in the Complaint is ba1Ted by the doctrine of Collateral Estoppel. 
13. The relief sought in the Complaint is barred by the docttines of res judicata, claim 
and/or issue preclusion. 
14. The relief sought in the Complaint is baned by the doctrines of unclean hands. 
15. The interest of Wildlife Ridge is p1ior to and superior to the interest of any of the 
Plaintiffs. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM 
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16. The security interest claimed by the Plaintiff is invalid and void. 
17. The "Modification" referred to in Paragraph 5 of the complaint is void and 
unenforceable. 
18. The "Modification" referred to in Paragraph 5 of the complaint caused the priority 
of the Trust Deed to become inferior to the 1ight, title and interest of the Wildlife Ridge. 
17. Plaintiffs did not act reasonably to protect itself or to mitigate any damages which 
it may have sustained, which damages are denied, and are barred from recovering on its Complaint 
to the extent of such failure to mitigate. 
18. Perfonnance of one or more contractual obligations alleged in the Complaint was 
excused due to, among other things, Plaintiffs' own breach of its wa1nnties, representations, 
and/or other obligations to Defendant, and consequently Plaintiffs are barred from recovery on any 
claim for relief contained in the Complaint. 
19. If any monetary sums are recoverable by Plaintiff, which liability Wildlife Ridge 
expressly denies, such sums must be offset by the amount in which Wildlife Ridge was damaged 
by Plaintiffs and the Defendant. M&S, including but not limited to all damages, costs, penalties, 
interest, and other sums incurred by the Defendant M&S due to the failure of said Defendant to 
timely pay any and all invoices, bills, accounts or other business expenses, its failure to indemnify 
Wildlife Ridge against resulting claims, causes of action, liabilities, and damages and all other 
damages incurred by Defendant relating to the subject matter of the Complaint or otherwise, or 
alleged in the Complaint filed in this action by Defendant. 
20. If any monetary sums are recoverable by Plaintiff, which liability Wildlife Ridge 
expressly denies, Defendant M&S, should indemnify and hold Wildlife Ridge harmless from all 
such monetary sums and from the foreclosure of any lien, deed of trust, mortgage or other 
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encumbrance including but not limited to all damages, costs, penalties, interest, and other sums 
incurred by the Defendant M&S relating to the subject matter of the Complaint or otherwise, or 
alleged in the Complaint filed in this action by said Defendant. 
21. The obligations sought to be enforced by Plaintiffs in this action are unenforceable 
and void by reason of violation of public policy and, as a result, Plaintiff may recover nothing 
thereon. 
22. The obligations sought to be enforced by Plaintiff are unconscionable and are 
unenforceable and void by reason of unconscionability. By reason of said unconscionability, and 
the unconscionable nature of activities related to attempted foreclosure or collection thereof, 
Plaintiffs should not recover on their Complaint. 
23. One or more of the Plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest and are without 
authority to act or bring an action to foreclose a mortgage in the state of Idaho. 
24. The interest claimed by the Plaintiffs in the real property owned by Wildlife Ridge, 
if any such interest exists, was obtained by the fraudulent and collusive conduct of the Plaintiffs 
and, Defendant M&S and their respective agents and employees, in particular: 
a). Dming August 2004, the Michael Williams (who is now the sole owner of 
Wildlife Ridge) began negotiating with J. P Lasley's and Jean Lasley's 
("Lasley's"), as trustees of the J.P and Jean Lasley's Living Trust, for the purchase 
of the real property ("Property") which is the subject matter of this action with the 
intent of developing the Property. Following those negotiations Michael Williams 
and the Lasley's executed a purchase and sale agreement for the Property. 
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b). Michael Williams and his partner Henry Proctor subsequently learned that they 
could not obtain lender financing to purchase the Property and decided to obtain 
additional capital investors. 
c). Sometime during September 2005 Michael Williams spoke with Defendant 
Millward, (who Wildlife Ridge now believes was acting jointly with the Plaintiffs 
and Plaintiffs' ptincipals as a part of an ongoing business), about financing the 
development project in exchange for a percentage of the profits. Defendant 
Millward represented that he and his business associates would handle the financing 
with their money to purchase of the Property if Michael Williams was able to obtain 
preliminary plat approval for the Property. Michael Williams relied on the 
representations of Defendant Millward including his representation that said 
defendant and the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' principals would be bound by the 
Agreement. 
d). During October 25, 2005, the preliminary plat was approved. All costs of 
obtaining the preliminary plat were paid by Michael Williams. Defendant Millward 
on behalf of Plaintiffs represented that they would agree to provide the needed 
financing to purchase the Property for a percentage of the profits. 
e. On December 29, 2005 Millward and Michael Williams mem01ialized their 
agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The 
Agreement provides among other things that: (i) M&S would pay $230,000 to 
purchase the Property from the Lasley's and would be entitled to 55% of the 
property; (ii) thereafter each party would pay $25,000 to buy-out Henry Proctor's 
interest; (iii) M&S would then own 62.5% of the Property and Michael Williams 
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would own the remaining 37.5% of the Property.(iv) M&S would form a limited 
liability company for the development project; (v) the Prope1ty would be held by 
the newly organized LLC, the Defendant M&S and Michael Williams would be 
managers of the LLC; (vi) in consideration of the mutual covenants outlined in the 
Agreement Michael Williams assigned his interest in the purchase and sale 
agreement to M&S. 
f). Contrary to the representations made to Michael Williams and contrary to the 
terms of the Agreement, Defendant M&S recorded a deed conveying the real 
property solely to M&S on December 30, 2006 in Bannock County as Instrument 
No. 20528397. A true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit "B". 
g). Defendant M&S and Plaintiffs immediately encumbered all of the Prope1iy with 
the Trust Deed which is the subject matter of this action. 
h). Thereafter Defendant M&S and Plaintiffs actively concealed the trne nature of 
the investment, loan balances, interest and accounts, said Defendants and Plaintiffs 
knew that the statements about the transaction were false, material and they 
intended that the representations would be acted upon in a reasonable manner, 
(i) Michael Williams, Wildlife Ridge's predecessor in interest was ignorant of 
the falsity of the Plaintiff's statements; relied on the truth of the representations; 
had the right to rely upon the trnth of the representations; and 
U) Wildlife Ridge has been injured in and amount to be shown at the trial of 
this matter as a consequence of Defendants Millward, M&S and the Plaintiff's 
representations and conduct. 
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WHEREFORE the Wildlife Ridge having fully responded to the Complaint request that this Comi 
enter Judgment in favor of the Wildlife Ridge as follows: 
1. Dismissing the Complaint with prejudice with the Plaintiffs taking nothing thereby. 
2. Awarding the Wildlife Ridge its costs necessarily incmTed in this action together 
with reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Code including but not 
limited to §§12-120, 12-121, and Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. That this Court denies the Plaintiffs request for equitable relief of foreclosure in 
any form. 
4. For such other and further relief as this Court dete1mines to be just. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife Ridge") alleges and complains of 
the Counterdefendants as follows: 
1. Wildlife Ridge is an Idaho limited liability company, in good standing with its 
principal place of business located at 4915 Apache Ave., Pocatello, ID 83204. 
2. Counterdefendant Monitor Financed L.C. ("Monitor") claims to be a Utah limited 
liability company, the Counterdefendant First Capital Funding, L.C., claims to be a Utah limited 
liability company. 
3. During August 2004, the Michael Williams (who is now the sole owner and a 
predecessor in interest of Wildlife Ridge) began negotiating with J. P Lasley's and Jean Lasley's 
("Lasley's"), as tmstees of the J.P and Jean Lasley's Living Trnst, for the purchase of the real 
property ("Property") which is the subject matter of this action with the intent of developing the 
Property. Following those negotiations Michael Williams and the Lasley's executed a purchase 
and sale agreement for the Property. 
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4. Michael Williams and his partner Henry Proctor subsequently learned that they 
could not obtain lender financing to purchase the Prope1ty and decided to obtain additional capital 
investors. 
5. Sometime dming September 2005 Michael Williams spoke with Defendant 
Millward, (who Wildlife Ridge now believes was acting jointly with the Counter Defendants and 
Counter Defendants' principals as a part of an ongoing business), about financing the development 
project in exchange for a percentage of the profits. Defendant Millward represented that he and 
his business associates would handle the financing with their money to purchase of the Property if 
Michael Williams was able to obtain preliminary plat approval for the Prope1ty. Michael Williams 
relied on the representations of Defendant Millward including his representation that said 
defendant and the Counter Defendants and Counter Defendants' ptincipals would be bound by the 
Agreement. 
6. During October 25, 2005 the preliminary plat was approved. All costs of obtaining 
the preliminary plat were paid by Michael Williams. Defendant Millward on behalf of Counter 
Defendants represented that they would agree to provide the needed financing to purchase the 
Property for a percentage of the profits. 
7. On December 29, 2005 Millward and Michael Williams memorialized their 
agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The Agreement 
provides among other things that: (i) M&S would pay $230,000 to purchase the Property from the 
Lasley's and would be entitled to 55% of the property; (ii) thereafter each party would pay $25,000 
to buy-out Henry Proctor's interest; (iii) M&S would then own 62.5% of the Prope1ty and Michael 
Williams would own the remaining 37.5% of the Prope1ty; (iv) M&S would form a limited 
liability company for the development project; (v) the Prope1iy would be held by the newly 
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organized LLC, the Defendant M&S and Michael Williams would be managers of the LLC; (vi) 
in consideration of the mutual covenants outlined in the Agreement Michael Williams assigned 
his interest in the purchase and sale agreement to M&S. 
8. Contrary to the representations made to Michael Williams and contrary to the terms 
of the Agreement, Defendant M&S recorded a deed conveying the real property solely to M&S on 
December 30, 2005 in Bannock County as Instrument No. 20528397. A true and co1Tect copy is 
attached as Exhibit "B". 
9. Defendant M&S and Counter Defendants immediately encumbered all of the 
Prope1ty with the Trust Deed which is the subject matter of this action. 
FRAUD 
10. Wildlife Ridge repleads paragraphs 1 through 9. 
11. Thereafter Defendant M&S and Plaintiffs actively concealed the true nature of the 
investment, loan balances, interest and accounts. The said Defendant and Plaintiffs knew that the 
statements about the transaction were false. The statements were material and they intended that 
the representations would be acted upon in a reasonable manner by Wildlife Ridge. 
12. Wildlife Ridge's predecessor in interest was ignorant of the falsity of the Plaintiffs 
statements; relied on the truth of the representations; had the right to rely upon the truth of the 
representations; and 
13. Wildlife Ridge has been injured in an amount to be shown at the trial of this matter 
as a consequence of Defendant M&S and the Plaintiffs representations and conduct. 
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DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
14. Wildlife Ridge repleads paragraphs 1 through 13. 
15. Wildlife Ridge desires a judicial detennination the Trust Deed sought to be 
foreclosed in this matter is unenforceable due the conduct of the Counterdefendants 
16. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the 
circumstances in order that Counterclaimants may ascertain the validity and enforceability of the 
Trust Deed and Note which form the basis of the Counterdefendants' claims. 
17. On December 30, 2005 and continuing to the present the Counterdefendants have 
wrongfully encumbered the Prope1ty owned by Wildlife Ridge. 
18. Counterdefendants have actively concealed the true nature of their transaction with 
M&S and misrepresented the same. 
19. Counterdefendants attempted to modify the transactions claimed Note at a time 
when M&S was administratively dissolved therefore the modification is void and unenforceable. 
20. As a result of Counterdefendants acts, Wildlife Ridge has and will sustain great and 
ilTeparable injury, in that the Counterdefendants' conduct interferes with the sale of developed lots 
owned by Wildlife Ridge and wrongfully encumbered by Counterdefendants. 
21. Wildlife Ridge cannot be fully compensated in damages, and is without an 
adequate remedy at law because the exact amount of damage Wildlife Ridge will sustain is difficult 
to detem1ine and there in no other adequate remedy at law to recover the damages. 
22. As a further result of defendant's acts, Wildlife Ridge has sustained money 
damages in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. If this court allows these acts to continue, 
Wildlife Ridge will be further damaged in an amount to proven at trial. 




23. The Wildlife Ridge is entitled to the award of attorney's fees in accordance with 
the provisions of Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121, provisions of Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 
Wildlife Ridge demands trial by jury and all issues that are triable by a jury in this action. 
WHEREFORE the Counterclaimants pray judgment against the Counterdefendant as 
follows: 
1. That the Court determine that an actual controversy has arisen and now exists 
between the Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants concerning their respective 1ights and 
duties; 
2. That the Trnst Deed is void and unenforceable and that the Counterdefendants are 
enjoined from the foreclosure of the said trust deed. 
3. That the Note and the modification of the Note are void and invalid. 
4. For actual damages to be proven at the time of trial. 
5. For an award of costs necessarily incuned herein together with an award of 
reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121; 
and 
6. For such fmther relief as the Comt deems just in the premises. 




DATED this_ day ofNovember, 2016. 
HEARN & WOOD LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1..(1 ~ay of November, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Ron Kerl 
COOPER & LARSEN, Chartered 
151 North Third A venue, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
[ ~ U.S. Mail - Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delive1y 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 208-235-1182 
[ K Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com 
~--L---====--_ 
A. BRUCE LARSON 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, LC, ETAL. I 
.. • ' . ', 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, ETAL. , 
Defendant. 
Case No:CV-2016-0003588-0C 
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF 
INFORMATION FOR 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
A Complaint was filed in this matter on the ?1h day of October, 2016. The 
Defendant has now appeared and/or answered and the case is at issue. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16, that the parties, through their 
counsel (or the parties themselves if self-represented), confer and submit to the Court, 
within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, a joint statement containing the 
following information: 
(1) Whether any service is still needed upon any unserved parties. 
(2) Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are 
contemplated. 
(3) Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-trial motions. 
(4) Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for trial 
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preparation. 
(5) The agreed amount of time required for trial. 
(6) Whether the case presents any unusual times requirements for discovery. 
(7) Whether any party requests court-ordered mediation. 
(8) Three stipulated trial dates, one no less than six (6) months and no more 
than nine (9) months from the date of this Order, and a second no less than nine (9) 
months and no more than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order, and a third no 
less than twelve (12) months and no more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this 
Order. These trial dates cannot be during the first full week of any month. 
(9) Whether there are other matters conducive to determination of the action that 
the parties agree should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a 
Scheduling Order. 
The parties shall agree as to which party shall make the joint submission but, if they 
cannot agree, Plaintiff shall be responsible to make the submission. 
Upon receipt of this joint submission the Court will issue an Order setting the matter 
for trial with appropriate dates for discovery, disclosure of witness, etc. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the stipulation required 
herein, within the fourteen (14) days set forth, the Court will set this matter for trial on a 
date available to the Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the submissions requested in the order are 
deemed by the Court to constitute the scheduling conference required by IRCP 16(a). 
However, if either party wishes a more formal scheduling conference please contact the 
Court's clerk and one will be scheduled. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that unless the Court receives written notification to 
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the contrary, all documents sent by the Court to counsel will be delivered electronically. 
Counsel is hereby instructed to provide the Court with an email address they wish to have 
documents delivered to. Counsel will also have the continuing obligation to notify the 
Court upon any change to the email address submitted. 
NOTICE: ELECTRONIC FILING IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IS NOT 
YET AVAILABLE. PLEASE CONTINUE TO PHYSICALLY FILE DOCUMENTS UNTIL 
FURTHER NOTICE. 
DATED this _15 __ day of November, 2016. 
Case No.: CV-2016-0003588-0C 
~c.0~ 
ROBERT C NAFTZ 
. District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Q'i day of November, 2016 I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Ron Kerl 
Cooper & Larsen 
Po Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
ron@coo12er-larsen.com 
A. Bruce Larsen 
Hearn & Wood LLP 
Po Box 70 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
bruce@hwlawpro.com 
Case No. : CV-2016-0003588-0C 
D U.S. Mail 
[ZI E-Mail 
D Hand Deliver 
0Fax: 
D U.S. Mail 
[ZI E-Mail 
D Hand Deliver 
D Fax: 
Robert Poleki 
Clerk of the Court 
l . - . . 
By:__.V_A/_AJ_yf"'-->~"'--1~ --'-l~_!Q_Mj ___ _ 
Deputy Clerk \./ 
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IN TH E DISTRICT COURT OF TH E SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, LC, ETAL. I 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC , ETAL., 
Defendant. 
Case No:CV-2016-0003588-0C 
ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL 
(1) TRIAL DATE(S). This matter is set for JURY TRIAL on (A) PRIMARY 
TRIAL SETTING: SEPTEMBER 6-8, 12, 2017 and (B) ALTERNATIVE TRIAL 
SETTING: DECEMBER 5-8, 2017 AT THE HOUR OF 9:00 A.M., in Courtroom 309, 
Bannock County Courthouse, Pocatello, Idaho. A continuance of the trial date shall occur 
only upon written Motion or Stipulated Motion to the Court which clearly states the reasons 
for the requested continuance and which includes an acknowledgment and agreement 
signed by each party that certifies that the Motion to Continue has been discussed with 
and agreed to by each party. All deadlines listed below shall apply to the trial setting listed 
in line (A) above. An Order continuing the trial date will not alter the deadlines set forth in 
this Order, except for good cause shown. 
(2) PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(b), in lieu of a pre-trial 
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conference, trial counsel for the parties (or the parties if they are self-represented) are 
ORDERED to meet and/or confer for the purpose of preparing a joint Pre-Trial 
Memorandum, which shall be submitted to the Court at least 14 days prior to Trial, and 
shall include: 
(A) A statement that all exhibits to be offered at trial have been provided to all 
other parties and attaching an Exhibit List of all exhibits to be offered at trial by 
both parties. The Exhibit List shall indicate: 1) by whom the exhibit is being 
offered, 2) a brief description of the exhibit, 3) whether the parties have 
stipulated to its admission, and if not, 4) the legal grounds for any objection. If 
any exhibit includes a summary of other documents, such as medical expense 
records, to be offered pursuant to I. R.E. 1006, the summary shall be attached to 
the Stipulation. 
(B) A statement whether depositions or any discovery responses will be offered 
in lieu of live testimony, and a list of what will actually be offered, the manner in 
which such evidence will be presented, and the legal grounds for any objection 
to any such offer. 
(C) A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which each party intends 
to call to testify at trial , including anticipated rebuttal or impeachment witnesses. 
Expert witnesses shall be identified as such. The Stipulation should also 
identify whether any witness' testimony will be objected to in its entirety and the 
legal grounds therefore. 
(D) A brief non-argumentative summary of the factual nature of the case. The 
purpose of the summary is to provide an overview of the case for the jury and is 
to be included in pre-proof instructions to the jury, unless found inappropriate by 
the Court. · 
(E) A statement that counsel have, in good faith , discussed settlement 
unsuccessfully and/or completed mediation unsuccessfully, if mediation was 
ordered by the Court. 
(F) A statement that all pre-trial discovery procedures under I.R.C.P. 26 to 37 
have been complied with and all discovery responses supplemented as 
required by the rules to reflect facts known to the date of the Stipulation. 
(G) A statement of all issues of fact and law which remain to be litigated, listing 
which party has the burden of proof as to each issue. 
(H) A list of any stipulated admissions of fact, which will avoid unnecessary 
proof. . 
(I) A list of any orders requested by the parties which will expedite the trial. 
(J) A statement as to whether counsel require more than 30 minutes per party 
for voir dire or opening statement and, if so, an explanation of the reason more 
time is needed. 
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These submissions will be deemed by the Court to constitute the final pre-trial 
conference required by IRCP 16(b). However, if either party wishes a more formal pre-
trial conference the same should be requested in writing at least 60 days prior to trial 
and one will be scheduled. 
(3) MOTIONS TO ADD NEW PARTIES OR AMEND PLEADINGS shall be filed 
no later than 60 days after the date of this Order. 
(4) DISCOVERY must be served and completely responded to at least 60 days 
prior to trial. This includes supplementation of discovery responses required by I.R.C.P. 
26(e) , unless good cause is shown for late supplementation. Discovery requests must be 
responded to in a timely way as required by the I.R.C.P. The deadlines contained in this 
Order cannot be used as a basis or reason for failing to timely respond to or supplement 
properly served discovery, including requests for disclosure of witnesses and/or trial 
exhibits. Discovery disputes will not be heard by the Court without the written certification 
required by I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). 
(5) WITNESS DISCLOSURE. Except as previously disclosed in responses to 
discovery requests, Plaintiff shall disclose all fact and expert witnesses no later than 140 
days before trial. Defendants shall disclose their fact -and expert witnesses no later than 
110 days before trial. Rebuttal witnesses shall be disclosed no later than 80 days before 
trial. Expert witnesses shall be disclosed in the manner and with the specificity required by 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Any objection to the I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) expert witness 
disclosure must be filed within 45 days of the disclosure or is deemed waived. Witnesses 
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not disclosed in responses to discovery and/or as required herein will be excluded at trial, 
unless allowed by the Court in the interest of justice. 
(6) MOTIONS. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, and responses thereto, shall comply 
in all respects with I.R.C.P. 56 and be filed no later than 90 days before trial. ALL 
OTHER MOTIONS, including any Motion in Limine, shall be filed and heard by the Court 
no later than 30 days before trial. The original of all Motions and supporting submissions 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court. However, one (1) duplicate Judge's Copy of all 
Motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting memorandum, 
affidavits and documents, shall be E-MAILED to the deputy clerk at 
kpovey@bannockcounty.us. All other pleadings, notices, etc., should be filed with the 
Clerk without copies to the Court's chambers. 
(7) STIPULATED MODIFICATIONS. The parties may stipulate to the 
modification of the discovery, witness disclosure and motion deadlines stated herein only 
upon submission of a stipulation to the Court and a Court Order modifying the deadlines. 
No order modifying deadlines will be granted if it would result in a delay in the trial date, 
without a formal motion to vacate the trial , and good cause shown. 
(8) TRIAL BRIEFS. Trial briefs are encouraged but not required. If submitted, 
trial briefs should address substantive factual, legal and/or evidentiary issues the parties 
believe are likely to arise during the trial, with appropriate citation to authority. Any trial 
brief should be exchanged between the parties and submitted to the clerk of the court, and 
a duplicate Judge's Copy shall be submitted to the Court's chambers in Bannock County, 
no later than 10 days prior to trial. 
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(9) PRE-MARKED EXHIBITS, AND AN EXHIBIT LIST IN THE FORM 
ATTACHED HERETO, shall be exchanged between the parties and filed with the Court no 
later than 10 days prior to trial. Unless otherwise ordered , Plaintiff shall identify exhibits 
beginning with the number "1" and the Defendant shall identify exhibits beginning with the 
letter "A." 
(10) JURY INSTRUCTIONS. Proposed jury instructions and verdict forms 
requested by any party shall be prepared in conformity with I.R.C.P. 51 (a), except that 
they shall be filed with the Court and exchanged between the parties at least 7 days prior 
to trial. Except for good cause shown , proposed jury instructions should conform to the 
pattern Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI) approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. In addition to 
submitting written proposed instructions that comply with Rule 51 (a), the parties shall also 
submit both a clean version and a version with cited authority by e-mail to the Court's 
Clerk, in Word format, at least 7 days prior to trial. Certain "stock" instructions need not be 
submitted . These will typically include IDJI 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.05, 1.09, 1.11 , 
1.13/1 .13.1, 1.15.1, 1.17, 1.20.1, and 1.24.1. It is requested that the parties agree on the 
basic instruction giving the jury a short, plain statement of the claims, per IDJI 1.07. 
(11) MEDIATION. Mediation is highly recommended . Any formal mediation 
must occur at least 60 days before the trial date. If the_ parties cannot agree on a mediator 
upon motion by either party, the Court will appoint a mediator. 
(12) TRIAL PROCEDURES. A total of FOUR (4) trial days have been reserved 
for this trial. If the parties believe that more trial days will be required, the parties are 
ORDERED to notify the Court of this request no less than 60 days prior to trial. On the 
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first day of trial , counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief status 
conference. Unless otherwise ordered, or as modified during trial as necessary, trial days 
will begin at 9:00 a.m. and close at or about 5:00 p.m., with a one hour break for lunch. 
(13) HEARINGS OR CONFERENCES WITH THE COURT. All meetings, 
conferences, and/or hearings with the Court shall be scheduled in advance with the 
Court's Clerk by calling 208-236-7252. No hearing shall be noticed without contacting 
the Clerk. 
(14) ALTERNATE JUDGES. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(1 )(G) , that an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case, 
if the current presiding judge is unavailable. The list of potential alternate judges is: 1) 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn; 2) Honorable David C. Nye; 3) Honorable Mitchell W . Brown; 
4) Honorable Jon Shindurling; 5) Honorable William H. Woodland; 6) Honorable Richard T. 
St. Clair. If the I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1) disqualification has not previously been exercised, failure 
to disqualify, without cause, any one of these alternate judges within ten (10) days of the 
date of this Order shall constitute a waiver of such right. 
' r () (:. _·:)[\''. • ,.:,., I ~J (' i (, 
DATED this o,·-1 day of January,.201-7. 
k&-_J& C _ r l~ 
,_ 
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~ D1~1'Ull~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ot.Jarlya,rr,z,84+, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Ron Kerl 
Cooper & Larsen 
PO Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
A Bruce Larson 
155 S 2nd Ave 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
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Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C. , a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING L.C. , a ) 






WILDLIFE RIDGE EST A TES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 





WILDLIFE RIDGE EST A TES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liabi lity company; ) 
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Counter-claimant, ) 
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MONITOR FfNANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 
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COMES OW the Plaintiff: and Counter-defendants Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, LC., a Utah limited liability company 
("First Capital"), and in answer to the Counter-claim filed aga inst them by the Defendant and 
Counter-c laimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife Ridge"), admits, denies and alleges the 
following: 
1. Monitor and First Capital re-allege the facts and claims set forth in thier Complaint 
on file in this case as if set forth herein at length. 
2. Monitor and First Capital admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1. , and 2. of 
Wildlife Ridge's Counter-cla im. 
3. Monitor and First Capital have insufficient knowledge of the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 3., 4., 5., 6., 7., and 8. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim, and therefore deny the same. 
4. Monitor and Fir t Capital, in answer to paragraph 9. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-
claim, admit that on the 301h day of December, 2005, they jointly loaned to Michael Millward and 
M&S Development, LLC the sum of$244,000, and as evidence of said loan, Michael Millward and 
M&S Development, LLC made, executed and delivered to the Plaintiffs their Trust Deed Note dated 
the 3011, day of December, 2005, in the principal sum of$244,000 as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached 
to the Complaint on file herein, and it is hereby incorporated herein by this reference as if set forth 
in full at thi s place. 
Further, as security for the repayment of the Trust Deed Note, together with interest, costs, 
and attorney's fees, M&S made, executed and delivered to Plaintiffs that certain Trust Deed, 
Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated December 30, 2005 ("Deed of 
Trust") on the Bannock County Real Property therein described. The Deed of Trust was recorded 
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on the 30111 day of December, 2005, under Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of 
Bannock County Idaho and is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Complaint on file herein. It is hereby 
incorporated herein by this reference as if set forth in full at this place (the "Monitor and First Capital 
Deed of Trust"). 
5. In answer to paragraph 10. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim, Monitor and First 
Capital restate their answers to paragraphs 1. through 9. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim. 
6. Monitor and Fir t Capita l deny the allegations set out in paragraphs 11. , 12., and 13. 
of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim. 
7. In answer to paragraph 14. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim, Monitor and First 
Capital restate their answers to paragraphs 1. through 13. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim. 
8. In answer to paragraphs 15. and 16. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim, Monitor and 
First Capita l admit that Wildlife Ridge is seeking the relief described therein, but denies that it is 
entitled to any such relief. 
9. Monitor and First Capital deny the allegations set out in paragraphs 17 ., 18., 19 ., 20., 
21., 22., and 23. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Counter-claim of Wildlife Ridge fails to state a claim against Monitor and First Capital 
upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Counter-claim of Wildlife Ridge is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations 
including, but not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 5-201, 5-216, 5-218, and 5-224. 
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Counter-claim of Wi ldlife Ridge is barred by the applicable doctrines of res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, issue preclusion,judicial estoppel, claim preclusion and waiver by reason of the 
following : 
On December 3, 20 14, Wildlife Ridge commenced an action against Monitor and First 
Capital in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County 
of Bannock as Case No. CV 2014-4783 OC (the "First Action"). 
In the First Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands 
described in the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, free and clear of the Monitor and First 
Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the Court that the sums due Monitor and First 
Capital, which were or may have been secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Tmst, had 
been satisfied. 
On March 12, 2015, Wildlife Ridge amended its complaint in the First Action and continued 
to seek a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Monitor and First Capital Deed 
of Trust, free and clear of the Monitor and First Capita l Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from 
the Court that the sums due Monitor and First Capital, which were or may have been secured by the 
Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, had been satisfied. 
On March 26, 2015, Monitor and First Capital filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint 
of Wildlife Ridge denying Wildlife Ridge's right to any of the relief sought in its Amended 
Complaint. 
On June 14, 2016, the First Action was dismissed by a Judgment of the Court, with prejudice, 
with each party to bear their own attorney fees and costs of suit (the "Dismissal of the First Action"). 
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Under the applicable doctrines ofres judicata, co ll atera l estoppel, and claim preclusion, the 
Dismissal of the First Action not only defeated the claims set out in the First Action, but also served 
to bar the future litigation of ev~ry matter which might and should have been litigated in the First 
Action , including the claims set out in Wildlife Ridge 's Counter-claim filed herein. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Monitor and First Capital reserve the right to assert further and additional affirmat ive 
defenses. 
ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST 
Monitor and First Capital have had to employ counsel to defend the Counter-claim and have 
obligated themselves to pay a reasonable fee for such services. Monitor and First Capital are 
entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees and their costs of suit against Wildlife Ridge 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ I 2- 120, 12- I 21, and 12- 123 , and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, having answered the Counter-claim of Wildlife Ridge, and having raised 
good and valid defenses thereto, Monitor and First Capital pray that judgment be entered in their 
favor dismissing the Counter-claim, with prejudice, and awarding Monitor and First Capital their 
reasonable attorney fees and their costs of suit against Wildlife Ridge pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§ 12- 120, 12- 121, and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 7da y of January, 2017. 
COOPER& 
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ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
("'···· 
I HEREBY CERTIFY on th-. . J day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document as fo llows: 
A. Bruce Larson 
Hearn & Wood LLP 
155 S. 2"t1 Ave. 
Pocatello, ID 8320 I 
Chamber Copy: 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
[x] U.S . Mail , postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932- 1083 
[ ] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com 
~Kj U.S. Mail , postage prepaid 
[)(] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-547-2147 
[ ]Email to : 
nicoled@bannockcounty.us 
Ron Kerl, of the firm 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, LC, ETAL I 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, ETAL , 
Defendant. 
Case No:CV-2016-0003588-0C 
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
THE PARTIES came before the Court on the 21st day of February, 2017 for motion 
for summary judgment. Ron Kerl appeared in person on behalf of the Plaintiff. A. Bruce 
Larson and Rick Hearn appeared in person on behalf of the Defendant. Stephanie Davis 
was the Court Reporter. 
At the outset, Mr. Kerl informed the Court that he had filed a motion to amend the 
complaint and that hearing is set on Monday, February 27, 2017. He had requested that 
the Court set that hearing separate from today's hearing due to not having enough time to 
give proper notice to Defense counsel. However if the Court would prefer to hear the 
motion and there was no objection from the Defense, that motion could be heard as well. 
Mr. Larson had no objection to the motion, therefore said motion was GRANTED. Mr. Kerl 
will prepare the order and submit it to the Court. 
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.. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs MOTION to 
amend the complaint that is scheduled to commence on Monday, February 27, 2017 at 
the hour of 2:00 p.m. is hereby VACATED. 
The Court next heard argument on the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. At 
the conclusion of argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
r 
DATED this ~ { day of February, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22---day of February, 2017, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Ron Kerl 
Cooper & Larsen 
PO Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
A. Bruce Larson 
155 S. 2nd Ave 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
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D U.S. Mail 
~ E-Mail: ron@cooper-larsen.com 
D Hand Deliver 
0 Fax: 
D U.S. Mail 
~ E-Mail: bruce@hwlawpro.com 
D Hand Deliver 
0 Fax: 
Robert Poleki 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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Ron Kerl , Esq. - ISB #1768 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Email: ·o·_"i ,, <X ,~~:r- l:w,,'11.u,11 1 
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited liabi lity ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 






WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 





WILDLIFE RIDGE EST A TES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 





MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 
Utah limited liabi lity company, ) 
) 
Counter-defendant, ) 
_ ____________ ) 
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THE COURT, having reviewed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complai nt to add a new 
defendant, and the parties having stipulated in open court that the Motion may be granted, 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the Plaintiffs are hereby granted leave to file 
the Amended Complain t in the form attached to their Motion dated February 7, 2017 . 
Dated thistlJ. day ofFebniary, 2017. [ ') _ (\ .. 
1~-C. 1 v~ 
Robert C. Naftz, District Judge ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l HEREBY CERTIFY on the'0day of February, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document as follows: 
A. Bruce Larson 
Hearn & Wood LLP 
155 S. 2"d Ave. 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Ron Kerl 
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205 
Order Granting Leave To Fi le Amen d ed Complaint 
Pg.2 
[x) U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ) Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083 
[ ] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com 
[x) U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delive1y 
[ ) Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083 
[ ) Email to: ron@cooper-larsen.com 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
~Tul 
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Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FlNANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPlT AL FUNDING, LC., a ) 






WILDLIFE RlDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER ) 









DEED OF TRUST 
Plaintiffs, for cause of suit against the above named Defendant, complains and alleges as 
follows : 
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I. 
STATUS OF PLAINTIFFS. At all times herein mentioned Monitor Finance, L.C. 
("Monitor") has been and now is a limited liability company organized under the state of Utah. 
Monitor has its place of business in Provo, Utah, and is authorized, among other things, to loan 
money and to take notes and deeds of trust as security therefore in the State of Idaho. 
At all times herein mentioned First Capital Funding, L.C. ("Capital") has been and now is 
a limited liability company organized under the state of Utah. Capital has its place of business in 
Provo, Utah, and is authorized, among other things, to loan money and to take notes and deeds of 
trust as security therefore in the State of Idaho. 
Monitor and Capital will be referred to herein collectively as the Plaintiffs. 
2. 
STATUS OF DEFENDANTS. The Defendant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife 
Ridge") is now a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Idaho, first 
organized in on May 12, 2006. However, between August 6, 2007 and August 27, 2007, between 
August 7, 2008 and October 5, 2009 and between August 5, 2010 and September 18, 2015 Wildlife 
Ridge was administratively dissolved as an Idaho limited liability company and did not legally exist. 
Wildlife Ridge is the current owner of the premises herein sought to be foreclosed, having acquired 
the property subject to the rights of the Plaintiffs. 
Michael J. Mi llward, a married man ("Millward") and M&S Development LLC ("M&S"), 
an Idaho limited liability company, are the makers of the Trust Deed Note hereinafter described, and 
M&S was the grantor of the Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture 
Filing herein sought to be foreclosed and owner in fee simple of the premises. 
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Defendant Pioneer Title Company is the Trustee named in the Trust Deed, Assignment of 
Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated December 30, 2005, herein sought to be 
foreclosed. 
3. 
INFERIOR INTERESTS. The above named Defendants, and each of them, claim some 
right, title, lien or interest in the property described in Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein, but 
their interest, if any, in and to said property is junior, subordinate, and subsequent to the right and 
lien of the Plaintiffs. 
4. 
TRUST DEED NOTE. On the 301" day of December, 2005, Plaintiffs jointly loaned to 
Millward and M&S the sum of$244,000, and as evidence of said loan Millward and M&S, made, 
executed and delivered to the Plaintiffs their Trust Deed Note in writing, which Note was dated the 
301" day of December, 2005, in the principal sum of $244,000, both principal and interest being 
payable in words and figures as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, which is a true and correct 
copy of the Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005 and it is hereby incorporated herein by this 
reference as if set forth in full at this place. 
5. 
MODIFICATION OF TRUST DEED NOTE. By an agreement dated March 3, 2008, 
Millward, M&S, the Plaintiffs and Wildlife Ridge entered into a Modification of Trust Deed Note 
to provide for additional sums loaned by Plaintiffs to Millward and M&S to become part of the 
unpaid principal balance of the Trust Deed Note ("Modification"). A True and correct copy of the 
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Modification is attached hereto as Exhibit "B," which is hereby incorporated herein by this reference 
as if set forth in full at this place 
6. 
BANKRUPTCY FILING OF MILLWARD. On September 10, 2012, Millward filed for 
relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 12-41260 pending in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay 
commenced on September 10, 2012 which prohibited Plaintiffs from taking any action to enforce 
the Trust Deed Note, as amended. That automatic stay existed until Millward's bankruptcy case was 
closed on June 23, 2016. 
7. 
DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY SECURITY. As security for the repayment 
of the Trust Deed Note, together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees, M&S made, executed and 
delivered to Plaintiffs that certain TrnstDeed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture 
Filing dated December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") on the following described real property situated 
in Bannock County, State of Idaho, to-wit: 
A Tract of land in the South Y2 of the South Y2 Section 31, Township 6 South, Range 35 East, Boise 
Meridian, Bannock County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the South quarter comer of Section 31; thence South 89°36'40" East, 82.68 feet; thence 
North 53°44'13" East. 88.1 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West, 320 feet; thence North 63°15'5 l '' East, 
260 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West 495.62 feet, more or less, to the Southerly dght of way line of 
Barton Road; thence South 72°27 '20" West along the Southerly tight of way of Barton Road 4 72. 74 feet; 
thence continuing aJongthe Southerly right of way line of Barton Road, South 83°18 '20" West, 389.3 
feet, more or less, to the Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail; thence South 26°44 '40" East along the 
Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail 791.56 feet, more or less, to the South line of said Section 31; thence 
South 89°44 • East, 462.23 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
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The Deed of Trust was recorded on the 301h day of December, 2005, under Recorder's 
Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, and contains covenants, 
conditions and agreements of the mortgagor as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto, which is a 
true and correct copy of the Deed of Trust, and it is hereby incorporated by this reference herein as 
if set forth at length. The Deed of Trust has never been satisfied or discharged or the rights 
thereunder reconveyed. 
8. 
PARTIAL RELEASES. After the recording of the Deed ofTmst, there was released from 
the Deed of Trust certain portions of the Property, and as of the date of this Complaint the Deed of 
Trust applies only to the following described portion of the Deed of Trust property: 
Lot 2, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 1, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument 
No. 97000607, records of Bannock Cmmty, Idaho. 
Lot 6, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 1, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument 
No. 97000607, record'l of Bannock Cornuy, Idaho. 
Lot 1, Block 2, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrnment 
• No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
Lot 2, Block 2, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument 
No. 20728743, re-cords of Bannock Cmmty, Idaho. 
Lot 4, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to rhe plat thereof, fl.Jed as Instrument 
No. 20728743, records ofBnnnockCounty, Idaho. 
Lot 5, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivisiou Phase 2, accordiug to the plat thereof, filed as Instnunent 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
Lot 7, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
Lot 9, Block 3, WiJd Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed l:lS Instrument 
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
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9. 
DEFAULT. Plaintiffs are the owners and holders of said Trust Deed Note and the joint and 
several beneficiaries of the Deed of Trust. 
In order to protect their interest in the Property, Plaintiffs paid attorney's fees and costs in 
the amount of $4,546.19 to defend Wild Life Ridge's Quiet Title Action brought against the 
Plaintiffs in Bannock County Case No. CV 14-7483. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover said fees and 
costs by virtue of the attorney fees provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Deed of Trust. 
General taxes were duly levied against and constituted a first lien upon the property 
described in the Deed of Trust and to protect the lien of their Deed of Trust, Plaintiffs have paid 
taxes in the amount of$22, 136.63. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reimbursement for the amount 
of the taxes they paid on behalfofWild Life Ridge by virtue of the provisions contained in the Deed 
of Trust. 
As of the I ' ' day of October, 2016, there is due, owing and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note 
the sum of $6,812,821.71, together with interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per 
annum until date of Judgment herein, together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and 
expenses necessary to preserve Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter 
accrumg. 
IO. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. Plaintiffs have had to employ counsel to represent it in this action 
and has ob ligated itself to pay a reasonable fee for such services. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney fees by virtue of the attorney fee provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note 
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as amended and Deed of Trust herein above described. Plaintiffs allege that $5,000.00 is a 
reasonable sum to be allowed as attorney's fees herein if this action is uncontested, plus such 
additional sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable attorney 's fees in the event of contest, trial 
or appeal. 
11. 
REASONABLE VALUE. The Plaintiffs, upon information and belief, allege that the 
reasonable value of the Deed of Trust Property and its appurtenances is the sum of $50,000.00 per 
lot, or a total of $400,000.00. 
12. 
NO OTHER ACTION. The Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law, and 
no other proceedings at law or in equity have been commenced or are pending to collect the Trust 
Deed Note as amended or any portion thereof or to fo reclose the Deed of Trust. All conditions 
precedent to the initiation and prosecution of this action and the forec losure of the Deed of Trust 
have been satisfied. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as fo llows: 
I. That Plaintiffs receive the Decree of this Court foreclosing the Deed of Trust so that 
the amounts due Plaintiffs under the Trust Deed Note as amended, which as of October I, 2016 
totaled $6,812,82 1.7 1, plus interest accruing thereafter, together with any additional sums advanced 
by Plaintiffs or which Plaintiffs become ob ligated to advance for the payment of taxes or 
assessments and/or attorney fees and costs during the pend ency of this action, including interest on 
such advances from date of advance; for the sum of $5,000.00 as attorney's fee if this action is 
uncontested, plus such additional sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable in the event of 
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contest, trial or appeal; for Plaintiffs' taxable costs and disbursements herein; and for interest on the 
entire amount of said judgment at the maximum rate allowed by law; 
2. That the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein be adjudged a first and prior lien 
upon the property described in the Deed of Trust superior to any right, title, claim, lien or interest 
on the part of the named Defendants or persons claiming by, through or under said Defendants; 
3. That the Court, in the Decree, establish the reasonable value of the property herein 
described at $400,000.00; 
4. That the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein be foreclosed and said real 
property be sold in separate parcels in accordance with and in the manner provided by law; that 
Plaintiffs be permitted to be a purchaser at sale; that the net proceeds of said sale be applied first 
toward the payment of the costs of said sale and then towards the payment of Plaintiffs Trust Deed 
Note as amended; 
5. That the Decree provide that after the sale of said property all right, title, claim, lien 
or interest of the named Defendants and every person claiming by, through or under said 
Defendants, in or to said property, including the right of possession thereof from and after said sale, 
be forever barred and foreclosed and that the purchaser at said sale be entitled to immediate 
possession of the premises as allowed by law subject only to such statutory right of redemption as 
said Defendants may have by law; 
6. That in the event the Plaintiffs become the purchasers at the sale and possession of 
the premises is not sun-endered to the Plaintiffs, a writ of assistance be issued directing the Sheriff 
of Bannock County, Idaho, to deliver possession of the premises to the Plaintiffs; 
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7. That after the conclusion of any forec losure sa le, upon proper motion of the Plaintiffs, 
that a deficiency judgment be entered aga inst M&S in the event the net proceeds of the foreclosure 
sa le are insufficient to fully satisfy the sums due and owing to the Plaintiffs; and 
8. That Plaintiffs may have such other and further relief as may be just and equitable 
in the premises. 
DA TED th is I st day of March, 20 17. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY on the I si day of March, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document as follows: 
A. Bruce Larson 
Hearn & Wood LLP 
155 S. 2"d Ave. 
Pocatello, ID 8320 I 
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TRUST DEED NOTE 
$244,000.00 Dated: December 30, 2005 
I. Promise to Pay. For value received, Michael J. Millward, a married man, and M & S 
Development, LLC, a Idaho Limited Liability Company (hereinafter individually referred to as 
"Maker" and collectively referred to as "Makers") each promise to pay to the order of Monitor 
Finance, L.C., a Utah limited liability company as to an undivided 50% interest an~ First Capital 
Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company as to an undivided 50% interest ("Holder(s)"), at 
3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604, or at such other place as Holder may from time to 
time designate, in lawful money of the United States of America, the principal sum of TWO 
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($244,000.00), or so much of that sum 
as may be advanced under this Trust Deed Note by the Holder, together with any other advances 
made pursuant to this Trust Deed Note (collectively the "Principal Indebtedness"), plus interest 
as computed below along with any other cost, fee or expenditure contemplated herein (the "Total 
Indebtedness"). All of the terms and conditions of that certain Trust Deed, of even date which 
secures this obligation are hereby incorporated and made a part of this Trust Deed Note. 
2. Term. The term of this Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This 
Trust Deed Note shall fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the "Maturity Date"). 
3. Interest. The outstanding balance of the Principal Indebtedness shall bear interest 
from December 30, 2005 until fully paid at a fixed interest rate of fifteen percent (15%) per 
annum. Interest shall accrue daily on the outstanding balance of the Principal Indebtedness both 
before and after judgment, and shall be calculated on the basis of a 360-day year. Interest is 
compounded on a 360-day year simple interest basis by applying the ratio for the annual interest 
rate over a year of 360 days (365/360), multiplied by the outstanding principal balance, 
multiplied by the actual number of days the principal balance is outstanding. 
4. Payments. Monthly interest payments will be made by Makers beginning February 1, 
2006 and the first of the month thereafter. This Trust Deed Note calls for a balloon payment to 
become due and payable on the Maturity Date. On the Maturity Date the Total Indebtedness 
shall be due and payable in full. Checks will constitute payment only when collected. If any 
installment or interest payment is not made within five (5) calendar days of the due date, a late 
penalty equal to twenty percent (20%) of any such installment or interest payment owed 
hereunder shall automatically be assessed. If any balloon payment is not made within five (5) 
calendar days of the due date, a late penalty equal to ten percent (10%) of any such balloon 
payment owed hereunder shall automatically be assessed. There shall be no grace period and no 
further notice shall be required. In the event that a payment date falls on a weekend, or public 
holiday, payment shall be due and payable the following business day. 
5. Origination and Document Fees. As part of this transaction, Makers agree to pay to 
Holder the amount of $12,200.00 as an origination fee (the "Origination Fee"). Said Origination 
Fee shall be due and paid by the Makers on December 30, 2005. Makers also agree to pay all of 
the costs incurred in documenting, recording and closing this transaction (the "Documentation 
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Fee"). Makers agree that both the Origination Fee and Documentation Fee may be subtracted 
directly from the principal amount at closing. 
6. Holder's Expenditures. Makers agree to pay on demand any expenditures made by 
Holder in accordance with the Trust Deed and this Trust Deed Note, including, but not limited 
to, the payment of taxes, insurance premiums, costs of maintenance and preservation of the 
collateral, common expense and other assessments relating to the collateral, and attorney fees 
and costs incurred in connection with any matter pertaining hereto or to the security pledged to 
secure the Principal Indebtedness or any portion thereof ( collectively the "Holder 
Expenditures"). At the election of Holder, all Holder Expenditures may be added to the unpaid 
balance of this Trust Deed Note and become a part of and on a parity with the Principal 
Indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed and shall accrue interest at such rate as may be 
computed from time to time in the manner prescribed in this Trust Deed Note. 
7. Prepayment. Makers shall have the right, from time to time and at any time, to prepay 
all, or any part, of this Trust Deed Note at any time or times prior to the Maturity Date of this 
note without payment of any premium or penalty. Prepaid Interest will be pro rated if this Note is 
paid off early. 
8. Default. Makers will be in default if any of the following happens: (a) Makers fail to 
make any payment when due; (b) any Maker breaks any promise Maker has made to Holder, or 
any Maker fails to comply with or to perform when due any other term, obligation, covenant, or 
condition contained in this Trust Deed Note or any agreement related to this Trust Deed Note; ( c) 
any Maker defaults under any loan, extension of credit security agreement, purchase or sales 
agreement, or any other in favor of any other creditor or person that may materially affect any 
Maker's property or any Maker's ability to repay this Trust Deed Note or perform Makers' 
obligations under this Trust Deed Note or any of the Related Documents; (d) any representation 
or statement made or furnished to Holder by any Maker or on any Maker's behalf is false or 
misleading in any material respect either now or at the time made or furnished; (e) any Maker 
dissolves (regardless of whether election to continue is made), any member withdraws from any 
Maker, any member dies, or any of the members of any Mak.er becomes insolvent, a receiver is 
appointed for any part of any Maker's property, any Maker makes an assignment for the benefit 
of creditors, or any proceeding is commenced either by any Maker or against any Maker under 
any bankruptcy or insolvency laws; (f) any creditor tries to take any of any Maker's property on 
or in which Holder has a lien or security interest; (g) a material adverse change occurs in any 
Maker's financial condition, or Holder believes the prospect of payment or performance of the 
Indebtedness is impaired; (h) Holder in good faith deems itself insecure. 
9. Default Interest Rate. Notwithstanding anything above to the contrary, if default 
occurs in the payment of any principal, interest, fee or cost, when due, or if any Event of Default 
occurs hereunder, time being of the essence hereof, if said default remains uncured for five (5) 
calendar days, thereafter, all outstanding Principal Indebtedness shall bear interest at a default 
rate of thirty-five percent (35%) until paid, both before and after judgment. If this Trust Deed 
Note becomes in default or payment is accelerated, Makers agree to pay to the Holder of the 
Trust Deed Note all collections costs, including reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses 
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incurred both before and after judgment, including any bankruptcy proceeding or appeal, in 
addition to all other sums due under this Trust Deed Note. 
10. Application of Payments. Any and all payments by any Maker under this Trust Deed 
Note shall be applied as follows: first, to the repayment of any Holder Expenditures advanced by 
Holder under this Trust Deed Note; second, to the payment of any late charges; third, to the 
payment of accrued interest on the Principal Indebtedness; and fourth, to the payment ofthe 
Principal Indebtedness. 
11. Extension. The time for any payment required under this Trust Deed Note may be 
extended from time to time at the sole discretion of the Holder. Makers agree to pay to Holder 
an extension fee in the sum of ten percent (10%) of the Total Indebtedness then outstanding 
under this Trust Deed Note (the "Extension Fee"). The Extension Fee shall be paid to Monitor 
Finance, L.C./First Capital Funding, L.C., at 3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. In 
addition to the Extension Fee, Makers further agree to pay any and all documentation and 
recording costs incurred in the preparation of said extension. Both the Extension Fee and the 
extension documentation costs shall be due and payable at the time the extension is executed. 
Acceptance by Holder of any additional security or guarantees for the performance of the terms 
and provisions contained in this Trust Deed Note shall not in any way affect the liability of an 
individual Maker. 
12. Governing Law. This Trust Deed Note has been delivered to Holder in the State of 
Utah. If there is a lawsuit, Makers agree upon Holder's request to submit to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of Utah County, the State of Utah. This Trust Deed Note shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
13. Joint and Several Liability. In the event this Trust Deed Note is executed, endorsed, 
guaranteed or assumed by more than one person, corporation, or any other entity, all of the 
parties shall be jointly and severally liable and do hereby waive presentment, demand, protest 
and notice of non-payment and of protest. Furthermore, each of the parties hereto agrees that 
his, her or its obligation shall continue in full force and effect notwithstanding the death, 
bankruptcy (or commencement thereof), dissolution or release of any other party and 
notwithstanding the taking or release of other or additional security and notwithstanding any 
waiver, amendment or modification (including, but not limited to, extensions of time or 
perfonnance) by the holder of this Trust Deed Note as to the obligations under this Trust Deed 
Note or under any other Loan Document of any of the other parties, with or without notice. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, each of the parties to this Trust Deed Note agree 
that a separate action or actions may be brought against him, her or it, whether or not such action 
is brought against any of the other parties to this Trust Deed Note. 
14. Interest Limitation. All agreements between the parties to this Trust Deed Note and 
the Holder of this Trust Deed Note are hereby expressly limited so that in no contingency or 
event whatsoever, whether by reason of deferment or advancement of the proceeds of the loan 
evidenced by this Trust Deed Note, acceleration of maturity of the Loan, or otherwise shall the 
amount paid or agreed to be paid to Holder for the use, forbearance or detention of the money to 
be loaned under this Trust Deed Note exceed the maximum interest rate pe1missible under 
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applicable Jaw. If, from any circumstance whatsoever, fulfillment of any provision of this Trust 
Deed Note or of any other agreement between the parties to this Trnst Deed Note and the Holder, 
at the time perfonnance of such provision shall be due, shall involve transcending the limit of 
validity prescribed by law, then, ipso facto, the obligation to be fulfilled shall be reduced to the 
limit of such validity. In the event that any payment is received by the Holder of this Trust Deed 
Note which would otherwise be deemed to by a payment of interest in excess of the maximum 
allowed by law, such payment shall be deemed to have been paid on account of principal at the 
time of receipt. This provision shall never be superseded or waived and shall control every other 
provision of the Trust Deed Note and all agreements between the pa1iies and the holder of this 
Trnst Deed Note. 
15. General Provisions. Both Holder and Maker acknowledge and agree that any and all 
monies provided by Holder to Maker pursuant to the terms hereof are for a business purpose. 
Holder may delay or forego enforcing any of its rights or remedies under this Trust Deed Note 
without losing them. Upon any change in the tem1s of this Trnst Deed Note, and unless 
otherwise expressly stated in writing, no party who sign this Trust Deed Note, whether as maker, 
guarantor, accommodation maker or endorser, shall be released from liability. All such parties 
agree that Holder may renew or extend (repeatedly and for any length of time) this loan, or 
release any party or guarantor or collateral; or impair, fail to realize upon or perfect Holder's 
security interest in the collateral; and take any other action deemed necessary by Holder without 
the consent of or notice to anyone. All such parties also agree that Holder may modify this Trust 
Deed Note without the consent of or notice to anyone other than the party with whom the 
modification is made. 
DATED this~ day of ~Qfd!)t}pj_k , 2005. 
MAKERS: 
Michael J. Mill~ 
M & S Developm , LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company 
By:---------
Its: ---------
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·_ ''i\i'~cii'ticatio1i'ofTi·liSfDeed .. Note : .. 
On December 30, 2005, Michael Millward and M&S Development, executed a 
Note and Trnst Deed in favor of Monitor Finance, L.<:;. a11d First Capital Funding, L.C. in 
the amount of $244,000.00. The Trnst Deed was iecorded as Entry No. · 20528398 in the 
records of the Bannock County, Idaho, Recorder. · 
The parties hereby modify said Trust Deed Note as follows: 
• The Note will be expanded to include,the follow£ng draws: 
q 8/14/07 $75,000.00 
o 9/4/07 $25,000.00 
o 9/19/07 $7,400.00 
o 10/25/07 $100,000.00 
o 3/1/08 $10,000.00 
The parties acknowledge that the same terms and conditions of the original Note and · 
Trust Deed will apply to the run ended amount .and terms. 
Date: 3/3/08 
Momlor Fi ce, L.C. 
By: Miles C. Pitcher 
Its: Iy.lan~ging Member 
, - /J 
.r 
·. ), [_'-c-,J ,/~,,u-~-· ··,.>~--e_ _  _ . '""-. 
tJirst Capital Funding, L.C. 










TRUST DEED, ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, 
SECURITY AGREEMENT AND 
FIXTURE FILING 
This Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing (the "Trust 
Deed") is made and executed this 30th day of December, 2005 (the "Closing Date"), by M&S 
Development, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company ( "Trustor") whose address is 1801 N. ARTHUR 
STE c, POCATELLO, ID 83 204 , and Pioneer Title Company as Trustee ("Trustee"), in 
favor of Monitor Finance, L.C. as to an undivided 50% interest whose address is 3191 North 
Canyon Road, Provo, UT 84604, and First Capital Funding, L.C. as to an undivided 50% 
interest whose address is 3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, UT 84604 ("Beneficiary") . 
Beneficiary has loaned monies to Trustor and the transaction is memorialized by that 
certain Promissory Note dated December 30, 2005 executed by Trustor in favor of Beneficiary in 
the amount of Two Hundred Forty Four Thousand Dollars ($244,000.00) (the "Note"). 
See attached "Exhibit A" 
In exchange for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and legal sufficiency of 
which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1.1 
ARTICLE I GRANT AND CONVEYANCE 
General Grant. Trustor hereby assigns, grants, bargains, sells, conveys, warrants, 
and transfers to Trustee in trust, for the Benefit of Beneficiary, with power of sale, 
and right of entry and possession, the following described property (the "Real 
Property''): 
1.1.1 Real Property. All right, title, interest and estate of Trustor, now 
owned or hereafter acquired, in and to the real property located in 
Bannock County, State ofldaho (the "Real Property") as more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
1.1.2 Buildings, Improvements and Interests. All right, title, interest and 
estate of Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All 
buildings, improvements, works, structures, facilities and fixtures, 
including any future additions to, and improvements and betterments now 
or hereafter constructed upon, and all renewals and replacements of, any 
of the foregoing, which are now or hereafter shall be constructed or 
affixed or constructively affixed to the Property, or to any portion of the 
Real Property (the "Improvements"). (b) All easements, licenses, streets, 
ways, alleys, roads, passages, rights-of-way, minerals, oil, gas and other 
hydrocarbon substances, development rights, air rights, water, water 
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courses, water rights, and water stock (whether now owned or hereafter 
acquired by Trnstor and whether arising by virtue of land ownership, 
contract or otherwise), of any kind and nature, relating to or in any way 
appurtenant or appertaining to the Real Property or to any portion of the 
Real Property. 
1.1.3 Tenements, Hereditaments. All right, title, interest and estate of 
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to all of the tenements, 
hereditaments, rights, privileges, and appurtenances belonging, relating, or 
in any way appertaining to any of the Real Property or the Improvements, 
or any po1iion of the Real Property or the Improvements, or which shall 
hereafter in any way belong, relate, or in any way appertain thereto, 
whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and the reversion and 
reversions, remainder and remainders, and estates, rights, titles, interests 
possessions claims, and demands of every natures whatsoever, at law or in 
equity, which Truster may have or may hereafter acquire in and to the 
Real Property, the Improvements, or any portion thereof. 
1.1.4 Leases. Rents. Issues, Etc. All right, title, interest and estate of 
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to all leases and 
subleases of all or any portion of the Real Property or the Improvements 
now or hereafter existing or entered into, and all lease agreements and 
documents evidencing the same, including without limitation, any tenant 
leases for all or a portion of the Real Property; and all right, title and 
interest of Trustor thereunder, including without limitation, all rents, sub-
rents, room rents and other amounts received for use of any portion of the 
Real Property, including the Improvements, and any and all room rental 
agreements and arrangements now owned or hereafter acquired, and all 
proceeds from such room rents, issues, royalties, security deposits, income 
and profits of and from the Real Property, the Improvements, or any 
portion thereof. 
1.2 Security Interest. Tmstor hereby assigns and grants to Beneficiary a 
security interest in the following described property (collectively the 
"Personalty"), whether now or hereafter existing, and in which Truster now has or 
hereafter obtains any right, title, estate or interest, together with all additions and 
accessions thereto and all rents and proceeds thereof: 
1.2.1 Tangible Personal Property. All right, title, interest, and estate of 
Truster, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All furniture, 
fixtures and equipment and inventory as equipment inventory are defined 
in the Uniform Commercial Code, wherever located, and all related right, 
title and interest of Truster, now owned or hereafter acquired or created, 
all proceeds and products of the foregoing and all additions and accessions 
to, replacements of. insurance or condemnation proceeds of. and 





foregoing, and all rents, revenues, issues, profits and proceeds arising from 
the sale, lease, license, encumbrance collection, or any other temporary or 
permanent disposition of any of the foregoing or any interest therein. 
1.2.2 Awards. All right, title, interest and estate of Trustor, now owned 
or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All awards made for the taking by 
eminent domain or by any proceeding or purchase in lieu thereof of the 
Real Property or Personalty or any portion of the Real Property or 
Pesonalty, the Improvements or any portion of the Improvements, or of 
any other Improvements now or hereafter situate thereon or any estate or 
easement in the Property (including any awards for change of grade of 
streets); (b) All insurance polic ies and all proceeds of insurance paid on 
account of any partial or total destruction of the Improvements or any 
portion thereof; ( c) All causes of action and recoveries for any loss or 
diminution in the value of the Real Property or Personalty or the 
Improvements; and ( d) All proceeds of each of the foregoing. 
1.2.3 General Intangibles. All general intangibles of Trustor, presently 
existing or hereafter arising, including general intangibles as defined in the 
Uniform Commercial Code, choses in action, proceeds, contracts, 
distributions, dividends, refunds, secu1ity deposits, judgments, insurance 
claims, any right to payment of any nature, intellectual property rights or 
licenses, any other rights or assets of trustor customarily or for accounting 
purposes classified as general intangibles, and all documentation and 
supporting information related to any of the foregoing all rents, profits and 
issues thereof, and all proceeds thereof. 
1.3 Security Agreement. This Trust Deed constitutes a Security 
Agreement with respect to the Personalty, and Beneficiary shall have all the rights 
and remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code of Utah as 
well as all other rights and remedies available at Jaw or in equity. Trustor and 
Beneficiary acknowledge their mutual intent that all security interests 
contemplated herein are given as a contemporaneous exchange for new value to 
Trustor, regardless of when advances to Trustor are actually made or when the 
Trust Estate is acquired. 
1.4. Fixture Filing. This Trust Deed is intended to be a fixture filing 
under Utah Code Annotated; Section 70A-9-402. The addresses of the Secured 
Party (Beneficiary) and the debtor (Trustor) from which information may be 
obtained concerning this security interest granted hereunder are set forth in 
Section 12.1 herein. This Trust Deed is to be recorded in the real estate records 
in the County Recorder's office of the county in which the Real Property is 
located. Trustor is the record owner of the Real Property. 
1.5 Trust Estate. The Real Property, the Improvements and the 
Personalty are sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Trust Estate". 
3 
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ARTICLE II OBLIGATION SECURED 
2.1 Obligations. This Trust Deed is given for the purpose of securing 
the following obligations (collectively the "Obligations") ofTrustor: 
2.1 .1 Note. The payment and performance of each and every 
agreement and obligation under the Note, including without limitation, the 
payment of principal and interest under the Note. 
2.1.2 Other Loan Documents. The payment and perfo1mance of 
each and every agreement and obligation ofTrustor under this Trust Deed, 
the Note, and any other Loan Document. 
2.1.3 Advances by Trustee or Beneficiary. The payment of all 
sums expended and advanced by Trustee or Beneficiary pursuant to the 
terms of this Trust Deed, together with interest thereon as provided in this 
Trust Deed. 
2.1.4 Extensions, Etc. The payment and performance of any 
extensions of, renewals of, modifications of, or additional advances under 
the Note, or any of the obligations evidenced by the Note, regardless of 
the extent of or the subject matter of any such extension, renewal, 
modification or additional advance. 
2.1.5 Other Obligations. The payment and performance of any 
other note or obligation reciting that it is secured by this Trust Deed. 
Truster expressly acknowledges its mutual intent with Beneficiary that the 
security interest created by this Trust Deed secure any and all present and 
future debts, obligations, and liabilities of Truster to Beneficiary without 
any limitation whatsoever. 
ARTICLE III REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES 
3.1 Property. Trustor represents and warrants to Beneficiary as 
follows: 
3.1.1 Fee Title. Truster is the owner of fee simple marketable 
title in and to the Real Property. 
3 .1.2 Defense of Title. Truster shall defend title to the Real 
Property and the Improvements against all claims and demands 
whatsoever. 
3.1.3 Hazardous Material. No Hazardous Materials have been 





by any person or entity on, in or under the Real Prope1ty or the 
Improvements in violation of any Environmental Laws. Truster has 
complied with all applicable federal, state and local laws, rules, ordinances 
and regulations relating to the storage, transportation, and disposal of 
Hazardous Materials on, in or under the Real Property or the 
Improvements. 
3.2 Personalty. Truster further represents and warrants to Beneficiary 
as follows: 
3.2.1 Owner of Personalty. Trustor is the owner, or upon 
acquisition thereof, will be the owner of the Personalty. 
3.2.2 Location of Personalty. The Personalty will be located in 
the State of Utah, will not be removed from that state without the prior 
written consent of Beneficiary. 
ARTICLE IV MAINTENANCE OF TRUST ESTATE 
4.1 Maintenance. Truster shall do each of the following: (a) maintain 
the Trust Estate at all times in good condition and repair; (b) not commit any 
waste of the Trust Estate, or remove, damage, demolish, or structurally alter any 
of the Improvements; (c) complete promptly and in good and workmanlike 
manner any Improvement on the Real Property; (d) except to the extent that 
insurance proceeds are applied by Beneficiary to the satisfaction of the 
Obligations in accordance with Article V, restore promptly and in good and 
workmanlike manner any of the Improvements or any portion thereof, which may 
for any reason be damaged or destroyed; (e) comply at all times with all laws, 
ordinances, regulations, covenants, and restrictions in any manner affecting the 
Trust Estate; (f) not commit or permit any act upon the Trust Estate in violation of 
law; and (g) do all acts which by reason of the character or use of the Trust Estate 
may be reasonably necessary to maintain and care for the same, the specific 
enumeration herein not excluding the general. 
ARTICLE V INSURANCE 
5.1 Insurance. Trustor shall secure and maintain in force on the Trnst 
Estate commercial general liability insurance. All such insurance policies must 
cover all risks required to be covered by Beneficiary, comply with any 
requirements set forth in the Sales Agreement and be approved by Beneficiary as 
to amount, form, terms, deductibles and insurer. All such policies of insurance 
shall name Beneficiary as an additional insured or loss payee, as appropriate. All 
such insurance policies shall contain a provision that such policies will not be 
cancelled or amended, which term shall include any reduction in the scope or 
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5.2 Notice of Casualty. In the event of loss or damage to the Trust 
Estate, or any portion of the Trust Estate, Trustor shall immediately give notice 
thereof to Beneficiary. 
5.3 Proceeds ofinsurance. All proceeds of insurance on the Trust 
Estate, and all causes of action, claims, compensation, awards and recoveries for 
any damage, condemnation or taking of all or any part of the Trust Estate, or for 
any damage or injury to it or for any loss or diminution in the value of the Trust 
Estate, are hereby assigned to and shall be paid to Beneficiary, except as 
otherwise provided in the Sales Agreement. Beneficiary may participate in any 
suits or proceedings relating to any such proceeds, causes of action, claims, 
compensation, awards or recoveries. 
5.4 Disposition of Policies on Foreclosure. In the event Beneficiary 
exercises the power of sale or foreclosure provisions of this Trust Deed or makes 
any other transfer of title or assignment of the Trust Estate in extinguishment in 
whole or in part of the Obligations, all right, title and interest ofTrustor in and to 
the policies of insurance required by Section 5. I shall inure to the benefit of and 
pass to the transferee of the interests conveyed under this Trust Deed or to the 
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, as the case may be. 
ARTICLE VI INDEMNIFICATION AND OFF-SET 
6.1 Indemnification. Trustor hereby indemnifies and holds 
Beneficiary ha1mless in accordance with the following: 
6. I . I General Indemnification. Trnstor shall indemnify and hold 
Beneficiary harmless from any and all losses, damages, claims, causes of 
action, suits, debts, obligations, or liabilities which arise from or relate to, 
the Note, this Trust Deed, but excluding any such claims based upon 
breach or default by Beneficiary or gross negligence or wilful misconduct 
of Beneficiary. If Beneficiary commences an action against Trustor to 
enforce any of the terms, covenants or conditions of this Trust Deed or 
because of the breach by Trustor of any of the terms, covenants, or 
conditions, or for the recovery of any sum secured hereby, Trustor shall 
pay to Beneficiary reasonable attorneys fees and costs actually incurred by 
Beneficiary. The right to such attorneys fees and costs shall be deemed to 
have accrued on the commencement of such action, and shall be 
enforceable whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment. If 
Truster breaches any term, covenant or condition of this Trust Deed, 
Beneficiary may employ an attorney or attorneys to protect Beneficiary's 
rights hereunder and in the event of such employment following any 
breach of Truster, Trustor shall pay Beneficiary reasonable attorneys fees 
and costs actually incuned by Beneficiary, whether or not action is 
actually commenced against Trustor by reason of such material breach. 
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6.1 .2 Mechanics Liens. If Beneficiary or the Real Property is 
held liable or could be held liable for, or is subject to any losses, damages, 
costs, charges or expenses, directly or indirectly on account of any claims 
for work, labor, or material furnished in connection with or arising from 
the construction of any building, fixture and improvements, then Trustor 
shall indemnify, defend and hold Beneficiary harmless from all liability or 
expense arising therefrom including reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 
6.1.3 Hazardous Materials. Trustor hereby agrees to indemnify, 
hold harmless and defend (by counsel of Beneficiary's choice) 
Beneficiary, its directors, officers, employees, agent, successors and 
assigns from and against any and all claims, losses, damages, liabilities, 
fines, penalties, charges, administrative and judicial proceedings and 
orders, judgments, remedial action requirements, enforcement actions of 
any kind, and all costs and expenses incurred in connection therewith 
(including but not limited to attorneys' fees and expenses), arising directly 
or indirectly, in whole or in part, out of (a) the presence on or under the 
Real Property of any Hazardous Materials, or any releases or discharges of 
any Hazardous Materials on, under or off the Real Property, or (b) any 
activity carried on or undertaken on or off the Real Property, whether prior 
to or during the term of the Note, and whether by Trustor or any 
predecessor in title or any employees, agents, contractors or 
subcontractors of Trustor or any predecessor in title, or any third persons 
at any time occupying or present on the Real Property, in connection with 
the handling, treatment, removal, storage, decontamination, clean-up, 
transport or disposal of any Hazardous Materials at any time located or 
present on or under the Real Property. The foregoing indemnity shall 
further apply to any residual contamination on or under the Real Property, 
or affecting any natural resources, and to any contamination of any 
property or natural resources arising in connection with the generation, 
use, handling, storage, transport or disposal of any such Hazardous 
Materials, and irrespective of whether any of such activities were or will 
be undertaken in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, codes and 
ordinances. Truster hereby acknowledges and agrees that, 
notwithstanding any other provision of this Trust Deed or any of the other 
Purchase Documents to the contrary, the obligations of Truster under this 
Section 6.1.3 shall be unlimited personal obligations of Trustor and shall 
survive any foreclosure under this Trust Deed, any transfer in lieu thereof, 
and any satisfaction of the obligations ofTrustor in connection with the 
Note. Trustor acknowledges that Beneficiary's appraisal of the Real 
Property is such that Beneficiary would not extend the Note but for the 





6.2 Off-Set. All sums payable by Trustor under the Note and this 
Trust Deed shall be paid without notices, demand, counterclaim, set-off, 
deduction or defense and without abatement, suspension, deferment, diminution 
or reduction. The Obligations and liabilities of Trustor hereunder shall in no way 
be released, discharged or otherwise affected ( except as expressly provided 
herein) by reason of: (a) any damage to or destruction of, or any condemnation or 
similar taking of the Trust Estate or any part thereof; (b) any destruction or 
prevention of or interference with any use of the Tmst Estate or any part thereof; 
(c) any title defect or encumbrance or any eviction from the Trust Estate or any 
part thereof by title paramount or otherwise; (d) any bankruptcy, insolvency, 
reorganization, composition, adjustment, dissolution, liquidation or other like 
proceeding relating to Beneficiary, or any action taken with respect to this Trust 
Deed by any tmstee or any action taken with respect to this Trust Deed by any 
trustee or receiver of Beneficiary, or by any court, in any such proceeding; (e) 
any claim which Trustor has or might have against Beneficiary; (f) the occurrence 
of an Event of Default or any default or failure on the pai1 of Beneficiary to 
perform or comply with any of the tenns, covenants or conditions of this Trust 
Deed or of any other agreement with Trustor; or (g) any other occurrence 
whatsoever, whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing. 
ARTICLE VII TAXES AND IMPOSITIONS 
7.1 Payment of Taxes and Impositions. Trustor shall pay, prior to 
delinquency, all real property taxes and assessments, general and special, and all 
other taxes, assessments and other governmental, municipal, or other charges or 
impositions of any kind or nature whalsoever (including without limitation, 
charges and assessments on water or water stocks used on or with the Real 
Property and levies or charges resulting from covenants, conditions and 
restrictions affecting the Trust Estate) which are assessed or imposed upon the 
Trust Estate, or become due and payable, and which create, may create, or appear 
to create, a lien upon the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust Estate, or upon 
any equipment or other facility used in the construction, operation or maintenance 
of the Trust Estate (all of which taxes, assessments and other governmental 
charges of like nature are referred to as the "Impositions"); provided, however, 
that if, by law, any such Imposition is payable, or may at the election of the 
taxpayer be paid in installments, Trustor may pay the same together with any 
accmed interest on the unpaid balance of such Imposition in installments as the 
same become due and before any fine, penalty, interest or cost may be added 
thereto for the nonpayment of any such installment and interest. 
7.2 Evidence of Payment. Unless such Imposition is paid directly by 
Beneficiary pursuant to Section 8.3, Trustor shall furnish Beneficiary, within 
thirty (30) days after the date upon which such Imposition is due and payable by 
Trustor, official receipts of the appropriate taxing authority, or other proof 





7.3 Right to Contest. Trustor shall have the right before any 
delinquency occurs to contest or object to the amount or validity of any 
Imposition by appropriate legal proceedings, but such contest shall not be deemed 
or construed in any way as relieving, modifying or extending Trnstor's covenant 
to pay any such Imposition at the time and in the manner provided in Section 7. I 
unless Trustor has given prior written notice to Beneficiary of Trustor's intent to 
so contest or object to an Imposition, and unless, at Beneficiary's option, (a) 
Trustor shall demonstrate to Beneficiary's satisfaction that the legal proceedings 
shall conclusively operate to prevent the sale of the Trust Estate, or any part 
thereof, to satisfy such Imposition prior to final determination of such 
proceedings; or (b) Trnstor shall furnish a good and sufficient undertaking and 
sureties as may be required or permitted by law to accomplish a stay of such 
proceedings. 
ARTICLE VIII ADDITIONAL COVENANTS 
8.1 Payment of Utilities. Trustor shall pay when due all utility charges 
incurred by Trustor for the benefit of the Trust Estate or which may become a 
charge or lien against the Trust Estate for gas, electricity, water or sewer services 
furnished to the Trust Estate and all assessments or charges of a similar nature, 
whether public or private, affecting the Trust Estate or any portion thereof. 
whether or not such assessments or charges are liens thereon. 
8.2 Reserves for Taxes and Insurance. In furtherance of Article V and 
Article VII of this Trust Deed and anything to the contrary herein 
notwithstanding, if any Event of Default shall occur and be continuing, and at 
Beneficiary's written request, Trustor shall deposit with Beneficiary in a non-
interest bearing account, on the first day of each month, until the Note is paid in 
full, an amount equal to one-twelfth of the annual Impositions, as defined in 
Article VII, as reasonably estimated by Beneficiary to pay the installment of 
Impositions next due on the Trust Estate, and one-twelfth of the estimated annual 
aggregate insurance premiums on all policies of insurance required in Article V. 
In such event, Trustor shall cause all bills, statements or other documents relating 
to the Impositions and insurance premiums to be sent to Beneficiary. Providing 
Trustor has deposited sufficient funds with Beneficiary pursuant to this Section 
8.2, Beneficiary shall pay such amounts as may be due thereunder out of the funds 
so deposited with Beneficiary. If at any time and for any reason the funds 
deposited with Beneficiary are or will be insufficient to pay such amounts as may 
then or subsequently be due, Beneficiary shall notify Trustor and Trustor shall 
immediately deposit an amount equal to such deficiency with Beneficiary. 
Nothing contained herein shall cause Beneficiary to be deemed a trnstee of such 
funds deposited with Beneficiary pursuant to this Section 8.2. Beneficiary shall 
not be obligated to pay any interest on any sums held b y Beneficiary pending 
disbursement or application hereunder, and Beneficiary may impound or reserve 
for future payment of Impositions and insurance premiums such portion of such 




applying the balance on the principal of or interest on the Obligations secured 
hereby. Should Trustor fail to deposit with Beneficiary ( exclusive of that portion 
of the payments which has been applied by Beneficiary on the principal of or 
interest on the Note) sums sufficient to fully pay such Impositions and insurance 
premiums at least thirty (30) days before delinquency thereof, Beneficiary, at 
Beneficiary's election, but without any obligation to do so, may advance any 
amounts required to make up the deficiency, which advances, if any, shall be 
secured by this Trust Deed and shall bear interest and be repayable to Beneficiary 
in the manner specified in Section 8.4 of this Trust Deed. 
8.3 Performance in Trustor's Stead. Should Trustor fail to make any 
payment or to do any act as provided in this Trust Deed, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without any obligation to do so, and without notice to or demand 
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: (a) 
make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem 
necessary to protect the security hereof (Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized 
to enter upon the Trust Estate for such purposes); commence, appear in and 
defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the 
rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; or (b) pay, purchase, contest, or 
compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either 
appears to be superior to the lien of this Trust Deed; and in exercising any such 
powers, incur any liability, or expend such reasonable amounts as Beneficiary 
may deem necessary therefor, including costs of evidence of title, employment of 
attorneys, and payment of reasonable attorney fees and costs. All such amounts 
expended by either or both Trustee or Beneficiary shall, at the election of 
Beneficiary, be added to the principal indebtedness secured by this Trust Deed 
and shall accrue interest in accordance with the terms of the Note. Trustor hereby 
waives and releases all claims or causes of action which may hereafter arise in 
favor of Trustor against Beneficiary by reason of any action taken by Beneficiary 
pursuant to any power or authority granted in this Section 8.3, except for 
Beneficiary's gross negligence or wilful misconduct. 
8.4 Repayment of Advances. Tmstor shall immediately repay to 
Beneficiary sums, with interest thereon as provided in the Note, which at any time 
may be paid or advanced by Beneficiary for the payment of insurance premiums, 
Impositions, title searches, title reports or abstracts, and any other advances made 
by Beneficiary which are reasonably necessary or desirable to maintain this Trust 
Deed as a prior, valid, and subsisting lien upon ;the Trust Estate, to preserve and 
protect Beneficiary's interest in this Trust Deed, or to preserve, repair, or maintain 
the Trust Estate. All such advances shall be wholly optional on the part of 
Beneficiary, and Trustor's obligation to repay the same, with interest, to 
Beneficiary shall be secured by the lien of this Trust Deed. 
8.5 No Removal of Fixtures. Tmstor shall not, during the existence of 
this Trust Deed and without the written consent of Beneficiary, remove from the 
Real Property or the Improvements, any fixture, structure, or other improvement 
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at any time affixed or constructively affixed to the Real Property or the 
Improvements or any portion thereof, or any Personalty, except in the ordinary 
course of Trnstor's business. 
8.6 Further Assurance. Trustor shall execute and deliver to 
Beneficiary such further instruments, including without limitation Uniform 
Commercial Code Financing Statements and Continuation Statements, and do 
such further acts as may be necessary or as may be reasonably required by 
Beneficiary to carry out more effectively the purposes of this Trust Deed and to 
subject to the lien, security interest and mo1tgage created or intended to be created 
hereby any property, rights, or interests covered or intended to be covered by this 
Trust Deed. Trnstor authorizes (to the extent such authorization is valid under 
applicable law) Beneficiary to execute and file, without Trustor's signature, such 
Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statements and Continuation Statements as 
Beneficiary may deem necessary in order to perfect, or continue the perfection of 
the security interests created by this Trust Deed. 
8. 7 Attornment. Trustor shall assign to Beneficiary, as additional 
security for Truster's performance of the Obligations, any and all existing or 
future lease agreements entered into by Trustor, as landlord, which pertain to the 
Property or the Improvements, or any portion thereof, and all such leases shall 
contain a covenant on the part of the tenant thereunder, enforceable by 
Beneficiary, obligating such tenant upon request of Beneficiary, to attom to and 
become a tenant of Beneficiary, or any purchaser form Trustee or through 
foreclosure of this Trust Deed, for the unexpired te1m, and subject to the terms 
and conditions of such future lease agreements. The assignments of lease shall be 
in form and content satisfactory to Beneficiary. 
8.8 No Further Encumbrances. As an express condition of Beneficiary 
making the loan secured by this Trust Deed, Trustor shall not further encumber, 
pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, place any lien, charge or claim upon, or otherwise 
give as security the Trust Estate or nay interest therein, not cause or allow by 
operation of law the encumbrance of the Trust Estate or any interest therein 
without the written consent of Beneficiary even though such encumbrance may be 
junior to the encumbrance created by this Trust Deed. Encumbrance of the Trust 
Estate contrary to the provisions of this Section 8.9 without the express written 
consent of Beneficiary, shall constitute an Event of Default and at Beneficiary's 
option, Beneficiary may declare the entire balance of principal and interest 
immediately due and payable, whether the same be created by Trustor or an 
unaffiliated third party asserting a judgment lien, mechanic's or materialmen's 
lien or any other type of encumbrance or title defect. 
8.9 Due on Sale. Other than (a) a transfer by devise, descent or by 
operation oflaw upon the death of a joint tenant; (b) a transfer of Personalty in the 
ordinary course of Trustor's business; or ( c) the grant of any leasehold interest of 
three (3) years or less not containing an option to purchase, Trustor shall not sell, 
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convey or otherwise transfer the Trust Estate or any part thereof or interest 
therein, without the prior written consent of Beneficiary. If the Trust Estate, or 
any part thereof, or any interest therein, is sold, conveyed or otherwise transfe1Ted 
without the prior written consent of Beneficiary, or ifTrustor be divested of title 
to the Trust Estate, or any part thereof or involuntarily, then the full principal 
indebtedness of the Note and the other Obligations, at the option of Beneficiary 
and without demand or notice, shall inunediately become due and payable. It is 
expressly acknowledged and agreed that any transfer of more than twenty-five 
percent (25%) of the capital stock, partnership or member interests ofTrustor, as 
the case may be, shall constitute a transfer of the entire Trust Estate within the 
meaning of this Section 8.9. 
8.10 Evidence of Title. Trustor shall deliver to, pay for and maintain 
with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is pain in full, such 
evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies 
of title insurance and any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements or 
endorsements thereto. 
8.11 Additional Collateral. If, at any time, the value of all of the Trust 
Estate, based on an appraisal acceptable to Beneficiary, is not sufficient to 
establish a ratio between the total amount of the Obligations then due and owing 
and the value of all of the Trust Estate equal to or less than one hundred percent 
(100%), Truster shall provide Beneficiary with such additional collateral as is 
necessary so that the total value of all collateral securing Trustor's perfonnance of 
the Obligations is sufficient to establish a ratio between the total amount of the 
Obligations due and owing and the value of all such collateral of no more than 
one hundred percent (100%). 
8.12 Compliance With Laws. Trustor shall company with all laws, 
ordinances, regulations, easement agreements, covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions (including laws relating to hazardous wastes and/or protection of the 
environment, or species of plants or animals protected by federal, state, local or 
other law) affecting the Trust Estate. Trustor shall not cause, permit nor suffer 
any violation of any of the foregoing and shall pay all response costs, fees, or 
charges of any kind in connection therewith and defend, indemnify, and hold 
hannless Beneficiary with respect thereto. 
8.13 Financial Statements. Trustor shall keep adequate books and 
records of account of the Trust Estate and its own financial affairs sufficient to 
permit the preparation of financial statements therefrom in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. Beneficiary shall have the right to 
examine, copy and audit Trustor's records and books of account at all reasonable 
times. Truster shall furnish to Beneficiary copies of its financial statements and 
other financial information satisfactory to Beneficiary at the time and in the 
manner provided in the Loan Agreement. 
12 
118 of 325
r r3"· \ 
~0528398 
8.14 Inspections. Beneficiary, and its agents, representatives and 
employees, are authorized, but not obligated, to enter at any reasonable time upon 
the Real Property for the purpose of inspecting the same, and for the purpose of 
performing any of the acts it or Trustor is authorized to perform under the terms 
of this Trust Deed or any other Loan Document. 
8.15 No Merger. If the Trust Estate is under any lease or any portion 
thereof which constitutes a part of the Trust Estate shal I at any time become 
vested in one owner, this Trust Deed and the lien created hereby shall not be 
destroyed or terminated by application of the doctrine of merger and, in such 
event, Beneficiary shall continue to have and enjoy all of the rights and privileges 
of Beneficiary as to the separate estates. In addition, upon the foreclosure of the 
lien created by This Trust Deed on the Trust Estate pursuant to the provisions of 
this Trust Deed, any leases or subleases then existing and created by Trustor shall 
not be destroyed or terminated by application of the law of merger or as a matter 
of law or as a result of such foreclosure unless Beneficiary or any purchaser at 
any such foreclosure sale shall so elect. No act by or on behalf of Beneficiary or 
any such purchaser shall constitute a tennination of any lease or sublease unless 
Beneficiary or such purchaser shall give written notice thereof to such tenant or 
subtenant. 
ARTICLE IX CONDEMNATION AW ARDS 
9 .1 If the Trust Estate or any portion thereof should be taken or 
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation proceeding, 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or 
relief therefor, and shall be entitled at Beneficiary's option to commence, appear 
in, and prosecute in Beneficiary's own name any action or proceeding, and to 
make any compromise or settlement, in cormection with such taking. Trustor 
shall promptly give notice to Beneficiary of any condemnation proceeding or any 
taking for public improvement. All such compensation, awards, damages, causes 
of action, proceeds, or other payments are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, which 
may, after deducting therefrom all costs and expenses (regardless of the particular 
nature thereof and whether incurred with or without suit or before or after 
judgment), including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by Beneficiary in 
connection with such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action, proceeds, 
or other payments, release any and all moneys so received by Beneficiary or apply 
the same, or any portion thereof, on any of the Obligations (whether or not then 
due) secured by this Trust Deed. Beneficiary shall have no obligation to apply 
proceeds of condemnation to restore or repair damage to the Trust Estate 
regardless of whether such taking has a significant adverse impact on the 
operation of the remaining portion of the Trust Estate. Truster shall execute and 
deliver to Beneficiary such further assignments of such compensation, awards, 
damages, causes of action, proceeds, or other payments as Beneficiary may from 




ARTICLE X ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES. RENTS AND INCOME 
10.1 Assigrunent. Trustor hereby absolutely assigns to Trustee all right, 
title and interest of Trustor in and to all leases now existing or hereafter entered 
into by Trustor and demising the whole or any pa11 of the Trust Estate, and does 
hereby further assign any and all rents, subrents, room rents and other amounts 
received for the use of any rooms in the Trust Estate, including the Improvements, 
and any and all room rental agreements and arrangements now owned or hereafter 
acquired, and all proceeds from such room rents, covering the Trust Estate or any 
portion thereof, now or hereafter existing or entered into, together with issues, 
royalties, income, profits and security deposits of and from the Trust Estate. Unti I 
the occurrence of an Event of Default, Trustor may, under a temporary revocable 
license granted hereby, collect and use all such rents, subrents, room rents, issues, 
royalties, income, and profits which become payable prior to default. Upon the 
occurrence of an Event or Default, Trustor's license to collect and use any of such 
proceeds shall immediately cease without further action by or on behalf of any 
party, and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession of 
the Trust Estate, and either in person, by agent, or through a court-appointed 
receiver (Trustor hereby consents to the appointment of Beneficiary or 
Beneficiary's designee as such receiver), to sue for or otherwise collect all such 
rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, and profits, including those 
past due and unpaid. Any sums so collected, after the deduction of all costs and 
expenses of operation and collection (regardless of the particular nature thereof 
and whether incurred with or without suit or before or after judgment), including 
reasonable attorney fees, shall be applied toward the payment of the Obligations. 
Such right of collection and use of such proceeds by Beneficiary shall obtain both 
before and after the exercise of the power of sale provisions of this Trust Deed, 
the foreclosure of this Trust Deed and throughout any period of redemption . The 
rights granted under this Section 10.1 shall in no way be dependent upon and shall 
apply without regard to whether all or a portion of the Trust Estate is in danger of 
being lost, removed, or materially injured, or whether the Trust Estate or any 
other security is adequate to discharge the obligations secured by this Trust Deed. 
Beneficiary's failure or discontinuance at any time to collect any of such proceeds 
shall not in any manner affect the right, power, and authority of Beneficiary 
thereafter to collect the same. Neither any provision contained herein, nor the 
Beneficiary's exercise of Beneficiary's right to collect such proceeds, shall be, or 
be constmed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease, sublease, 
option, or other interest in the Trust Estate, or an assumption of liability under, or 
a subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to, any tenancy, lease, 
sublease, option, or other interest in the Trust Estate. All tenants, lessees, 
sublessees and other persons which have any obligation to make any payment to 
Trustor in connection with the Trust Estate or any portion thereof are hereby 
authorized and directed to pay rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, 
income, and profits payable t\by them with respect to the Trust Estate, or any part 
thereof, directly to Beneficiary on the demand of Beneficiary. Beneficiary's 
receipt of such rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, and profits 
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shall be a good and sufficient discharge of the obligation of the tenant lessee, 
sublessee, or other person concerned to make the payment connected with the 
amount so received by the Trustee. 
10.2 Application of Payments. If at any time during the term of this 
Trust Deed Beneficiary receives or obtains a payment, installment, or sum which 
is less than the entire amount then due under the Note secured by this Trust Deed 
and under all other instruments further evidencing or securing the Obligations, 
then Beneficiary shall, except as provided otherwise in the Note and 
notwithstanding any instructions which may be given by Trustor, have the right to 
apply such payment, installment, or sum, or any pait thereof, to such of the items 
or obligations then due from Trustor or to Beneficiary as Beneficiary may in 
Beneficiary's sole discretion determine. 
10.3 No Waiver of Rights by Collection of Proceeds. The entering 
upon and taking possession of the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust Estate 
or the collection ofrents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, profits, 
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any 
taking or damaging of the Trust Estate, or the application or release thereof as 
aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any Event of Default or notice of default 
hereunder, shall not invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice of default, and 
shall not operate to postpone or suspend the obligation to make, or have the effect 
of altering the size of any scheduled installments provided for in any of the 
Obligations secured by this Trust Deed. 
10.4 Indemnification. Trustor shall indemnify, pay, protect, defend and 
hold Beneficiary harmless from and against all claims, demands, judgments, 
liabilities, actions, costs, and fees (including reasonable attorney fees) arising 
from or related to receipt by Beneficiary of the rents, subrents, room rents, issues, 
royalties, income and profit from the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust 
Estate, except those liabilities arising from Beneficiary's own gross negligence 
and wilful misconduct. 
ARTICLE XI EVENTS OF DEFAULT AND REMEDIES 
11.1 Events of Default. Fifteen (15) days after written notice from 
Beneficiary to Trustor for monetary defaults and thirty (30) days after written 
notice from Beneficiary to Trustor for non-monetary defaults, if such defaults are 
not cured within such fifteen (15) day or thirty (30) day periods, respectively, 
each of the following shall constitute an event of default under this Trust Deed (an 
"Event of Default"): 
11 .1.1 Failure to Make Payment. If Trustor shall fail to make any 
payment due and payable under the terms of the Note or this Trust Deed. 
15 
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11.1.2 Non-Monetary Default. Except as provided otherwise in 
Section 11.1.1, failure to observe and perfom1 any of the ten11s, covenants, 
or conditions to be observed or perfon11ed in the Note or this Trust Deed. 
11.1.3 False Warranty. Any material representation or warranty 
of the Trustor contained in the Note or this Trust Deed. 
11 .1.4 Insolvency, Etc. If (a) Trustor commences any case, 
proceeding, or other action seeking reorganization, arrangement, 
adjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or composition of Trustor or Trustor's 
debts under any Jaw relating to bankruptcy, reorganization, or relief of 
debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or other 
similar official for Trustor of for all or any substantial part of Trustor's 
property; (b) any guarantor of the Note commences any case, proceeding, 
or other action seeking reorganization, arrangement, adjustment, 
liquidation, dissolution, or composition of such guarantor or such 
guarantor's debts under any law relating to bankruptcy, reorganization, or 
relief of debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, 
or other similar official for such guarantor or for any substantial part of 
such guarantor's property; or ( c) any such case, proceeding, or other 
action is commenced against either Trustor or any guarantor of the Note. 
11.1.5 Failure to Pay Debts. Trustor fails to pay Trustor's debts as 
they become due, admits in writing Trustor's inability to pay Trustor's 
debts, or makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. 
11.1.6 Failure to Perform Other Obligations. A default by Trustor 
under the ten11s of any other promissory note, deed of trust, security 
agreement, undertaking or arrangement between Trustor and Beneficiary 
now existing or entered into hereafter. 
11.2 Acceleration; Notice. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon the 
occurrence of any Event of Default under this Trust Deed and following the 
expiration of any cure period provided for herein, at Beneficiary's option and in 
addition to any other remedy Beneficiary may have under the Note, Beneficiary 
may declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and elect to 
have the Trust Estate sold in the manner provided herein. In the event 
Beneficiary elects to sell the Trust Estate, Beneficiary may execute or cause 
Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause the Trust 
Estate to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such 
notice for record in the office of the County Recorder of the County wherein the 
Trust Estate is located. Beneficiary shall also deposit with Trustee the Note and 
all documents evidencing expenditures secured by this Trust Deed. 
11.3 Exercise of Power of Sale. Upon receipt of such notice from 




Trustor and each Guarantor such Notice of Default and Election to Sell as then 
required by Chapter 57 of the Utah Code Annotated. Trustee shall, without 
demand on Trustor, after lapse of such time as may be required by law and after 
recordation of such Notice of Default and Election to Sell first give notice of the 
time and place of such sale, in the manner provided by the laws of the State of 
Utah for the sale ofreal property under execution, and may from time to time 
postpone such sale by such advertisement as it may deem reasonable, or without 
further advertisement, by proclamation made to the persons assembled at the time 
and place previously appointed and advertised for such sale, and on the day of 
sale so advertised, or to which such sale may have been postponed, Trustee may 
sell the Real Property so adve11ised, at public auction, at the time and place 
specified in the notice, either in the county in which the Real Property, or any part 
thereof, to be sold, is situated, or at the principal office of Trustee located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, in its discretion, to the highest cash bidder. Trustee 
shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a Trustee's Deed conveying the Real 
Property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The 
recitals in the Trustee's Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of 
the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. 
Trnstee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (a) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of 
Trustee's and attorney's fees and costs; (b) cost of any evidence of title procured 
in connection with such sale; (c) all sums expended under the terms hereof in 
conjunction with any default provision hereunder, not then repaid, with accrued 
interest at the rate then provided for in the Note; ( d) all sums then secured by this 
Trust Deed, including interest and principal on the Note; and (e) the remainder, if 
any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or Trustee, in Trustee's 
discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the 
County wherein the Trust Estate is located. 
11.4 Surrender of Possession. Trustor shall surrender possession of the 
Trust Estate to the purchaser immediately after the sale of the Trust Estate as 
provided in Section 11.3 above, in the event such possession has not previously 
been surrendered by Trustor. 
11.5 UCC Remedies. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
Sections 11.3 and 11.4 of this Trust Deed, Beneficiary, with regard to all the 
Personalty, shall have the right to exercise, from time to time, any and all rights 
and remedies available to Beneficiary, as a secured party under the Unifonn 
Conunercial Code of Utah, and any and all rights and remedies available to 
Beneficiary under any other applicable law. Upon written demand from 
Beneficiary, Truster shall, at Truster's expense, assemble the Personalty and 
make them available to Beneficiary at a reasonably convenient place designated 
by Beneficiary. Beneficiary shall have the right to enter upon any premises 
where the Personalty or records pertaining to Personalty may be and take 
possession of the Personalty and records relating to the Personalty. Beneficiary 




deducting the reasonable costs and out of pocket expenses incurred by 
Beneficiary, including, without limitation, (a) reasonable attorneys fees and legal 
expenses, (b) transportation and storage costs, ( c) advertising of sale of the 
Personalty, (d) sale commissions, (e) sales tax,(£) costs for improving or repairing 
the Personalty, and (g) costs for preservation and protection of the Personalty, 
apply the remainder to pay, or to hold as a reserve against, the Obligations. 
The rights and remedies of Beneficiary upon the occurrence of one or 
more Events of Default (whether such rights and remedies are conferred by 
statute, by rule oflaw, by this Trust Deed, the Loan Agreement or otherwise) may 
be exercised by Beneficiary, either alternatively, concunently, or consecutively in 
any order. The exercise of Beneficiary or Trustee at the express direction of 
Beneficiary of any one or more of such rights and remedies shall not be construed 
to be an election of remedies nor waiver of any other rights and remedies 
Beneficiary might have unless, and limited to the extent that, Beneficiary shall 
elect or so waive by an instrument in writing delivered to Trustee. Without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, to the extent that this Trust Deed covers 
both the Real Property and the Personalty, Beneficiary may, in the sole discretion 
of Beneficiary, either alternatively, concunently or consecutively in any order: 
a. Proceed as to the Real Property, Improvements and the Personalty 
in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to 
real property. 
b. Proceed as to the Real Property and Improvements in accordance 
with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to real property 
and proceed as to the Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's 
rights and remedies in respect to the personal property. 
Beneficiary may, in the sole discretion of Beneficiary, appoint Trustee as 
the agent of Beneficiary for the purpose of disposition of the Personalty in 
accordance with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code - Secured Transactions. 
If Beneficiary should elect to proceed as to the Real Property, 
Improvements and the Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and 
remedies in respect to real property: 
c. All the Personalty may be sold, in the manner and at the time and 
place provided in this Trust Deed, in one lot, or in separate lots 
consisting of any combination or combinations of the Real 
Property, Improvements and Personalty, as the Beneficiary may 
elect, in the sole discretion of Beneficiary. 
d. Truster acknowledges and agrees that a disposition of the 




respect to real property, as hereinabove provided, is a 
commercially reasonable disposition of the Personalty. 
If Beneficiary should elect to proceed as to the Personalty in accordance 
with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to personal property, 
Beneficiary sha ll have all the rights and remedies conferred on a secured party by 
the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by the State of Utah. 
11.6 Foreclosure as a Mortgage. If an Event of Default occurs 
hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to foreclose this Trust Deed in the 
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mo1igages on real property and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses 
incident thereto, including reasonable attorneys fees and costs in such amounts as 
shall be fixed by the court. 
11.7 Receiver. If an Event of Default occurs, Beneficiary, as a matter 
of right and without regard to the interest of Trustor therein, shall have the right 
upon notice to Trustor to apply to any court having jurisdiction to appoint a 
receiver or receivers of the Trust Estate and Trustor hereby irrevocably consents 
to such appointment. Any such receiver or receivers shall have all the usual 
powers and duties of a receiver and shall continue as such and exercise all such 
powers w1til completion of the sale of the Trust Estate or the foreclosure 
proceeding, unless the receivership is sooner terminated. 
11.8 No Remedy Exclusive. No remedy conferred upon or reserved to 
Beneficiary under this Trust Deed shall be exclusive of any other available 
remedy or remedies, but each and every such remedy shall be cumulative and 
shall be in addition to every other remedy given under this Trust Deed or any 
other Loan Document, or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by 
statute. No delay or failure to exercise any right or power accruing upon any 
Event of Default shall impair any such right or power or shall be construed to be a 
waiver thereof, but any such right and power may be exercised from time to time 
and as often as may be deemed expedient. 
11.9 Rights upon Default. In making the Note, Beneficiary has relied 
upon the rights available to Beneficiary under this Trust Deed upon the 
occurrence of an Event of Default, including, but not limited to, the rights to 
accelerate the payment of any and all amounts secured by this Trust Deed, to sell 
the Real Property encumbered by this Trust Deed pursuant to the power of sale 
granted hereunder, the right to foreclose this Trust Deed as a mortgage, and the 
right to have a receiver appointed. In addition to any other damages that might be 
recoverable by Beneficiary under the terms of this Trust Deed, Trustor shall be 
liable for any damages incurred by Beneficiary because Beneficiary is, for any 
reason, denied the opportunity to exercise Beneficiary's rights upon the 
occurrence of an Event of Default, including, but not limited to, such damages as 
are occasioned by depreciation of the Trust Estate, loss ofuse of the Trust Estate 
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by Beneficiary, and all opportunity costs incurred through the loss of use of any 
funds as would have been received by Beneficiary through exercise of the power 
of sale or foreclosure, or the appointment of a receiver. 
ARTICLE XII GENERAL PROVISIONS 
12.1 Notices. All notices shall be in writing and shall be deemed to 
have been sufficiently given or served when personally delivered, deposited in the 
United States mail, by registered or certified mail, or deposited with a reputable 
overnight mail carrier which provides deli very of such rnai I to be traced, 
addressed as follows: 
Beneficiary: 
With copies to: 
Trustee: 
Trustor: 
With copies to: 
Monitor Finance, LC./ 
First Capital Funding, L.C. 
3191 North Canyon Road 
Provo, UT 84604 
John G. Mulliner 
363 North University, Suite 103 
P.O. Box 1045 
Provo, UT 84603 
Such addresses may be changed by notice to the other party given in the 
same manner provided in this Section. 
12.2 Severability. If any provision of this Trust Deed shall be held or 
deemed to be or shall, in fact, be illegal, inoperative, or unenforceable, the same 
shall not affect any other provision or provisions contained in the Trust Deed or 
render the same invalid, inoperative, or unenforceable to any extent whatsoever. 
20 
126 of 325
(' . ~ -\ 
by Beneficiary, and all opportunity costs incuITed through the loss of use of any 
funds as would have been received by Beneficiary through exercise of the power 
of sale or foreclosure, or the appointment of a receiver. 
ARTICLE XII GENERAL PROVISIONS 
12.1 Notices. All notices shall be in writing and shall be deemed to 
have been sufficiently given or served when personally delivered, deposited in the 
United States mail, by registered or certified mail, or deposited with a reputable 
overnight mail carrier which provides delivery of such mail to be traced, 
addressed as follows: 
Beneficiary: 
With copies to : 
Trustee: 
Trustor: 
With copies to: 
Monitor Finance, L.C. / 
First Capital Funding, L.C. 
3191 North Canyon Road 
Provo, UT 84604 
John G. Mulliner 
363 North University, Suite 103 
P.O. Box 1045 
Provo, UT 84603 
Such addresses may be changed by notice to the other party given in the 
same manner provided in this Section. 
12.2 Severability. If any provision of this Trust Deed shall be held or 
deemed to be or shall, in fact, be illegal, inoperative, or unenforceable, the same 
shall not affect any other provision or provisions contained in the Trust Deed or 




12.3 Amendments, Changes, and Modifications. This Trust Deed may 
not be amended, changed, modified, altered, or terminated without the written 
consent of Beneficiary. 
12.4 Governing Law. This Trust Deed shall be governed exclusively by 
and construed in accordance with the applicable laws of the State of Utah. 
12.5 Interpretation. Whenever the context shall include the singular, the 
whole shall include any part thereof, and the gender shall include both other 
genders. The section headings contained in this Trust Deed are for purposes of 
reference only and shall not limit, expand, or otherwise affect the construction of 
any provisions hereof. 
12.6 Binding Effect. This Trust Deed shall be binding upon Trustor and 
Trustor's successors and assigns. This Trust Deed shall inure to the benefit of 
Beneficiary, and Beneficiary's successors and assigns, and the holders of any of 
the Obligations secured hereby. 
12.7 Waivers. Beneficiary's failure at any time or times hereafter to 
require strict performance by Trustor of any of undertakings, agreements, or 
covenants contained in this Trust Deed shall not waive, affect, or diminish any 
right of Beneficiary hereunder to demand strict compliance and performance 
therewith. Any waiver by Beneficiary of any Event of Default under this Trust 
Deed shall not waive or affect any other Event of Default hereunder, whether such 
Event of Default is prior or subsequent thereto and whether of the same or a 
different type. None of the undertakings, agreements, or covenants of Trustor 
under this Trust Deed, shall be deemed to have been waived by Beneficiary, 
unless such waiver is evidenced by an instrument in writing signed by an officer 
of Beneficiary and directed to Trustor specifying such waiver. 
12.8 Successor Trustee. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at 
any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of the county 
wherein the Real Property is located, a substitution of trustee. From the time the 
substitution is filed for record, the new Trustee shall succeed to all the powers, 
duties, authority and title of Trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proofthereofmade in the 
manner provided by law. 
12.9 Heirs, Successors, Etc., Definitions. This Trust Deed shall apply 
to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of 
Trustor hereunder, if more than one party, are joint and several as between them. 
The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, 
of the Note secured hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context so requires, 
the masculine gender includes both the feminine and neuter, and the singular 




12.10 Acceptance of Trust. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust 
Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by 
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of any pending sale under 
any other deed of trust or any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, 
or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
12.11 Attorneys' Fees. Trustor agrees to reimburse Beneficiary for any 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred by Beneficiary with respect 
to any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, or other action involving Trustor or 
any guarantor as a debtor. 
Trustor additionally agrees to pay all reasonable costs and out of pocket 
expenses, including, without limitation, (a) reasonable attorneys fees and legal 
expenses, (b) transportation and storage costs, ( c) advertising of sale of the Trust 
Estate, (d) sale commissions, (e) sales tax, (f) costs for improving or repairing the 
Trust Estate, and (g) costs for preservation and protection of the Trust Estate, 
incurred by Beneficiary in obtaining possession of Trust Estate, storage and 
preparation for sale, sale or other disposition, and otherwise incurred in 
foreclosing upon the Trust Estate. Any and all such costs and out of pocket 
expenses shall be payable by Trustor upon demand, together with interest thereon 
from the date of the advance until repaid, both before and after judgment, at the 
rate provided in the Note. 
Regardless of any breach or default, Trustor agrees to pay all expenses, 
including reasonable attorneys fees and legal expenses incurred by Beneficiary in 
any bankruptcy proceedings of any type involving Trustor, the Trust Estate, or 
this Trust Deed, including, without limitation, expenses incurred in modifying or 
lifting the automatic stay, determining adequate protection, use of cash collateral, 
or relating to any plan of reorganization. 
12.12 Request for Notice. Trustor requests that a copy of any Notice of 
Default and of any Notice of Sale hereunder be mailed to Trustor at the address 
for Trustor specified in Section 12.1. 
12.13 Limitation on Damages. Beneficiary and its officers, directors, 
employees, representatives, agents, and attorneys, shall not be liable to Trustor or 
any Guarantor for consequential damages arising from or relating to any breach of 
contract, tort, or other wrong in connection with or relating to this Trust Deed or 
the Trust Estate. 
12.14 Preferential Transfers. If the incurring of any debt by Trustor or 
the payment of any money or transfer of property to Beneficiary by or on behalf 
of Trustor or any Guarantor should for any reason subsequently be determined to 
be "voidable" or "avoidable" in whole or in part within the meaning of any state 
or federal law (collectively "voidable transfers"), including, without limitation, 
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fraudulent conveyances or preferential transfers under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code or any other federal or state law, and Beneficiary is required to 
repay or restore any voidable transfers or the amount or any portion thereof, or 
upon the advice of Beneficiary's counsel in advised to do so, then, as to any such 
amount or property repaid or restored, including all reasonable costs, expenses, 
and attorneys fees of Beneficiary related thereto, the liability of Trnstor and 
Guarantor, and each of them, and this Trnst Deed, shall automatically be revived, 
reinstated and restored and shall exist as though the voidable transfers had never 
been made. 
12.15 Survival. All agreements, representations, warranties and 
covenants made by Trustor shall survive the execution and delivery of this Trust 
Deed, the filing and consummation of any bankruptcy proceedings, and shall 
continue in effect so long as any obligation to Beneficiary contemplated by this 
Trust Deed is outstanding and unpaid, notwithstanding any tennination of this 
Trnst Deed. All agreements, representations, wananties and covenants in this 
Trust Deed shall run with the land, shall bind the party making the same and its 
heirs and successors, and shall be to the benefit of and be enforceable by each 
party for whom made and their respective heirs, successors and assigns. 
DATED: DECEMBER 30 
State of IDAHO 






On this 30th day of DECEMBER , 2005 , before me, a Notary Public in and for 
said State, personally appeared MICHAEL J. MILLWARI> , known to me to be the 
MANAGER of M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC 'Inc. I and that (s)he executed the same. 
~------·; . . / .. ?----( 
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A Tract of land in the South Yi of the South Yi Section 31, Township 6 South, Range 35 East, Boise 
Meridian, Bannock County, Idaho, more pa1ticularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the South quarter comer of Section 31; thence South 89°36'40" East, 82.68 feet; thence 
North 53°44'13" East, 88.1 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West, 320 feet; thence North 63°15'5 I" East, 
260 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West 495 .62 feet, more or less, to the Southerly right of way line of 
Barton Road; thence South 72°27'20" West along the Southerly right of way of Barton Road 472.74 feet; 
thence continuing along the Southerly right of way line of Barton Road, South 83°18'20" West, 389.3 
feet, more or less, to the Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail; thence South 26°44 '40" East along the 
Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail 791.56 feet, more or less, to the South line of said Section 31; thence 
South 89°44' East, 462.23 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB # 1768 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Emai I: ron@cooper-larsen .com 
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Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a 











WILDLIFE RIDGE EST A TES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 





WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 





MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 
Utah limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counter-defendant, ) __________________ ) 
CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C 
STIPULATION CONSENTING 
TO SALE OF REAL 
PROPERTY AND DEPOSIT 
OF PROCEEDS INTO TRUST 
Stipulation Consenting To Sale of Real Property and Deposit of Proceeds Into Trust 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiffs and Counter-defendants Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company 
("First Capital"), by and through their attorney ofrecord, Ron Kerl; and the Defendant and Counter-
claimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife Ridge"), by and through its attorney of record, A. 
Bruce Larson, and stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. In their Complaint on file herein, Monitor and First Capital allege that on the 
December 30, 2005, they jointly loaned to Michael Millward andM&S Development, LLC the sum 
of $244,000, as evidenced by a Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005, in the principal sum of 
$244,000, both principal and interest being payable in words and figures as set fo rth in Exhibit "A" 
attached to their Complaint on file herein. They further allege that the Deed of Trust Note was 
thereafter modified on March 3, 2008. 
2. In their Complaint Monitor and First Capital allege that as security for the repayment 
of the Trust Deed Note as modified, M & S Development, LLC executed a Deed of Trust on certain 
Bannock County real prope1ty. The Deed of Trust was recorded on the 30th day of December, 2005, 
under Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho. 
3. In its Answer and Counter-claim on file herein, Wildlife Ridge disputes the 
enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, as modified, and the Deed of Trust. 
4. Wildlife Ridge has arranged for the sale of some of the real property described in the 
Deed of Trust and has asked Monitor and First Capital to consent to the sale and release the Deed 
of Trust on the property to be sold. Wildlife Ridge proposed that Monitor and First Capital 's 
consent to such sales would be dependent upon the proceeds of such sales being deposited into a 
trust account and the lien rights and security interests of Monitor and First Capital will 
Stipu lation Consenting To Sale of Rea l Property and Deposit of Proceeds Into Trust 
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automatically attach to the sale proceeds deposited into trust. 
5. Monitor and First Capital consent to the sale of the below described real property 
provided that after payment of real estate commissions and closing costs the net proceeds of such 
sales are deposited by the closing agent closing the sales into a trust account at Pioneer Title 
Company, Pocatello, Idaho and the lien rights and security interests of Monitor and First Capital in 
that real property automatically attach to the sale proceeds deposited into trust. Based upon that 
agreement by Wildlife Ridge, Monitor and First Capital will consent to the following real property 
sales, and execute any and all instruments required by the closing agent to release the Deed of Trust 
as an encumbrance to the title of such prope1ty: 
a. Sale of Lot 4, Block 3, Wildlife Ridge Estates, Division 2, to Timothy D. And 
Micaela Queen Jones for the Purchase Price of $49,900.00. 
b. Sale of Lot 6, Block 3, Wildlife Ridge Estates, Division 1, to Jonathan Vincent for 
the Purchase Price of $38,000.00. 
c. Sale of Lot 7 and Lot 9, Block 3, Wildlife Ridge Estates, Division 2, to SDH 
Construction, LLC for the Purchase Price of $92,926.00. 
d. Sale of Lot 1, Block 2, Wildlife Ridge Estates, Division 2, to Thomas James 
McFarland for the Purchase Price of $44,000.00. 
6. Once deposited into Trust, the sale proceeds shall be held until either Wildlife 
Ridge, Monitor and First Capital enter into a written agreement directing the distribution of 
such sale proceeds, or the Comt in this proceeding issues its Order directing the distribution of 
such sale proceeds. 
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7. The parties agree that this Stipulation shall not be enforceable against each other until 
the Cou11 in this proceeding enters its Order approving the terms of this Stipulation and makes the 
same binding upon Wildlife Ridge, Monitor and First Capital. 
Dated this~day of March, 2017. 
Ron Kerl 
Dated this 61h day of March, 2017. 
HEARN & WOOD, LLP 
Attorney for Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC 
A. Bruce Larson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST ATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited ) 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL ) 
FUNDING, L.C. , a Utah limited liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; M&S 















WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; 
Counter-claimant, 
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Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
• MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C. 
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC2, filed an Answer 
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and 
injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs have now submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as 
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs also submitted a Motion to Amend the Complaint, 
which was scheduled for a hearing date separate from the motion for partial summary judgment. 
In support of partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs submitted a written brief and the Affidavit 
of Ron Kerl , including exhibits. Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge responded with an 
opposing brief and the Affidavit of Richard A. Hearn, with attached exhibits. The Plaintiffs then 
followed up with a reply brief and the Second Affidavit of Ron Kerl , including exhibits. 
Oral arguments were conducted on February 21, 2017. At the outset of the hearing, the 
patties addressed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint. Although that motion was set 
to be heard at a later date, counsel for the Defendants indicated they had no objection to the 
amendment of the Complaint. Therefore, in a ruling from the bench, this Court granted the 
Plaintiffs' request to add a new defendant based upon stipulation of the parties. 
Having reviewed the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the 
arguments made by the parties, this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1. Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
1 Collectively referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs". 
2 Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant" . 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
56( c )(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 
867 P.2d 960,963 (1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that pruty's favor. 
Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. 
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine iss_ue of material fact exists, the burden now shi_fts to the non-moving party to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 
90, 867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving paity when 
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that pa1ty's case 
upon which that paity bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P .2d 
at 1037-38; Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing 
the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the paity's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2016) 
( emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following pertinent facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence, with all 
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the Defendant. Bus hi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 
Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009)("All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006)).3 
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real property described in the Deed of 
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to JudiciaJly Foreclose Deed of Trust. 
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed its initial Complaint seeking to quiet title in that 
property against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First 
Action").4 (See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by 
Monitor and First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 
12, 2015. (Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, 
Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of 
Trust free and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from 
3 The background information was extracted from the patties' briefs and the submitted affidavits and exhibits. 
4 Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of 
the First Action. 
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the district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust 
Deed Note ("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been 
satisfied. (Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, a Judgment dismissing the 
First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.) 
DISCUSSION 
As explained above, the case presently before this Comt was initiated by a Complaint to 
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed against Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC and 
M&S Development, LLC. Wildlife Ridge filed an Answer to Complaint and a Counterclaim 
against the Plaintiffs for fraud and declaratory and injunctive relief. In an earlier action, Wildlife 
Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free 
and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the 
district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification had been 
satisfied. That case was dismissed with prejudice. In seeking pa1tial summary judgment, the 
Plaintiffs argue that all defenses and claims now raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the 
current lawsuit are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
a. Law 
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court 
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon 
the same claim. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the doctrine of res judicata, or claim 
preclusion, as follows: 
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Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this 
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous 
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original 
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the 
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
Berkshire investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943,951 (2012) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent 
relitigation of a claim previously asse1ted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating 
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v. 
Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes 
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim 
but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic 
Valley Radiology, P .. A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10 
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 
208 P. 241. 242-43 (1922). As further explained by Idaho courts, because the transactional 
concept of a claim is broad, "the bar of claim preclusion may apply even where there is not a 
substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence 
relating to those theories ." Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,259,668 P.2d 130, 135 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1983)(cited with approval by Kolouch, 123 Idaho at 437,849 P.2d at 110.) Thus, "a valid 
and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Kolouch, 123 Idaho 
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at 43 7, 849 P .2d at 11 O; see also Diamond v. Farmers Ins., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P .2d 319. 
323 (1990) . 
Res judicata serves tlu·ee fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the 
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 
(Ct.App.1983)). 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 PJd 613, 617 (2007). 
b. Analysis 
The Plaintiffs argue the First Action already addressed the enforceability of the same 
Deed of Trust Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust at issue here. Because that lawsuit was 
dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants are now prevented from 
presenting any defense or claim challenging the enforceability of the debt which might have and 
should have been litigated in that First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by 
Monitor and First Capital ("Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J."), Jan. 6, 2017, 3-4.) The Plaintiffs have 
therefore asked this Court to strike and dismiss the affirmative defenses and the Counterclaim 
raised by the Defendant. 
In response, the Defendant argues res Judicata is not a bar to the defenses and/or 
counterclaim it has raised in the present lawsuit because none of those issues were "actually 
litigated in the Quiet Title Action and they could not have been litigated." (Def. Wildlife 
Ridge's Resp. to Pis. Monitor Finance L.C.'s and First Capital L.C.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 
("Def. 's Resp."), Feb. 6, 2017, 12.) For example, Wildlife Ridge first argues that "[t]he entity 
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that appeared in the Quiet Title Action as Monitor Financial LC. was not a real party in interest 
to the transactions that were the subject matter of that action or the present action." (Def. 's Resp. 
at 6.) In support of that allegation, the Defendant points to the fact that the Monitor Finance, 
L.C. that was named as a party to the Note and Deed of Trust expired on September 17, 2012, 
and was never renewed. Instead, "[a] new entity bearing the same name Monitor Financial L.C. 
was established on January 23 , 2015 nearly two months after the Quiet Title Action was filed on 
December 3, 2014." (Id.) Thus, the Defendant argues that one of the plaintiffs in this case, 
Monitor Finance, L.C. , which entity was named as a defendant in the First Action to quiet title 
filed by Wildlife Ridge, was not a real pa1ty in interest in that case because it had been 
administratively dissolved before the First Action was filed. The Defendant fu1ther argues that 
its pending counterclaim and affirmative defenses for fraud were not raised and could not have 
been litigated in the quiet title action because neither M&S Development, LLC ("M&S"), or 
Michael Millward were named parties.5 (See id.) While the Defendant notes that M&S and Mr. 
Millward were referenced in both the initial complaint and the amended complaint to quiet title, 
the Defendant argues that neither M&S nor Mr. Millward were named parties in the quiet title 
action and "there were no allegations made by any party in the Quiet Title Action that either 
M&S or Millward had done anything wrong." (Id.) The Defendant thus argues: "As Millward 
and M&S would have been necessary patties to any fraud claim brought against Plaintiffs, 
5 "On December 30, 2005, M&S Development, LLC and Michael Millward signed a promissory note with First 
Capital Funding, L.C. and Monitor Finance, L.C. for $244,000.00." (Ex. C, attached to Kerl Aff., Am. Cornpl. to 
Quite Title ("First Action"), March 16, 2016, ~7; see also Ex. B, attached to Kerl Aff. , Compl. to Quiet Title, Dec. 1, 
2014, §§7-8.) 
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Wildlife Ridge had no duty to bring its claim for fraud against Plaintiffs, Millward and M&S in 
association with its Quiet Title Action." (Def. 's Resp. at 8.) Finally, the Defendant argues that 
the Modification of Trust Deed Note was never mentioned in the pleadings filed in the quiet title 
action. (Id. at 7.) The Defendant argues the Modification is "central" to the foreclosure action 
and Wildlife Ridge's counterclaim for fraud, and is another example of a claim that could not 
have been brought in the First Action. (Id.) 
First, this Cou1t must reject the Defendant's argument that Monitor Finance, L.C., while a 
named defendant in the First Action, was nonetheless not a real pa1ty in interest to that lawsuit 
because it had been previously administratively dissolved . Dissolution of a corporation does not 
prevent the commencement of legal proceedings against that corporation in its corporate name. 
Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, NA., 1999 UT 91, ~ 14, 991 P .2d 584, 587; see also 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-lOa-1405 (West).6 Because the debt owed existed prior to any 
6 § 16-IOa-1405. Effect of dissolution 
(I) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that 
appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining prope1ty among its shareholders according to their interests; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs. 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the 
corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8, Directors and 
Officers; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name; 
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dissolution and Monitor Finance was sued during the winding down process to invalidate that 
debt, Monitor Finance was a legitimate party in interest and a named defendant in the First 
Action. 
This Court further rejects the Defendant's argument that M&S and Michael Millward 
were indispensable patties for a complete resolution regarding Wildlife Ridge's claim that the 
debt due to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. Whether a party is "indispensable" is governed by 
IRCP _19(a)(l). 7 Under that rule, a pa1ty shall be joined if: 
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing 
parties; or 
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that disposing of the action in the person's absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the 
interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing pruty subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a). In this case, complete relief could have been granted to Wildlife Ridge if 
the court in the quiet title action had determined that the debt had been satisfied. If that had been 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation. 
UTAH CODE A NN. § I 6-IOa-1405 (West)(emphasis added). 
7 Rule 19. Required joinder of parties 
(a) Persons Required to be Joined if Feasible. 
(I) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party in the action if: 
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or 
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in 
the person's absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing paity subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations because of the interest. 
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the outcome, the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust would have no debt to secure, and title to the premises 
could have been quieted in Wildlife Ridge, free and clear of that encumbrance. No matter the 
basis for such a finding, that outcome would not have adversely affected either M&S or Mr. 
Millward since the debt they were personally liable for would no longer be enforceable. In 
addition, there was no risk of double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations since M&S 
and Mr. Millward would have been bound by a decree finding that the debt owed was 
unenforceable, no matter whether the basis of such a decree was that the debt had been satisfied 
or that the debt was unenforceable based on a statute of limitations or fraud argument. As such 
M&S and Mr. Millward were not indispensable parties to Wildlife Ridge's quiet title action 
and/or Wildlife Ridge's attempt to have the debt deemed unenforceable. 
This Com1 must also reject the Defendant's arguments regarding the Modification. The 
Defendant argued the Modification dated March 3, 2008, was fraudulent and the "statute of 
limitations claim is related directly to the validity and effect of the claimed Modification." 
(Def. 's Resp. at 10.) The Defendant argued that because the Modification of Trust Deed Note 
was "never mentioned" in the pleadings filed in the quiet title action, the issues surrounding the 
Modification could not have been litigated and therefore cannot now be barred by res Judicata. 
However, the record shows the Defendant was aware of the Modification during the First Action, 
since the Modification was produced to Wildlife Ridge through discovery. (Ex. 2, First Capital 
Funding, L.C. 's Resp. to Pl. 's First Set of Discovery, attached to Second Aff. of Ron Kerl in 
Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., 114-5, 
Feb. 14, 2017.) As such, any claims pe11aining to the Modification could have been raised in the 
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First Action, and this Comt has also already determined that M&S and Mr. Millward were not 
indispensable parties to the Quiet Title Action necessary to any fraud allegation attempting to 
show the debt owed to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. 
Therefore, based on the above findings and the undisputed facts in this case, all of the 
Defendant's claims that could have challenged the enforceability of the debt secured by the Deed 
of Trust should have been litigated in the quiet title action. There is no dispute that in the First 
Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title to the property described in Monitor 
Finance's and First Capital's Deed of Trust free and clear of that Deed of Trust by claiming there 
was no enforceable debt which could be secured because the applicable promissory note had 
been satisfied by previous payments made to the Plaintiffs. Thus, the gravamen of the first quiet 
lillt: aclion was lhat there was no enforceable debt left to be secured by the Plaintiffs ' 
encumbering the Deed of Trust. Fmthermore, there is no question that both the First Action and 
this matter involve the same parties and the same Deed of Trust. There is also no question that 
the First Action was finally resolved and dismissed with prejudice by entry of a final judgment 
rejecting the Defendant's attempt to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the 
Modification, and the Deed of Trust. As explained, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not 
only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of 
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have 
been made. No matter the theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the 
dismissal of the First Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was 
available in the First Action to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the 
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Modification, and the Deed of Trust in this case. A careful reading of Wildlife Ridge's Answer 
and Counterclaim show that the affirmative defenses and claim of fraud all challenge the 
enforceability of the same Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed 
of Trust at issue in the First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First 
Action. The Defendant has not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented from presenting 
in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised. This Court has found there to be no 
question of fact that those claims, including any statute oflimitations defense, the equitable 
doctrines of laches and unclean hands, and the claim of fraud all relate to and arose prior to the 
dismissal of the First Action. 
Therefore, because the First Case ended in a final judgment on the merits, because this 
case involves the same parties as the First Case, and because all of the claims in this case arise 
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Case, the affirmative 
defenses and counterclaim now raised by the Defendant are barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Court 
has determined the Defendant's affirmative defenses and fraud claim are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. Therefore, all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as 
well as the Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED thisa2_ day of March 2017. 
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In this action the Defendant M & S Development, LLC, having been regularly served with 
process, and having failed to appear or answer Plaintiffs Complaint on file herein, and the time 
allowed by law for answering having expired, upon application of the Plaintiff herein, the default 




DATED This ~() day of March, 2017. 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss 
County of Bannock ) 
I, Ron Kerl, being first duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say: 
1. I am a citizen of the United States, a resident of Idaho, of legal age, and competent 
to be a witness. If called upon to testify I could testify to the following all of which are within my 
own personal knowledge. 
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state ofldaho, and counsel of record 
for the Plaintiffs and Counter-defendants Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah limited liability company 
("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("First Capital"), . 
3. Attached as Exhibit "1" is a true and accurate copy of page 3 of 5 of Schedule B 
Personal Property filed by Michael Millward and Stephanie Millward in their Chapter 7 Bankrnptcy 
case, Case No. 12-41260-JDP, Docket No. 21. 
Dated this (day of May, 2017. 
Ron Kerl 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this z1!1>- day of May, 2017. 
NOTARY PUBLIC for Idaho 
Residing at: Pocatello, Idaho 
Commission Expires: -'6, - I " I~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY on the 411, day of May, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document as follows: 
A. Bruce Larson 
Hearn Law, PLLP 
P.O. Box 70 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Chamber Copy: 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083 
~mail to: bruce@hwlawpro.com 
[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-547-2147 
~Email to: 
nicoled@bannockcounty.us 
Ron Kerl, of the firm 
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Case 12-41260-JDP D1.,.., 21 Filed 10/01/12 Entered 10/01,~L 20:10:48 Desc Main 
868 (Official Form 68) (1 2/07) - Cool. 
In re Michael Millward, 
Stephanie Millward 
Document Page 7 of 58 
Case No. __ 1~2~-4~1~2~6~0 _______ _ 
Debtors 
SCHEDULE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY 
(Continuation Sheet) 
N 
Type of Prope1ty 0 Description and Location of Property N 
E 
7. Furs and jewelry. X 
8. Firearms and sports, photographic, X 
and other hobby equipment. 
9. Interests in insurance policies. X 
Name insurance company of each 
policy and itemize surrend er or 
refund value of each. 
10. Annuities. Itemize and name each X 
issuer. 
I I. Interests in an education IRA as X 
defined in 26 U.S .C. § 530(b)(l) or 
under a qualified State tuition plan 
as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 529(b)(J). 
Give particulars. (File separately the 
record(s) of any such in terest(s). 
I 1 U.S .C. § 521 (c).) 
12. Interests in IRA, ERISA, Keogh, or PERSI 
other pension or profit sharing 
plans. Give particulars. 
13. Stock and interests in incorporated X 
and unincorporated businesses. 
Itemize. 
14. interests in partnerships or joint 100% Ownership of M & S Development 
ventures. Itemize. 
65% interest in Wildlife Ridge LLC 
15. Government and corporate bonds X 
and other negotiable and 
nonnegotiable instruments. 
16. Accounts receivable. X 
17. Alimony, maintenance, suppo1t, and X 
property settlements to which the 
debtor is or may be entitled. Give 
particulars. 
18. Other liquidated debts owed to debtor X 
including tax refunds. Give particulars. 
Sheet _ 3_ of_5_ continuat ion sheets attached 
to the Schedule of Personal Property 
Software Copyright (c) 1996-2012 - CCH INCORPORATED - www.bestcase.com 
Husband, Curren t Value of 
Wife, Debtor's Interest in Property, 
Joint, or without J:?educting any 
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Ron Kerl , Esq. - ISB # 1768 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Email : •u1.-, ; r:-_,,,p,·r -l:1r~.,·11.u1 111 
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF rDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FI ANCE, L.C. , a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 






WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER TITLE ) 




WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an ldaho limited ) 





MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liabil ity ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 
Utah limited liability company, ) 
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs Monitor Finance, LC., a Utah limited liability company 
("Monitor"), and First Capital Funding, LC., a Utah limited liability company ("First Capital"), by 
and through their attorneys and submit this memorandum (I) in opposition to the Motion for 
Reconsideration filed by Wild life Ridge Estates, LLC on May l, 2017, and (2) as a Reply 
Memorandum in support of Monitor and First Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 
13, 2017. 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit was commenced when Monitor and First Capital filed a Complaint to enforce 
a Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005, in the principal sum of $244,000, as set forth in Exhibit 
"A" attached to the Amended Complaint on file herein ("Deed of Trust Note"). The Deed of Trust 
Note was amended by the Modification attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit "B" 
("Modification"). Plaintiffs seek t9 judicially foreclose a Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security 
Agreement and Fixture Filing dated December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trnst") on the Bannock County 
real property therein described. A true and accurate copy of the Deed of Trust is attached to the 
Amended Complaint as Exhibit "C". 
Wi ldlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of the rea l prope1ty described in the Deed of Trust 
and has filed its Answer (including Affirmative Defenses) and Counter-claim in this action seeking 
a declaration from this Court that the Deed of Trust Note, as Modified, and the Deed of Trust 
securing that Note, are unenforceable. On March 27, 2017, this Court entered its Memorandum 
Decision and Order granting Plaintiffs' prior motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed 
1Plaintiffs also submit a Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Foreclosure 
Decree ( dated May 3, 2017) and Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl ( dated May 4, 2017) in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motion and in opposition to Wildlife Ridge's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
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Wildlife Ridge's affim1ative defenses and counter-claim against the Plaintiffs, finding that they are 
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and co llateral estoppel. Wildlife Ridge's Motion for 
Reconsideration seeks to reverse the Court's March 27, 20 17 decision. 
The Court, on March 30, 20 17, entered a default against the Defendant, M&S. On May 4, 
2017, the Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County filed a waiver of its right to respond 
further to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and consented to the entry of a Judgment and Decree 
of Foreclosure as prayed for by Monitor and First Capital in their Amended Complain t. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Wildlife Ridge's motion for reconsideration makes two affirmations of fact and law which 
are incorrect and not support by either the law or the facts: 
1. The Statute of Limitations Defense was not Available in the First Quiet Title 
Action. 
and, 
2. The Debt [owed to Monitor and First Capital} Cannot be Relitigated. 
A. The Applicability of Statute of Limitations to Bar Plaintiff's Enforcement of its 
Obligation and Right to Foreclose its Deed of Trust was Available in the First Quiet 
Title Action. 
Wi ldlife Ridge cites this Court to the 1952 Idaho Supreme Court decision in Trusty v Ray, 
73 Idaho 232, 249 P.2d 814 (Idaho, 1952) for the proposition that in the Quiet Title Action2 it had 
no standing to quiet title and raise a claim that the statute oft imitations prohibited Monitor and First 
Capital from enforcing the debt secured by, and foreclosing, the Deed of Trust. 
2 On December 3, 20 14, Wildlife Ridge commenced a quiet title action against the 
Plaintiffs in Bannock County Case No. CV 20 14-4783 OC (the "First Quiet Title Action"). 
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A careful reading of that case does not support this broad conclusion. The Court in Trusty 
only concluded that a "mortgagor or his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, 
while the secured debt remains unpaid, although the statute of limitations has run against the right 
to foreclose the mortgage." 
This simple statement, however, does not also state that Wildlife Ridge was prohibited from 
bringing al I available claims for relief other than one for quieting title to the property. Wildlife 
Ridge was free to request a declaration from the Court that subject obligation and Deed ofTrust were 
unenforceable for any other legitimate reason3 and could have made a request for relief that included 
the cou1t's permanent injunction prohibiting Monitor and First Capital from enfo rcing the subject 
obligation through foreclosure of the Deed ofTrnst. It did not do so. Having not done so, it cannot 
now raise additional claims for reli ef which could have been raised in the First Quiet Title Action. 
Resjudicata's subparts, issue and claim preclusion, as explained in Ticor Title Company 
v. St anion , I 44 Idaho 119, 157 P .3d 613 (2007), cover not only the theory of recover advanced in 
the first ac tion (here, "Quiet Title") but any theory of recovery at law or inequity which could have 
been raised in the first action. At 144 Idaho, page 123, the Supreme Court stated: 
The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and 
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindm arsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 
803,805 (2002). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties 
upon the same claim or upon claims "relating to the same cause of action ... which 
might have been made." Id. Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating an 
identical issue with the same pa11y or its privy. Rodriguez v. Dep 't of Corr., 136 
3Such as those claims raised in its answer and counterclaim filed in this case: ( l) Statute 
of Limitations - ~10, (2) Laches - ip 1, (3) Collateral Estoppel - ~12, ( 4) Res Judicata, claim 
and/or issue preclusion - ~13, (5) Unclean Hands - ~14, and (6) Fraud as set out in the Counter-
claim - ~~10-13. 
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Jdaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 40 1, 403 (2001 ). Separate tests are used to determine whether 
claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies. See, D.A.R., Inc., v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 
141, 144,997 P.2d 602,605 (2000). Resjudicata serves three fundamental purposes: 
( 1) it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive 
disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent 
results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of 
repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose from the 
harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 
(quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,257,668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
In other words, Wildlife Ridge should have asserted eve1y legal rule and/or equitable remedy 
estab li shing that Monitor and First Capital's Deed of Trust Note was unenforceable; and, Wildlife 
Ridge shou ld have requested any remedy, other than to 'quiet title', to prevent foreclosu re of the 
Deed of Trust. 
Wildlife Ridge did not have to limit its requested relief to simply seeking a decree quieting 
titl e to the land. Wildlife Ridge, having chosen that solitary claim for relief cannot now attempt to 
add new and additional claims for relief that were available at the time the First Quiet Title action 
was litigated to a final judgment. 
B. The Debt owed to Monitor and First Capital Is Not Being Relitigated Because It Was 
Not Raised by Monitor and First Capital as a "Claim" in the First Quiet Title Action. 
First, Wildlife Ridge conflates Monitor and First Capital's defense that the obligation owed 
by Michael Millward ("Millward") and M & Development, LLC ("M & S Development") had not 
been satisfied - as a 'claim actually litigated' in the First Quiet Title Action. Monitor and First 
Capital's denial that the obligation was fully satisfied and their production of evidence in discovery 
supporting that denial does not constitute a 'claim' within the scope of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel. 
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A 'claim' is where one seeks affirmative relief, that is, seeking a ' remedy' from the court. 
A 'defense' is where an opposing party seeks to prevent a claim made against it from succeeding. 
"Claim" is defined very broadly for res judicata purposes: "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies 
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected 
transactions, out of which the action arose." Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24( 1 ), at 196 & 
Comment c ( 1982). That broad definition comports with the goal of res judicata to require a plaintiff 
to seek all relief or available remedies in a single action. 
Second, Monitor and First Capital did not seek any relief in the First Quiet Title Action they 
were defending because they was prohibited from doing so under applicable bankruptcy law. The 
makers of the Deed of Trust Note, as modified, were Millward and M &S Development. They were 
not parties to the First Quiet Title Action commenced by Wildlife Ridge. They would have been 
necessary and indispensable parties to any claim by Monitor and First Capital to foreclose the Deed 
of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust Note and Modification. l.R.C.P. Rule 20(a)(2). 
On September 10, 2012, Millward filed for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankrnptcy Code, 
Case No. 12-41260 pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay commenced on September IO, 2012 which prohibited 
the Plaintiffs from taking any action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, as amended, and foreclose the 
Deed of Trust securing that Trust Deed Note. That automatic stay existed until Millward 's 
bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016.4 
4Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint; Wildlife Ridge's answer to the original 
complaint, at paragraph 7, admits the filing of Millward's bankruptcy, Case No. 12-41260. 
Wildlife Ridge has not yet answered Plaintiffs ' Amended Complaint. 
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Millward 'spending chapter 7 bankruptcy prevented Monitor and First Capital from asserting 
their foreclosure claims against Millward, M & S Development, and Wildlife Ridge in the First Quiet 
Title Action. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) provides: 
Compulso,y Counterclaim. 
( 1) In General. A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that, at the time of 
its service, the pleader has against an opposing pa1iy if the claim: 
(A) arises out of the transaction or occunence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party's claim; and 
(B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction. (Emphasis added). 
The automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 commenced on September 10, 2012 and 
continued until Millward 's bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016, a date falling after the First 
Quiet title Action was dismissed with prejudice on June 14, 2016. 
The bankruptcy stay prohibited Monitor and First Capital from taking any action to enforce 
the Trust Deed Note, as amended, against either Millward or his prope1ty, M & S Development. 11 
U.S.C. § 362 provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 
301 [a voluntary case under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, including Chapter 
7], 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all 
entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of 
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the 
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the 
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a 
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title; 
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(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the 
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 
( 5) any act to create, pe,fect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the 
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title; .... (Emphasis added) 
Millward owned 100% ofM & S Development, and that ownership interest became property 
of his bankruptcy estate when he filed his bankruptcy case in 2012.5 See, 11 U.S.C. §541 (a){l ). Any 
suit against Millward or M & S Development to collect and enforce the obligation they owed to 
Monitor and First Capital was prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
As a result of the bankruptcy stay the court in the First Quiet Title Action could not issue its 
process or summons against Millward and M & S Development and therefore obtain jurisdiction 
over them during the pendency of the First Quiet Title Action. The bankruptcy stay protected 
Millward and M & S from any effort by Monitor and First Capital to seek enforcement of the Deed 
of Trust Note and Modification, or foreclose the Deed of Trust in the Fi rst Quiet Title Action. 
Since Monitor and First Capital were not required to request foreclosure relief in the form 
of a compu lsory counterclaim in the First Action, Monitor and First Capital were prohibited from 
'litigating its claim' in the First Quiet Title Action. A fortiori, Monitor and First Capital did not 
actually litigate its claim in the First Quiet Title Action because they were prohibited by law from 
actually doing so. 
5See, Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl, dated May 4, 2017, Exhibit - Schedule B Personal 
Property. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
A. The Statute of Limitations has Not Expired. 
Wildlife Ridge urges the Court to conclude that the applicable statute of limitations bars 
Monitor and First Capital from enforcing their rights under Deed ofTrust Note and Modification and 
to foreclose the Deed of Trust on the lands described therein. 6 That is not true, and the record before 
the Court and applicable law supports a finding that the subject obligation is not time barred by any 
appl icable statute of I imitations. 
LC. §5-2 I 4A provides a general five year statute oflimitations applicable to the foreclosure 
of a mortgage: 
5-2 l 4A. Action to foreclose mortgage on real property. An action for the foreclosure 
of a mortgage on real prope11y must be commenced within five (5) years from the 
maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage. If the 
obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a maturity date, 
then the date of the accrua l of the cause of action giving rise to the right to foreclose 
shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness. 
LC. §45-15 15 adopts the same statute of limitations for the foreclosure of a deeds of trust: 
45-1515. Time limits for foreclosure. The foreclosure of a trust deed by 
advertisement and sale shall be made and the foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial 
procedure shall be commenced within the time limited by the same period and 
accord ing to the same provisions including extensions as provided by law for the 
forec losure of a mortgage on real property. 
Wildlife Ridge urges thi s Court to find that the applicable five year statute ofl imitations began from 
the maturity date stated in the Deed of Trust Note, to wit: June 26, 2006. But, the above noted 
statutes cannot be read in a vacuum. They must also be read in conjunction with LC. §5-238 which 
6Most of the lots encumbered by the Deed of Trnst have been sold by Wildlife Ridge 
pursuant to two stipulations and this Court's April 28, 2017 Order approving the stipulations. 
The parties' stipulation provided that Monitor and First Capital's lien on the land would attach to 
the net sale proceeds from the partial sales of that land. Net sale proceeds on the sale of several 
lots are now being held in trust by Pioneer Ti tle Company of Bannock County. 
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provides: 
5-238. Acknowledgment or new promise - Effect on operation of statute - Effect 
of pa11ial payment. No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new 
or continuing contract by which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, 
un less the same is contained in some writing, signed by the pa11y to be charged 
thereby; but any payment of principal or interest is equivalent to a new promise in 
,vritiug, duly signed, to pay the residue of the debt. (Emphasis added) 
On November 8, 2012, Monitor and First Capital received a payment on the Deed of Trust 
Note in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that payment to the principal due on the obligation. 
This payment represented the net sale proceeds derived from the sale of Lot 2, Block 3, Division 2 
of the Wildlife Ridge Estates Subdivision, property that had been encumbered by the Deed ofTrnst.7 
In Horkley v Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 173 P.3d 1138 (Idaho 2007), the Idaho Supreme Court 
ruled that such a payment as that received by Monitor and First Capital on November 8, 2012, served 
to "restart the statute of limitations on all installments of the Note." 173 P3d 1140. 
This partial payment resta1ted the applicable five year statute of limitations, extending the 
maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, and the right to foreclose that Deed 
of Trust, to November 8, 2017. 
The partial payment of $38,472.24 received and applied to the obligation owed to Monitor 
and Fi rst Capital on November 8, 2012, was made after Wildlife Ridge had acquired the subject 
prope11y from M & S Development on June 13, 2006.8 This partial payment was made to Monitor 
and First Capital with Wildlife Ridge's full knowledge and consent. 
As provided by I.C. §5-214A, this partial payment to the Plaintiffs constituted a 'new 
promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue' of the obligation and extended the statute of 
7See, Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Foreclosure Decree dated May 3, 
2017, and page 3 of its exhibit. 
8See, paragraph 9 of Wildlife Ridge's Complaint filed in the First Quiet Title Action. 
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limitations for an additional five years under J.C. §§ 5-214A, 5-216 and 45-1515 and permits 
Monitor and First Capital's present action to foreclose its Deed of Trust. This action was filed on 
October 7, 2016, well within five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation created by the 
November 8, 2012 payment and new promise to pay Monitor and First Capital's obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
Wildlife Ridge's Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because Wildlife Ridge could 
have raised alternative claims for relief other than its request that the court 'quiet title' in the First 
Quiet Title Action. Wildlife Ridge could have sought a declaration from that court that Monitor and 
First Capital's right to collect on their obligation secured by the Deed of Trust were barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations, or !aches, or fraud, or any other legal theory or claim for relief 
besides its actual request for a decree quieting title. Wildlife Ridge did not seek remedies under any 
alternative claims for relief, and it is now prohibited from asserting any alternative claims for relief 
in this proceeding under the doctrine of resjudicata. 
The amount of Monitor and First Capital's debt owed by Millward and M & S Development 
was not actually litigated in the First Quiet Title Action. Raising a defense to Wildlife Ridge's claim 
that the debt had been fully satisfied is not the equivalent of making a claim for the payment of that 
obligation. Further, Monitor and First Capital were prevented from making such a claim because 
their debtors, Millward and M & S Development, were not parties to the First Quiet Title Action and 
the bankruptcy stay prohibited Monitor and First Capital from using the process of that court to bring 
them into the First Quiet Title Action. Because of the bankruptcy stay, Monitor and First Capital 
were not compelled by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) to bring a counterclaim against Millward 
and M & S Development to prosecute its 'claim' that the obligation was unpaid, in default and the 
Deed of Trust was ripe for foreclosure. 
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Lastly, Wildlife Ridge's claim that the obligation owed to Monitor and First Capital are time 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and their right to foreclose their Deed of Trust has 
lapsed, is simply wrong and without any supporting facts or applicable law. The undisputed fact is 
that the November 8, 2012, partial payment on the Deed of Trust Note, by operation oflaw, resta1ted 
the app licable five year statute of limitations, thereby extending the maturity date of the obligation 
to November 8, 2017. This foreclosure action was commenced timely. 
Monitor and First Capita l respectfully request the Court to deny Wildlife Ridge's Motion for 
Reconsideration, and to grant Monitor and First Capital's motion for summary judgment and issue 
its Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale.9 
DATED This £ay of May, 2017 . 
Ron Kerl 
9Most of the lots still encumbered by the Deed of Trust have been sold by Wildlife Ridge 
pursuant to two stipulations and this Coutt's April 28, 2017 Order approving the stipulations. As 
part of its requested relief, Monitor and First Capital ask that the Court to include in its Decree an 
order directing Pioneer Title of Bannock County to surrender the funds it holds in trust to the 
Plaintiffs, in care of their counsel, Ron Kerl. 
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY on the 
the fo regoing document as fo ll ows: 
day of May, 20 17, I served a true and con-ect copy of 
A. Bruce Larson 
Hearn Law, PLLP 
P.O. Box 70 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Chamber Copy: 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
[x] U.S. Mail , postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST ATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE EST A TES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; M&S 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Counterdefendants, 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C. 
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("First Capital").1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLc2, filed an Answer 
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
On January 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as 
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was 
granted, and all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the 
Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Mem. Decision and Order, 
March 27, 2017, 13.) 
On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, along 
with a brief and affidavits. Defendant Wildlife Ridge opposed the Motion for Summary 
Judgment by submitting a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reversal of this Court's prior 
entry of summary judgment granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's affirmative 
defenses and Counterclaim. The Defendant's brief addressed both the Motion for 
Reconsideration and opposed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant did 
not submit any affidavits or other evidence. 
Oral arguments regarding both motions were heard on May 15, 2017. Having reviewed 
the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the arguments made by the parties, 
this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1 Collectively referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs". 
2 Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant". 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgm ent 
2 
173 of 325
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of ce1tain real prope1ty described in the Deed of 
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust. 
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed a Complaint seeking to quiet title in that prope1ty 
against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First Action").3 
(See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor and 
First Capital ("Kerl Aff. "), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 12, 2015. 
(Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, Wildlife Ridge 
sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free and 
clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the district 
court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust Deed Note 
("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been satisfied. 
(Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, a 
Judgment dismissing the First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.) 
The dismissal of the First Action was followed by the Plaintiffs' present lawsuit to judicially 
foreclose the Deed of Trust. 
As explained, this Court previously granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. In seeking partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs argued that all of the defenses 
and claims raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the current lawsuit were barred by the 
3 Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of 
the First Action. 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Case No.CV-2016-3588-0C 
Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
3 
174 of 325
doctrine of res Judi cat a based on the dismissal of the First Action. In granting that motion, this 
Court detem1ined that the First Action ended in a final judgment on the merits and that the 
present case involves the same patties as the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order, March 27, 
2017, 13.) This Court further determined that because all of the claims in this case arise out of 
the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Action, the affirmative 
defenses and counterclaim raised by the Defendant were baITed by res judicata. (Id.) Therefore, 
all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the Defendant's 
Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Id.) A Judgment to that effect was entered 
on March 27, 2017. Then, on March 30, 2017, Default was entered against Defendant M & S 
Development, LLC ("M&S"), for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Subsequently, Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock Cow1ty filed a waiver of its right to 
respond further to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and consented to the entry of a Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant to the Amended 
Complaint. 
The Plaintiffs then filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. By that motion, the 
Plaintiffs are seeking a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against Defendant Wildlife Ridge 
on the basis of this Cowt's prior Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Wildlife Ridge's 
affirmative defenses and counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, as well as the fact that Defendant 
Pioneer Title Company waived its right to respond and consented to the entry of a Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure. 
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I. Whether to grant the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
2. Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
It is necessary for this Comt to first address the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, 
as resolution of that motion necessarily resolves the question of smmnary judgment. 
Motion for Reconsideration 
a. Standard of Review 
Rule 11.2(b )( 1 )4 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") governs motions for 
reconsideration. Under that rule, "[a] motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered 
before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or with.in 14 days after the entry of a 
final judgment." 
In explaining motions for reconsideration, the Idaho Supreme Comt has stated: "A 
motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court-when new law is applied to 
previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or any 
combination thereof-to reconsider the correctness of an interlocutory order." Johnson v. N. 
Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012). "[T]he most important consideration is 
the conectness of the interlocutory order." Id. Thus, "[a]fter a final judgment, a party has one 
more chance under [Rule l l.2(b)(l)] to ask the couit to decide the law and facts correctly." 
Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 913, 332 PJd 815,825 (2014). That rule "allows 
4 Prior to 2016, this rule was labeled as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B). 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
5 
176 of 325
the trial comt to reconsider facts in light of any new or additional facts that are submitted in 
support of the motion. This ensures the district court decides a case on the proper law and facts." 
Id. (internal citation omitted.) Therefore, the district court should consider any new facts and 
new evidence presented by the moving party bearing on the correctness of the interlocutory 
order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 
1026, 1037 (1990); Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., 152 Idaho 207, 210, 268 P.3d 1159, 1162 
(2012). "The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts." 
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823,800 P.2d at 1037. A trial court is not required "to 
search the record to determine if there is any new info1mation that might change the specification 
of facts deemed to be established." Id. However, while Rule 1 l.2(b)(l) "permits a party to 
present new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, [the rule] does not require that 
the motion be accompanied by new evidence." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472, 147 
P .3d 100, 104 (Idaho Ct.App. 2006). Thus, this Court is not precluded from reconsidering an 
interlocutory decision on the grounds of the initial evidence. Id. at 473, 147 P.3d at 105. 
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district comt must apply the same 
standard of review that the comt applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). This 
Comt is being asked to reconsider the granting of a prutial motion for summary judgment. 
Therefore, this Court "must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of 
material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id. 
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As explained, this Court previously dismissed the Defendant's affirmative defenses and 
counterclaim on the basis of res Judicata. This Couii specifically determined that the First 
Action between the parties ended in a final judgment on the merits, that case involved the same 
pa11ies as the First Action, and all of the claims in this case arise out of the same transaction or 
series of transactions as decided in the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order at 13.) Because 
"the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously 
asse11ed, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which 
were actually made or which might have been made", this Court ruled that "[n]o matter the 
theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the dismissal of the First 
Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of eve1y matter thal was available in the First Action 
to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the Modification, and the Deed of 
Trust in this case." (Id. at 12.) This Court further determined that all of the affirmative defenses 
and the counterclaim raised by Wildlife Ridge challenged "the enforceability of the same 
Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed of Trust at issue in the 
First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First Action." (Id. at 13.) 
This Court found that the Defendant had "not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented 
from presenting in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised." (Id.) As such, this 
Court found there were no questions of fact regarding the Defendant's defenses or counterclaim, 
and the defenses and counterclaim were necessarily stricken and dismissed. (Id.) 
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Tlu·ough the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant specifically challenges the 
dismissal of the statute of limitations defense, arguing that defense was not available in the First 
Action and therefore should not have been ban-ed by this CoUit under the theory of res judicata. 
(Mem. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Def. 's Mot. for Reconsideration 
("Mem. in Opp'n"), May 1, 2017, 2.) Wildlife Ridge, the Defendant in this action, was the 
Plaintiff in the First Action to quiet title filed against Monitor and First Capital, now the 
Plaintiffs in the present case. The Defendant argues that during the time of the First Action, 
Wildlife Ridge had no standing to quiet title and raise a claim that the statute of limitations 
prohibited Monitor and First Capital from enforcing the debt secured by, and foreclosing, the 
Deed of Trust. (See id. at 2-3.) In support of that argument, the Defendant cited to Idaho Code§ 
5-214A, which provides a five-year statute of limilations for the commencement of an action for 
the foreclosure of a mortgage. The Defendant also cited to one sentence from a 1952 Idaho 
Supreme Court case pertaining to that statute of limitations. Quoting from Trusty v. Ray, 73 
Idaho 232, 249 P.2d 814 (1952), the Defendant argued: "In Idaho, a 'mortgagor or his successor 
in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains unpaid, 
although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage.'" (Id. at 2.) 
The Plaintiffs dispute the Defendant's analysis of Trusty as being too broad. The 
Plaintiffs agree that the Idaho Supreme Court in the Trusty case concluded that the "mortgagor or 
his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains 
unpaid, although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mmtgage." 
(Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration and Reply Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. ("Mem. 
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Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration"), May 8, 2017, 4.) However, the Plaintiffs argue that 
"simple statement" did not prohibit Wildlife Ridge "from bringing all available claims for relief 
olher than one for quieting title to the properly" in the First Action. (Id.) Thus, the Plaintiffs 
argue that even if quiet title was not available to Wildlife Ridge in the First Action, there is 
nothing about the Trusty case that prevented the Defendant from pursuing other, still available 
avenues of relief, such as seeking a permanent injunction stopping any enforcement of the deed 
of trust by foreclosure. The Plaintiffs point out, for example, that the Defendant raised different 
fonns for relief other than quiet title in responding to this action. (See id.) The Plaintiffs argue 
that because Wildlife Ridge did not pursue those other avenues of relief in the First Action, the 
Defendant is baned under the theory of res judicata from "now rais[ing] additional claims for 
relief which could have been raised in the First Quiet Title Action." (Id.) Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs maintain that this Court was correct in its decision granting paitial summary judgment 
because "[r]esjudicata 's subparts, issue and claim preclusion, ... cover not only the theory of 
recover[y] advanced in the first action (here, 'Quiet Title') but any theory of recovery at law or 
inequity [sic] which could have been raised in the first action." (Id.) 
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court 
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon 
the same claim. "[R]es judicata is an umbrella term for different but related concepts: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion." Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Ttab Decide Your Next 
Infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38 (2016); see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,892, 
128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). "Separate tests are used to determine whether 
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claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 ldaho 119, 123, 
157 P.3d 613,617 (2007)(intemal citation omitted). 
Pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment bars a party from re-
litigating that same claim, regardless of whether the subsequent litigation involves new or 
different issues. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 . The Idaho Supreme CoU1t fmther 
explained claim preclusion as follows: 
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this 
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous 
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original 
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the 
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P .3d 943, 951 (2012) ( citations 
omitted, emphasis added) . Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent 
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating 
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v. 
Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the fmmer adjudication concludes 
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim 
but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic 
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436- 37, 849 P.2d 107, 109- 10 
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co. , 35 Idaho 549, 553, 
208 P. 24 1, 242-43 (1922). Similarly, "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars 'successive litigation of an 
Memorandum Decision and Order 10 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
Re: Defendant's Motion/or Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion/or Summary Judgment 
181 of 325
issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the 
prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Sturgell, 553 U.S . at 
892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (internal citation omitted). Thus, when a court finally determines an 
issue in one case that is essential to that judgment, a litigant is barred from raising the issue again 
in another lawsuit. 
Res Judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the conosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the 
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 
at 94, 57 P .3d at 805 ( quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P .2d 130, 133 
(Ct.App.1983)). 
Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617; see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S . 880,892, 128 
S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). 
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties of 
a prior litigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review. 
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). Res Judicata is an 
affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 890, 841 
P.2d 413,420 (1992). 
Id. at 122, 157 P.3d at 616. 
In its decision granting partial summary judgment, this Court detennined that the doctrine 
of res Judicata applied to not only the theory of recovery advanced by Wildlife Ridge in the First 
Action, but to any theory of recovery at law or equity which could have been raised in that First 
Action. Thus, Wildlife Ridge should have asserted every legal rule and/or equitable remedy to 
establish that the Deed of Trust Note was unenforceable. The Defendant's new reliance on the 
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Trusty case does not support the Defendant's argument that it was prohibited in the First Action 
from bringing all available claims for relief other than a claim for quieting title. Wildlife Ridge 
was not required to limit its requested relief to simply seeking a decree quieting title to the land. 
However, having selected that solitary claim for relief, the doctrine of res judicata prohibits 
Wildlife Ridge from now adding new or additional claims for relief that were available at the 
time of the First Action, which action was indisputably litigated to a final judgment. When the 
First Action was dismissed, Wildlife Ridge lost the ability to relitigate any other theories of 
recovery arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions which were actually made 
or which might have been made in the First Action. Unfortunately, Wildlife Ridge limited itself 
by seeking a relief that was too narrow, and this Court can find no error of fact or law in its 
previous decision to that effect. 
The Defendant additionally argued reconsideration should be granted because the 
Plaintiffs are simply ban-ed from "the commencement of a foreclosure action in this matter" 
because "[ a]n action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property must be commenced 
within five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such 
mortgage." (Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) Citing to the Trust Deed Note attached to the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, the Defendant argued: 
The Deed of Trust being foreclosed is subject to the mandatory maturity date 
contained in the Trust Deed Note. The note specifically states that "2. The term of this 
Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This Trust Deed Note shall 
fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the 'Maturity Date').'' 
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(Id. at 3.) The Defendant argues there was no stay on the statute oflimitations, and the five-year 
timeframe for commencing an action for the foreclosure of the subject mortgage has expired 
based on the maturity date of June 28, 2006. Therefore, the Defendant claims the Plaintiffs are 
now time-baned from enforcing their rights under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification. 
(See Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) The Plaintiffs dispute that contention, arguing that "the record before 
the Court and applicable law supports a finding that the subject obligation is not time barred by 
any applicable statute oflimitations." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 9.) 
As mentioned earlier, Idaho Code § 5-2 l 4A provides a five-year statute of limitations for 
the commencement of an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage. That statute states: 
An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real prope1ty must be commenced within 
five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such 
m01tgage. If the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a 
maturity date, then the date of the accrnal of the cause of action giving rise to the right to 
foreclose shall be deemed the date of matmity of such obligation or indebtedness. 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-214A (West). Idaho Code § 45-1515 adopts the same five-year statute of 
limitations for the foreclosure of deeds of trust. That statute states: 
The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale shall be made and the 
foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedure shall be commenced within the time 
limited by the same period and according to the same provisions including extensions as 
provided by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. 
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 45-1515 (West). The Defendant points to the maturity date stated in the 
Deed of Trust Note, which is June 28, 2006. (See Ex. A, Trust Deed Note, attached to Com pl. to 
Judicially Foreclose Deed ofTrnst, Oct. 7, 2016.) That date is not in dispute, and the Complaint 
to foreclose the Deed of Trust was not filed until 2016. However, the Plaintiffs argue the statute 
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of limitations was restarted by a partial payment made on November 8, 2012, "extending the 
maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, and the right to foreclose that Deed 
of Tmst, to November 8, 2017." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10.) 
In support of the extension argument, the Plaintiffs direct this Court to Idaho Code § 5-
238, which pertains to the effect of partial payments. That statute provides: 
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract by 
which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in 
some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but any payment of principal or 
interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay tile residue of the 
debt. 
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-238 (West)(emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has found that 
payments of interest or principal serve to restart the statute of limitations on all installments on 
the note pursuant to IC§ 5-238. Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879,881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140 
(2007). There is no dispute in this case that on November 8, 2012, the Plaintiffs "received a 
payment on the Deed of Trust Note in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that payment to the 
principal due on the obligation." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10; see also, 
Supplemental Aff. in Supp. of Pls.' Foreclosure Decree, May 8, 2017, ~ 3.) As such, the partial 
payment made on the Deed of Trust in this case on November 8, 2012, restarted the five-year 
statute of limitations, extending the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of 
Trust, including the right to foreclose that Deed of Trust, to November 8, 2017. The Complaint 
to Judicially Foreclose the Deed of Trust was filed on October 7, 2016, within the five-year limit. 
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the partial payment extending the maturity date was made 
after Wildlife Ridge had acquired the subject property and was therefore made with the 
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Defendant's full knowledge and consent. Thus, under the provisions of IC § 5-238, the partial 
payment to the Plaintiffs constituted "a new promise in writing", extending the statute of 
limitations found in IC§§ 5-214A and 45-1515 for an additional five years. As such, the 
Plaintiffs' action to foreclose the Deed of Trust, filed on October 7, 2016, was timely filed, and 
the Plaintiffs are not barred by the statute of limitations from commencing this action. 
Therefore, the Defendant's statute of limitation argument does not provide a valid basis for this 
Court to reconsider its prior decision granting pa11ial summary judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiffs. 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment seeking a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure against Wildlifo Ridge. As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' request is supported by 
this Comi's previous entry of partial summary judgment and the subsequent Default entered 
against Defendant M & S Development, LLC, for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County has also consented to the 
entry of a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant 
to the Amended Complaint. Based on that procedural history, the Plaintiffs argue this Cow1 
need now only make a determination that there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of 
Trust, and make a fmiher finding as to the description and reasonable value of the property still 
encumbered by that Deed of Trust. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot., April 13, 2017, 4.) 
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a. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving patty is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 
56( c )(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). This Comt liberally construes the record in favor of the pa1ty 
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that patty's favor. 
Friel v. Boise City Rous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. 
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90, 
867 P.2d at 964. Summat-y judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the 
nomnoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon 
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 5 30-31, 887 P .2d at 
1037-38; Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing the 
summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Case No . CV-2016-3588-0C 
Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summa,y Judgment 
16 
187 of 325
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IDAHO R. C1v. P. 56(e)(2016) 
(emphasis added). 
b. Analysis 
In opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argued the amount of the 
debt cannot be relitigated because the amount of the debt was already raised and litigated in the 
First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at 4.) The Defendant stated: "[T]he 
amount of the debt was raised and litigated in the first quiet title action the result was a joint 
stipulation dismissing the action." (Id.) Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, the Defendant 
contends that the issue of whether a debt was owed was already litigated in the First Action, and 
based on the joint stipulation entered there, the Plaintiffs are now barred from relitigating the 
debt owed.5 
This Comt has already extensively set forth the law regarding res judicata in the 
proceeding sections, as well as in its prior Memorandum Decision and Order. There is no need 
to repeat that discussion in great depth here. It is sufficient to note that under principles of res 
judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an 
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim. A judgment, 
"once rendered, is treated as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties 
on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action."' Aldape, I 05 Idaho at 256, 668 P .2d at 132( quoting 
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., 575 F.2d at 535-36). 
5 Outside of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant did not raise any factual issues challenging summary 
judgment, and the Defendant did not submit any affidavits or other evidence to challenge summary judgment. 
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Monitor and First Capital were defendants in the First Action. One defense raised by 
Monitor and First Capital was the denial that the obligation owed by Michael Millward and 
M&S Development had been satisfied. Mr. Millward and M&S were the makers of the Deed of 
Trust Notes. However, Monitor and First Capital did not pursue any claims for relief in the First 
Action because they were prohibited from doing so under applicable bankruptcy laws. As 
makers of the Deed of Trust Notes, as modified, Mr. Millward and M&S were necessary parties 
to any claim to foreclose the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust Note and Modification. 
See IDAHO R. C1v. P. 20(a)(2)(2016).6 However, at the time of the First Action, Mr. Millward 
had already filed for bankruptcy. Pursuant to Title 11, Section 362 of the United States Code 7, 
an automatic stay commenced on September 10, 2012. The Plaintiffs submit they were 
6 Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties 
(a) Persons Who May Join or be Joined. 
(I) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: 
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occw-rences; and 
(B) any question of Jaw or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. 
(2) Defendants. Persons may be joined in one action as defendants if: 
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. 
7 (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,302, or 303 of this title, 
or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, 
applicable to all entities, of--
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over 
property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against prope1ty of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a 
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West). 
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prohibited by that bankruptcy stay from taking any action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, as 
amended, and foreclose the Deed of Trust securing that Trust Deed Note. According to the 
Plaintiffs, the automatic stay existed until the bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016. 
Thus, the pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy prevented Monitor and First Capital from asserting any 
foreclosure claims against Defendants Millward, M&S Development, and Wildlife Ridge in the 
First Action, and the amount of Monitor and First Capital's debt still owed was therefore never 
actually litigated. In responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant offered no 
evidence to dispute the fact that Monitor and First Capital could not have actually litigated a 
claim for foreclosure in the First Action because they were prohibited from pursuing such a 
claim against the makers of the Note based on the bankruptcy stay. As res Judicata is only a bar 
to the relitigation of claims that have already been decided, and the Plaintiffs made no "claim" 
for foreclosure in the First Action, res judicata cannot now prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing 
litigation regarding the amount of debt still owed. 
Fmthermore, notwithstanding the proceeding discussion regarding res judicata, no 
factual issues have been raised by the Defendant in challenging summary judgment. Under the 
governing standards, the patty opposing the motion for summary judgment must produce 
"evidence by way of affidavit or deposition ... to contradict the assertions of the moving party." 
Ambrose By & Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 
1088, 1091 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994)(intemal citations omitted). Such evidence must be anchored 
in something more than mere speculation. See id. A non-moving party's failure to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that patty's case, on which 
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that pruty will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. See 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S . 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 295 
(1986). "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonrnoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322- 23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus, where 
the non-moving patty has fai led to make a showing of proof on any element for which it bears 
the burden at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; see 
also, Sparks v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. , 115 Idaho 505,509, 768 P.2d 768, 772 (1988). 
The Defendant here has failed to present any affidavits or evidence to challenge summary 
judgment or to support any defense to the foreclosure relief sought by the Plaintiffs. On the 
other hand, the Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits in support of summary judgment. Therefore, 
based on the governing standards, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must 
necessarily be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Cowt fiuther 
finds there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust. Pursuant to the affidavit filed 
in supp01t of the Plaintiffs' motion, "[a] s of the 1st day of April, 2017, there will be due, owing 
and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note, as modified, the sum of $6,814,076.41, together with 
interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per annum until date of Judgment herein, 
together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney ' s fees and expenses necessary to preserve 
Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter accruing." (Aff. in Supp. of 
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Pls.' Foreclosure Decree at 6:6.) Based on that undisputed affidavit, this Court finds there 
remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust and owing to the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
$6,814,076.41. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit a proposed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
detailing the amount remaining on the unpaid debt and the description and reasonable value of 
the property still encumbered by that Deed of Trust for this Court 's consideration and signature. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs may also submit an appropriate memorandum detailing the 
grounds for any claimed award of litigation costs and attorney fees. However, any decision 
regarding costs and fees will be made in a separate order after this Court is provided an 
opportunity to review such a request in detail. 
Based on the preceding discus~ion and this Court's findings, no claims remain. As such, 
this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
r r2 
DATED this ~ day of June 2017. 
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This matter having come on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz 
presiding, and finding good cause therefore; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
I . Pursuant to the parties stipulation and this Court's Stipulated Order Approving 
Stipulations Consenting to the Sale of Real Property dated April 28, 2017, Pioneer Title Company 
is hereby ordered to tum over to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., in care of 
their attorney of record, Ron Kerl of the firm of Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., 151 N. 3rd Ave., Second 
Floor, Pocatello, Idaho, the net proceeds from the sale of the below described prope1ty, totaling 
$256,76 1.67. Said funds are currently deposited in the trust account of Pioneer Title Company. The 
net proceeds from the sale of the following property: 
Lot 2, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES DIVISION 2 - $44,195.82 
Lot 5, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,928 .14 
Lot 7 & Lot 9, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $86,749.80 
Lot 4, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $45,433.92 
Lot 6, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES DIVISION 1 - $35,453.99 
2. The Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated 
December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") , executed and delivered by M&S Development LLC , to 
Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., recorded on the 301" day of December, 2005, 
under Recorder's Instrnment No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, is a valid first 
lien on the below described real property securing an indebtedness of $6,828,907.39, as of June 19, 
2017, plus any additional attorney fees and costs awarded by the Comt pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54, 
and costs related to the enforcement of this Decree by Sheriffs Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest 
on the entire sum of the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree to and including the date 
of Sheriffs sale at the highest rate allowed by law; 
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The real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust is situated in the County of Bannock, 
State of Idaho, is more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 1, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2; and 
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDUFE ESTATES DIVISION 1 
3. The Deed of Trust described in paragraph 2 is foreclosed, and all interests which the 
Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S Development LLC, and 
Pioneer Title Company have in the above described real prope1ty, and any fixtures on the prope1ty, 
shall be sold by the Sheriff of Bannock County, Idaho, in the manner provided by law, payable in 
cash lawful money of the United States of America and in accordance with the practice of this Court. 
The reasonable value of said prope1ty as of the date of this Decree is as follows: 
Lot 1, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES DIVISION 2 - $50,000.00 
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1 - $50,000 
4. The proceeds of sale shall be applied as follows: First, to the costs of sale; second, 
towards the satisfaction of the indebtedness owing to Monitor Finance, LC. and First Capital 
Funding, LC. as set forth in paragraph 2 above; and third, any surplus thereafter remaining shall be 
paid into the District Court for fu1ther determination regarding priority among those parties to this 
litigation whose rights are subordinate to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, LC .. 
5. The Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S 
Development LLC, and Pioneer Title Company, and all persons claiming through or under them 
as purchasers, encumbrancers, or otherwise and all persons claiming to have acquired any equity or 
interest in said premises are foreclosed of all interests, liens, or claims in the real property herein 
above described, and eve1y portion thereof, save and except such statutory rights of redemption as 
said parties or any of them may have. 
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6. The Plaintiff, with either a cash bid or a credit bid against the sum herein found to be 
due it, or any party to this suit may become the purchaser at the sale of said property, and the 
purchaser thereof shall be entitl ed to all of the rights and privileges of such a purchaser under the 
laws of the State of Idaho. 
( · 
DA TED This ill}_ day of June, 2017. 
r 
'- · 
Hon. Robe1t C. Naftz 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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This matter having come on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Robert C. Nath 
presiding, and finding good cause therefore; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS : 
l. Pursuant to the parties stipulation and this Court's Stipulated Order Approving 
Stipulations Consenting to the Sale of Real Property dated April 28, 2017, Pioneer Title Company 
is hereby ordered to turn over to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., in care of 
their attorney of record, Ron Kerl of the firm of Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., 151 N. 3rd Ave., Second 
Floor, Pocatello, Idaho, the net proceeds from the sale of the below described prope1ty, totaling 
$256,761.67. Said funds are currently deposited in the ttust account of Pioneer Title Company. The 
net proceeds from the sale of the following prope1ty: 
Lot 2, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,195.82 
Lot 5, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,928.14 
Lot 7 & Lot 9, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $86,749.80 
Lot 4, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $45,433.92 
Lot 6, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION I - $35,453.99 
2. The Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated 
December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trnst") , executed and delivered by M&S Development LLC , to 
Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., recorded on the 301h day of December, 2005, 
under Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, is a valid first 
lien on the below described real property securing an indebtedness of $6,828,907.39, as of June 19, 
2017, plus any additional attorney fees and costs awarded by the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54, 
and costs related to the enforcement of this Decree by Sheriff's Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest 
on the entire sum of the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree to and including the date 
of Sheriffs sale at the highest rate allowed by law; 
Judgement und Decree of Foreclosure und Order of Sulc - pg. 2 
200 of 325
') c!. .. '} 
? 
The real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust is situated in the County of Bannock, 
State of Idaho, is more particularly described as follows: 
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2; and 
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1 
3. The Deed of Trust described in paragraph 2 is foreclosed, and all interests which the 
Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S Development LLC, and 
Pioneer Title Company have in the above described real property, and any fixtures on the property, 
shall be sold by the Sheriff of Bannock County, Idaho, in the manner provided by law, payable in 
cash lawful money of the United States of America and in accordance with the practice of this Court. 
The reasonable value of said property as of the date of this Decree is as follows: 
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $50,000.00 
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1 - $50,000 
4. The proceeds of sale shall be applied as follows: First, to the costs of sale; second, 
towards the satisfaction of the indebtedness owing to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital 
Funding, L.C. as set forth in paragraph 2 above; and third, any surplus thereafter remaining shall be 
paid into the District Court for further detennination regarding priority among those parties to this 
litigation whose rights are subordinate to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C .. 
5. The Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J_. Millward, M&S 
Development LLC, and Pioneer Title Company, and all persons claiming through or under them 
as purchasers, encumbrancers, or otherwise and all persons claiming to have acquired any equity or 
interest in said premises are foreclosed of all interests, liens, or claims in the real prope11y herein 
above described, and every portion thereof, save and except such statutory rights of redemption as 
said parties or any of them may have . 
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6. The Plaintiff, with either a cash bid or a credit bid against the sum herein found to be 
clue it, or any party to this suit may become the purchaser at the sale of said property, and the 
purchaser thereof shall be entitled to all of the rights and privileges of such a purchaser under the 
laws of the State of Idaho. 
DATED This Jd}_ day of June, 2017. 
~c.~~ 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
. 
r ,,,, :;s. 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, MONITOR FINANCE, L.C. a Utah 
limited liability company, FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD, RON KERL OF THE FIRM COOPER & 
LARSEN, CHARTERED AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT; 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Designation of Appeal : That the above-named Appellant, Wildlife Ridge Estates, 
an Idaho limited liability company, appeals against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the following appealable judgments and orders issued by the District Court 
in this matter pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(a): 
a. Memorandum Decision and Order (3/27/2017); 
b. Memorandum, Decision & Order (6/13/2017); 
c. Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale (6/20/2017). 
2. Issues: 
a. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
Respondent, dismissing Appellant's Affomative Defenses and Counterclaim and in issuing its 
subsequent orders referenced hereinabove; 
b. The District Court erred in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing the Affomative Defenses and Counterclaim of Appellant in that there are disputed 
material issues of fact and issues of law; 
c. The District Court's determinations on the Respondents' Motions for Summary 
Judgment were not based upon a proper legal basis or suppo1ied by substantial undisputed 
evidence; 
d. The District Court ened in determining that the Respondents' Trust Deed should 
be judicially foreclosed, in that there are legal issues and disputed materials issues of fact that 
would precluded the entry of summary judgment allowing the foreclosure; and, 
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e. Such other issues that may be identified subsequent to the filing of this Notice of 
Appeal. 
3. Jmisdictional Statement: Under and pursuant to I.A.R. 11, Appellant has the right 
to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court the aforementioned appealable orders under and pursuant 
to LA.R. l l(a). 
4. Transcript: There was no trial or recorded testimony and, therefore, Appellant 
does not request a reporter's transcript of any comt proceedings. 
5. Record: The documents to be included in the clerk's record in addition to those 
automatically included pursuant to I.AR. 28 are: 
a. Respondents' two Motions for Summary Judgment and Supporting 
Memoranda; 
b. Respondents' Affidavits and affidavit exhibits filed in support of the 
motions for Summary Judgment; 
c. Appellant's Memoranda in opposition to the motions for Summary 
Judgment; 
d. Appellant's Motion to Reconsider and Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Supp01t of Motion for Reconsideration; 
6. Exhibits : No exhibits were offered or admitted. 
7. No order has been entered sealing any part of the record or transctipt. 
8. I hereby certify that: 
a. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court Reporter of 
these proceedings, no reporter's transcript has been requested; 
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b. The Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript pursuant to I.A.R. 24; 
c. That all appellate filing fees have been paid; and 
d. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to I.A.R. 20. 
DATED this-ll-~ofJuly, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Jl tl<of July, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Ron Kerl 
COOPER & LARSEN, Chartered 
151 North Third A venue, 2nd Floor 
P .0. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
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liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL ) 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; M&S 
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WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 











MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited ) 
limited liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL ) 




Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C. 
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC2, filed an Answer 
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and 
injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs have now submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as 
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs also submitted a Motion to Amend the Complaint, 
which was scheduled for a hearing date separate from the motion for partial summary judgment. 
In support of partial summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs submitted a written brief and the Affidavit 
of Ron Kerl, including exhibits. Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge responded with an 
opposing brief and the Affidavit of Richard A. Hearn, with attached exhibits. The Plaintiffs then 
followed up with a reply brief and the Second Affidavit of Ron Kerl, including exhibits. 
Oral arguments were conducted on February 21, 2017. At the outset of the hearing, the 
paities addressed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint. Although that motion was set 
to be heard at a later date, counsel for the Defendants indicated they had no objection to the 
amendment of the Complaint. Therefore, in a ruling from the bench, this Court granted the 
Plaintiffs' request to add a new defendant based upon stipulation of the parties. 
Having reviewed the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the 
arguments made by the parties, this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1. Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
1 Collectively referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs". 
2 Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant". 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving patty is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. 
Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. 
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 
90, 867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when 
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case 
upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P .2d 
at 1037-38; Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing 
the summary judgment motion 1'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e)(20I6) 
( emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OFF ACTS 
The following pertinent facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence, with all 
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the Defendant. Bus hi v. Sage Health Care, P LLC, 146 
Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009)("All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006)).3 
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real property described in the Deed of 
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust. 
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed its initial Complaint seeking to quiet title in that 
property against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First 
Action").4 (See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. ofSumm. J. Mot. Filed by 
Monitor and First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 
12, 2015. (Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, 
Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of 
Trust free and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from 
3 The background information was extracted from the parties' briefs and the submitted affidavits and exhibits. 
4 Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of 
the First Action. 
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the district court that the sums due under the Deed ofTrnst Note and the Modification of Trust 
Deed Note ("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been 
satisfied. (Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, a Judgment dismissing the 
First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.) 
DISCUSSlON 
As explained above, the case presently before this Court was initiated by a Complaint to 
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed against Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC and 
M&S Development, LLC. Wildlife Ridge filed an Answer to Complaint and a Counterclaim 
against the Plaintiffs for fraud and declaratory and injunctive relief. In an earlier action, Wildlife 
Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free 
and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the 
district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification had been 
satisfied. That case was dismissed with prejudice. In seeking partial summary judgment, the 
Plaintiffs argue that all defenses and claims now raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the 
current lawsuit are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
a. Law 
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court 
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon 
the same claim. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the doctrine of res Judicata, or claim 
preclusion, as follows: 
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Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this 
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous 
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original 
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the 
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81 , 278 P.3d 943 , 951 (2012) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent 
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating 
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v. 
Darvvin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes 
pat1ies and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim 
but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic 
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10 
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. Jvfurphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 
208 P. 241. 242-43 ( 1922). As further explained by Idaho courts, because the transactional 
concept of a claim is broad, "the bar of claim preclusion may apply even where there is not a 
substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence 
relating to those theories." Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 259, 668 P.2d 130, 135 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1983)(cited with approval by Kolouch, 123 Idaho at 437,849 P.2d at 110.) Thus, "a valid 
and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 
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at 43 7, 849 P.2d at 11 O; see also Diamond v. Farmers Ins., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P .2d 319, 
323 (1990) . 
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the 
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 
(Ct.App.1983)). 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613,617 (2007). 
b. Analysis 
The Plaintiffs argue the First Action already addressed the enforceability of the same 
Deed of Trust Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust at issue here. Because that lawsuit was 
dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants are now prevented from 
presenting any defense or claim challenging the enforceability of the debt which might have and 
should have been litigated in that First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. Filed by 
Monitor and First Capital ("Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J."), Jan. 6, 2017, 3-4.) The Plaintiffs have 
therefore asked this Court to strike and dismiss the affirmative defenses and the Counterclaim 
raised by the Defendant. 
In response, the Defendant argues res judicata is not a bar to the defenses and/or 
counterclaim it has raised in the present lawsuit because none of those issues were "actually 
litigated in the Quiet Title Action and they could not have been litigated." (Def. Wildlife 
Ridge's Resp. to Pls. Monitor Finance L.C.'s and First Capital L.C.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 
("Def.'s Resp."), Feb. 6, 2017, 12.) For example, Wildlife Ridge first argues that "[t]he entity 
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that appeared in the Quiet Title Action as Monitor Financial L.C. was not a real party in interest 
to the transactions that were the subject matter of that action or the present action." (Def.' s Resp. 
at 6.) In support of that allegation, the Defendant points to the fact that the Monitor Finance, 
L.C. that was named as a party to the Note and Deed of Trust expired on September 17, 2012, 
and was never renewed. Instead, "[a] new entity bearing the same name Monitor Financial L.C. 
was established on January 23, 2015 nearly two months after the Quiet Title Action was filed on 
December 3, 2014." (Id.) Thus, the Defendant argues that one of the plaintiffs in this case, 
Monitor Finance, L.C., which entity was named as a defendant in the First Action to quiet title 
filed by Wildlife Ridge, was not a real party in interest in that case because it had been 
administratively dissolved before the First Action was filed. The Defendant further argues that 
its pending counlerclaim and affirmative defenses for fraud were not raised and could not have 
been litigated in the quiet title action because neither M&S Development, LLC ("M&S"), or 
Michael Millward were named parties.5 (See id.) While the Defendant notes that M&S and Mr. 
Millward were referenced in both the initial complaint and the amended complaint to quiet title, 
the Defendant argues that neither M&S nor Mr. Millward were named parties in the quiet title 
action and "there were no allegations made by any party in the Quiet Title Action that either 
M&S or Millward had done anything wrong." (Id.) The Defendant thus argues: "As Millward 
and M&S would have been necessary parties to any fraud clai~ brought against Plaintiffs, 
5 "On December 30, 2005, M&S Development, LLC and Michael Millward signed a promissory note with First 
Capital Funding, L.C. and Monitor Finance, L.C. for $244,000.00." (Ex. C, attached to Kerl Aff., Am. Compl. to 
Quite Title ("First Action"), March 16, 2016, 17; see also Ex. B, attached to Kerl Aff., Compl. to Quiet Title, Dec. I, 
20 14, §§7-8.) 
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Wildlife Ridge had no duty to bring its claim for fraud against Plaintiffs, Millward and M&S in 
association with its Quiet Title Action." (Def.'s Resp. at 8.) Finally, the Defendant argues that 
the Modification of Trust Deed Note was never mentioned in the pleadings filed in the quiet title 
action. (Id. at 7.) The Defendant argues the Modification is "central" to the foreclosure action 
and Wildlife Ridge's counterclaim for fraud, and is another example of a claim that could not 
have been brought in the First Action. (Id.) 
First, this Court must reject the Defendant' s argument that Monitor Finance, L.C. , while a 
named defendant in the First Action, was nonetheless not a real party in interest to that lawsuit 
because it had been previously administratively dissolved. Dissolution of a corporation does not 
prevent the commencement of legal proceedings against that corporation in its corporate name. 
Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, NA., 1999 UT 91, ~ 14, 991 P.2d 584, 587; see also 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-lOa-1405 (West).6 Because the debt owed existed prior to any 
6 § 16-lOa-1405. Effect of dissolution 
(I) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that 
appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs. 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization. to dissolve may provide for closing the 
corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8, Directors and 
Officers; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name; 
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dissolution and Monitor Finance was sued during the winding down process to invalidate that 
debt, Monitor Finance was a legitimate party in interest and a named defendant in the First 
Action. 
This Court further rejects the Defendant's argument that M&S and Michael Millward 
were indispensable parties for a complete resolution regarding Wildlife Ridge's claim that the 
debt due to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. Whether a party is "indispensable" is governed by 
IRCP .19( a)(l ). 7 Under that rule, a party shall be joined if: 
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing 
parties; or 
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that disposing of the action in the person's absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the 
interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing pruiy subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. l 9(a). In this case, complete relief could have been granted to Wildlife Ridge if 
the court in the quiet title action had determined that the debt had been satisfied. If that had been 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation. 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-IOa-1405 (West)(emphasis added). 
7 Rule 19. Required joinder of parties 
(a) Persons Required to be Joined if Feasible. 
(I) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party in the action if: 
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or 
(8) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in 
the person's absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations because of the interest. 
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the outcome, the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trnst would have no debt to secure, and title to the premises 
could have been quieted in Wildlife Ridge, free and clear of that encumbrance. No matter the 
basis for such a finding, that outcome would not have adversely affected either M&S or Mr. 
Millward since the debt they were personally liable for would no longer be enforceable. In 
addition, there was no risk of double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations since M&S 
and Mr. Millward would have been bound by a decree finding that the debt owed was 
unenforceable, no matter whether the basis of such a decree was that the debt had been satisfied 
or that the debt was unenforceable based on a statute of limitations or fraud argument. As such, 
M&S and Mr. Millward were not indispensable parties to Wildlife Ridge's quiet title action 
and/or Wildlife Ridge's attempt to have the debt deemed unenforceable. 
This Court must also reject the Defendant's arguments regarding the Modification. The 
Defendant argued the Modification dated March 3, 2008, was fraudulent and the "statute of 
limitations claim is related directly to the validity and effect of the claimed Modification." 
(Def.'s Resp. at 10.) The Defendant argued that because the Modification ofTrnst Deed Note 
was "never mentioned" in the pleadings filed in the quiet title action, the issues surrounding the 
Modification could not have been litigated and therefore cannot now be barred by res judicata. 
However, the record shows the Defendant was aware of the Modification during the First Action, 
since the Modification was produced to Wildlife Ridge through discovery. (Ex. 2, First Capital 
Funding, L.C.'s Resp. to Pl.'s First Set of Discovery, attached to Second Aff. of Ron Kerl in 
Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., ~~4-5, 
Feb. 14, 2017.) As such, any claims pertaining to the Modification could have been raised in the 
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First Action, and this Court has also already determined that M&S and Mr. Millward were not 
indispensable parties to the Quiet Title Action necessary to any fraud allegation attempting to 
show the debt owed to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. 
Therefore, based on the above findings and the undisputed facts in this case, all of the 
Defendant's claims that could have challenged the enforceability of the debt secured by the Deed 
of Trust should have been litigated in the quiet title action. There is no dispute that in the First 
Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title to the property described in Monitor 
Finance's and First Capital's Deed of Trust free and clear of that Deed of Trust by claiming there 
was no enforceable debt which could be secured because the applicable promissory note had 
been satisfied by previous payments made to the Plaintiffs. Thus, the gravamen of the first quiet 
title action was that there was no enforceable debt left to be secured by the Plaintiffs' 
encumbering the Deed of Trust. Furthermore, there is no question that both the First Action and 
this matter involve the same parties and the same Deed of Trust. There is also no question that 
the First Action was finally resolved and dismissed with prejudice by entry of a final judgment 
rejecting the Defendant's attempt to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the 
Modification, and the Deed of Trust. As explained, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not 
only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of 
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have 
been made. No matter the theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the 
dismissal of the First Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was 
available in the First Action to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the 
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Modification, and the Deed of Trust in this case. A careful reading of Wildlife Ridge's Answer 
and Counterclaim show that the affirmative defenses and claim of fraud all challenge the 
enforceability of the same Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed 
of Trust at issue in the First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First 
Action. The Defendant has not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented from presenting 
in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised. This Court has found there to be no 
question of fact that those claims, including any statute of limitations defense, the equitable 
doctrines of laches and unclean hands, and the claim of fraud all relate to and arose prior to the 
dismissal of the First Action. 
Therefore, because the First Case ended in a final judgment on the merits, because this 
case involves the same parties as the First Case, and because all of the claims in this case arise 
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Case, the affirmative 
defenses and counterclaim now raised by the Defendant are barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Court 
has determined the Defendant's affirmative defenses and fraud claim are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. Therefore, all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as 
well as the Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this cf)_ day of March 2017. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STAt:E" .,\ 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; M&S 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAP IT AL 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Counterdefendants, 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C. 
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC2, filed an Answer 
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
On January 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as 
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was 
granted, and all of the affomative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the 
Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Mem. Decision and Order, 
March 27, 2017, 13 .) 
On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, along 
with a brief and affidavits. Defendant Wildlife Ridge opposed the Motion for Summary 
Judgment by submitting a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reversal of this Court's prior 
entry of summary judgment granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's affirmative 
defenses and Counterclaim. The Defendant's brief addressed both the Motion for 
Reconsideration and opposed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant did 
not submit any affidavits or other evidence. 
Oral arguments regarding both motions were heard on May 15, 2017. Having reviewed 
the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the arguments made by the parties, 
this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1 Collectively referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs". 
2 Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or ''the Defendant". 
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STATEMENT OFF ACTS 
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real property described in the Deed of 
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust. 
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed a Complaint seeking to quiet title in that property 
against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital (''the First Action").3 
(See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor and 
First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 12, 2015 . 
(Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, Wildlife Ridge 
sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free and 
clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the district 
court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust Deed Note 
("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been satisfied. 
(Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, a 
Judgment dismissing the First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.) 
The dismissal of the First Action was followed by the Plaintiffs' present lawsuit to judicially 
foreclose the Deed of Trust. 
As explained, this Court previously granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. In seeking partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs argued that all of the defenses 
and claims raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the current lawsuit were barred by the 
3 Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of 
the First Action. 
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doctrine of res judicata based on the dismissal of the First Action. In granting that motion, this 
Court determined that the First Action ended in a final judgment on the merits and that the 
present case involves the same parties as the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order, March 27, 
2017, 13 .) This Court further determined that because all of the claims in this case arise out of 
the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Action, the affirmative 
defenses and counterclaim raised by the Defendant were barred by res judicata. (Id.) Therefore, 
all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the Defendant's 
Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Id.) A Judgment to that effect was entered 
on March 27, 2017. Then, on March 30, 2017, Default was entered against Defendant M & S 
Development, LLC ("M&S"), for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Subsequently, Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County filed a waiver of its right to 
respond further to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and consented to the entry of a Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant to the Amended 
Complaint. 
The Plaintiffs then filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. By that motion, the 
Plaintiffs are seeking a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against Defendant Wildlife Ridge 
on the basis of this Court's prior Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Wildlife Ridge's 
affirmative defenses and counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, as well as the fact that Defendant 
Pioneer Title Company waived its right to respond and consented to the entry of a Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure. 
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1. Whether to grant the Defendant' s Motion for Reconsideration. 
2. Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
It is necessary for this Court to first address the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, 
as resolution of that motion necessarily resolves the question of summary judgment. 
Motion for Reconsideration 
a. Standard of Review 
Rule 1 l .2(b )(1 )4 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") governs motions for 
reconsideration. Under that rule, "(a] motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered 
before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a 
final judgment." 
In explaining motions for reconsideration, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "A 
motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court-when new law is applied to 
previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or any 
combination thereof-to reconsider the correctness of an interlocutory order." Johnson v. N 
Idaho Coll. , 153 Idaho 58, 62,278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012). "[T]he most important consideration is 
the correctness of the interlocutory order." Id. Thus, "[a]fter a final judgment, a party has one 
more chance under [Rule 1 l.2(b)(l)] to ask the court to decide the law and facts correctly." 
Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,913,332 P.3d 815, 825 (2014). That rule "allows 
4 Prior to 2016, this rule was labeled as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). 
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the trial court to reconsider facts in light of any new or additional facts that are submitted in 
support of the motion. This ensures the district court decides a case on the proper law and facts." 
Id. (internal citation omitted.) Therefore, the district court should consider any new facts and 
new evidence presented by the moving party bearing on the correctness of the interlocutory 
order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 
1026, 1037 (1990); Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty. , 152 Idaho 207,210,268 P.3d 1159, 1162 
(2012). "The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts." 
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. A trial court is not required "to 
search the record to determine if there is any new information that might change the specification 
of facts deemed to be established." Id. However, while Rule 1 l.2(b)(l) "permits a party to 
present new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, [the rule) does not require that 
the motion be accompanied by new evidence." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 
P .3d 100, 104 (Idaho Ct.App. 2006). Thus, this Court is not precluded from reconsidering an 
interlocutory decision on the grounds of the initial evidence. Id. at 473, 147 P.3d at 105. 
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). This 
Court is being asked to reconsider the granting of a partial motion for summary judgment. 
Therefore, this Court "must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of 
material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id. 
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As explained, this Court previously dismissed the Defendant's affirmative defenses and 
counterclaim on the basis of res judicata. This Court specifically determined that the First 
Action between the parties ended in a final judgment on the merits, that case involved the same 
parties as the First Action, and all of the claims in this case arise out of the same transaction or 
series of transactions as decided in the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order at 13.) Because 
''the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously 
asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which 
were actually made or which might have been made", this Court ruled that "[n]o matter the 
theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the dismissal of the First 
Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was available in the First Action 
to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the Modification, and the Deed of 
Trust in this case." (Id. at 12.) This Court further determined that all of the affirmative defenses 
and the counterclaim raised by Wildlife Ridge challenged "the enforceability of the same 
Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed of Trust at issue in the 
First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First Action." (Id. at 13.) 
This Court found that the Defendant had "not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented 
from presenting in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised." (Id.) As such, this 
Court found there were no questions of fact regarding the Defendant's defenses or counterclaim, 
and the defenses and counterclaim were necessarily stricken and dismissed. (Id.) 
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Through the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant specifically challenges the 
dismissal of the statute of limitations defense, arguing that defense was not available in the First 
Action and therefore should not have been barred by this Court under the theory of res judicata. 
(Mem. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. ofDef.'s Mot. for Reconsideration 
("Mem. in Opp'n"), May 1, 2017, 2.) Wildlife Ridge, the Defendant in this action, was the 
Plaintiff in the First Action to quiet title filed against Monitor and First Capital, now the 
Plaintiffs in the present case. The Defendant argues that during the time of the First Action, 
Wildlife Ridge had no standing to quiet title and raise a claim that the statute of limitations 
prohibited Monitor and First Capital from enforcing the debt secured by, and foreclosing, the 
Deed of Trust. (See id. at 2-3.) In support of that argument, the Defendant cited to Idaho Code§ 
5-214A, which provides a five-year statute of limitations for the commencement of an action for 
the foreclosure of a mortgage. The Defendant also cited to one sentence from a 1952 Idaho 
Supreme Court case pertaining to that statute of limitations. Quoting from Trusty v. Ray, 73 
Idaho 232, 249 P.2d 814 (1952), the Defendant argued: "In Idaho, a 'mortgagor or his successor 
in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains unpaid, 
although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage."' (Id. at 2.) 
The Plaintiffs dispute the Defendant's analysis of Trusty as being too broad. The 
Plaintiffs agree that the Idaho Supreme Court in the Trusty case concluded that the "mortgagor or 
his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains 
unpaid, although the statute oflirnitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage." 
(Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration and Reply Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. ("Mem. 
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Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration"), May 8, 2017, 4.) However, the Plaintiffs argue that 
"simple statement" did not prohibit Wildlife Ridge "from bringing all available claims for relief 
other than one for quieting title to the property" in the First Action. (Id.) Thus, the Plaintiffs 
argue that even if quiet title was not available to Wildlife Ridge in the First Action, there is 
nothing about the Trusty case that prevented the Defendant from pursuing other, still available 
avenues of relief, such as seeking a permanent injunction stopping any enforcement of the deed 
of trust by foreclosure. The Plaintiffs point out, for example, that the Defendant raised different 
forms for relief other than quiet title in responding to this action. (See id.) The Plaintiffs argue 
that because Wildlife Ridge did not pursue those other avenues of relief in the First Action, the 
Defendant is barred under the theory of res judicata from "now rais[ing] additional claims for 
relief which could have been raised in the First Quiet Title Action." (Id.) Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs maintain that this Court was conect in its decision granting partial summary judgment 
because "[r Jes judicata 's subparts, issue and claim preclusion, ... cover not only the theory of 
recover[y] advanced in the first action (here, 'Quiet Title') but any theory ofrecovery at law or 
inequity [sic] which could have been raised in the first action." (Id.) 
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court 
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon 
the same claim. "[R]es judicata is an umbrella term for different but related concepts: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion." Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Ttab Decide Your Next 
Infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38 (2016); see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 
128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). "Separate tests are used to determine whether 
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claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 
157 P.3d 613,617 (2007)(intemal citation omitted). 
Pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment bars a party from re-
litigating that same claim, regardless of whether the subsequent litigation involves new or 
different issues. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171. The Idaho Supreme Court further 
explained claim preclusion as follows: 
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this 
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous 
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original 
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the 
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent 
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating 
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v. 
Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 (2002). As such, "in an action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes 
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim 
but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic 
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10 
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 
208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922). Similarly, "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars 'successive litigation of an 
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issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the 
prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 
892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (internal citation omitted). Thus, when a court finally detennines an 
issue in one case that is essential to that judgment, a litigant is barred from raising the issue again 
in another lawsuit. 
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the conosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the 
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 
(Ct.App.1983 )). 
Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617; see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 
S. Ct. 2161, 2171 , 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). 
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties of 
a prior litigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review. 
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). Res judicata is an 
affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. _Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883 , 890, 841 
P.2d 413,420 (1992). 
Id. at 122, 157 P.3d at 616. 
In its decision granting partial summary judgment, this Court determined that the doctrine 
of res judicata applied to not only the theory of recovery advanced by Wildlife Ridge in the First 
Action, but to any theory of recovery at law or equity which could have been raised in that First 
Action. Thus, Wildlife Ridge should have asserted every legal rule and/or equitable remedy to 
establish that the Deed of Trust Note was unenforceable. The Defendant's new reliance on the 
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Trusty case does not support the Defendant's argument that it was prohibited in the First Action 
from bringing all available claims for relief other than a claim for quieting title. Wildlife Ridge 
was not required to limit its requested relief to simply seeking a decree quieting title to the land. 
However, having selected that solitary claim for relief, the doctrine of res judicata prohibits 
Wildlife Ridge from now adding new or additional claims for relief that were available at the 
time of the First Action, which action was indisputably litigated to a final judgment. When the 
First Action was dismissed, Wildlife Ridge lost the ability to relitigate any other theories of 
recovery arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions which were actually made 
or which might have been made in the First Action. Unfortunately, Wildlife Ridge limited itself 
by seeking a relief that was too narrow, and this Court can find no error of fact or law in its 
previous decision to lhal effect. 
The Defendant additionally argued reconsideration should be granted because the 
Plaintiffs are simply barred from "the commencement of a foreclosure action in this matter" 
because "[a]n action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property must be commenced 
within five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such 
mortgage." (Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) Citing to the Trust Deed Note attached to the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, the Defendant argued: 
The Deed of Trust being foreclosed is subject to the mandatory maturity date 
contained in the Trust Deed Note. The note specifically states that "2. The term of this 
Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This Trust Deed Note shall 
fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the 'Maturity Date')." 
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(Id. at 3.) The Defendant argues there was no stay on the statute oflimitations, and the five-year 
timeframe for commencing an action for the foreclosure of the subject mortgage has expired 
based on the maturity date of June 28, 2006. Therefore, the Defendant claims the Plaintiffs are 
now time-barred from enforcing their rights under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification. 
(See Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) The Plaintiffs dispute that contention, arguing that "the record before 
the Comt and applicable law supports a finding that the subject obligation is not time barred by 
any applicable statute of limitations." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 9.) 
As mentioned earlier, Idaho Code § 5-214A provides a five-year statute oflimitations for 
the commencement of an action for the foreclosure of a mo1tgage. That statute states: 
An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property must be commenced within 
five (5) years from the matmity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such 
mortgage. If the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a 
maturity date, then the date of the accrual of the cause of action giving rise to the right to 
foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness. 
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-214A (West). Idaho Code§ 45-1515 adopts the same five-year statute of 
limitations for the foreclosure of deeds of trust. That statute states: 
The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale shall be made and the 
foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedure shall be commenced within the time 
limited by the same period and according to the same provisions including extensions as 
provided by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1515 (West). The Defendant points to the maturity date stated in the 
Deed of Trust Note, which is June 28, 2006. (See Ex. A, Trust Deed Note, attached to Compl. to 
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust, Oct. 7, 2016.) That date is not in dispute, and the Complaint 
to foreclose the Deed of Trust was not filed until 2016. However, the Plaintiffs argue the statute 
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of limitations was restarted by a partial payment made on November 8, 2012, "extending the 
maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed ofTrnst, and the right to foreclose that Deed 
of Trust, to November 8, 2017." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10.) 
In support of the extension argument, the Plaintiffs direct this Court to Idaho Code § 5-
238, which pertains to the effect of partial payments. That statute provides: 
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract by 
which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in 
some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but any payment of principal or 
interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue of the 
debt. 
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-238 (West)(emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has found that 
payments of interest or principal serve to restart the statute of limitations on all installments on 
the note pursuant to IC§ 5-238. Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140 
(2007). There is no dispute in this case that on November 8, 2012, the Plaintiffs "received a 
payment on the Deed of Trust Note in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that payment to the 
principal due on the obligation." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10; see also, 
Supplemental Aff. in Supp. of Pls.' Foreclosure Decree, May 8, 2017, 13.) As such, the partial 
payment made on the Deed of Trust in this case on November 8, 2012, restarted the five-year 
statute of limitations, extending the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of 
Trust, including the right to foreclose that Deed of Trust, to November 8, 2017. The Complaint 
to Judicially Foreclose the Deed of Trust was filed on October 7, 2016, within the five-year limit. 
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the partial payment extending the maturity date was made 
after Wildlife Ridge had acquired the subject property and was therefore made with the 
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Defendant's full knowledge and consent. Thus, under the provisions ofIC § 5-238, the partial 
payment to the Plaintiffs constituted "a new promise in writing", extending the statute of 
limitations found in IC§§ 5-214A and 45-1515 for an additional five years. As such, the 
Plaintiffs' action to foreclose the Deed of Trust, filed on October 7, 2016, was timely filed, and 
the Plaintiffs are not barred by the statute of limitations from commencing this action. 
Therefore, the Defendant's statute oflimitation argument does not provide a valid basis for this 
Court to reconsider its prior decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiffs . 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment seeking a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure against Wildlife Ridge. As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' request is supported by 
this Court's previous entry of pruiial summary judgment and the subsequent Default entered 
against Defendant M & S Development, LLC, for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County has also consented to the 
entry of a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant 
to the Amended Complaint. Based on that procedural history, the Plaintiffs argue this Court 
need now only make a determination that there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of 
Trust, and make a further finding as to the description and reasonable value of the property still 
encumbereq by that Deed of Trust. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot., April 13, 2017, 4.) 
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a. Standard of Review 
Swnmary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." IDAHO R. Crv. P. 
56( c )(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 
867 P .2d 960, 963 (1994 ). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. 
Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then swnmary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. 
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90, 
867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the 
nonrnoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon 
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d at 
1037-38; Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing the 
summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IDAHO R. Crv. P. 56(e)(2016) 
( emphasis added). 
b. Analysis 
In opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argued the amount of the 
debt cannot be relitigated because the amount of the debt was already raised and litigated in the 
First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at 4.) The Defendant stated: "[T]he 
amount of the debt was raised and litigated in the first quiet title action the result was a joint 
stipulation dismissing the action." (Id.) Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, the Defendant 
contends that the issue of whether a debt was owed was already litigated in the First Action, and 
based on the joint stipulation entered there, the Plaintiffs are now barred from relitigating the 
debt owed.5 
This Court has already extensively set forth the law regarding res judicata in the 
proceeding sections, as well as in its prior Memorandum Decision and Order. There is no need 
to repeat that discussion in great depth here. It is sufficient to note that under principles of res 
judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an 
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim. A judgment, 
"once rendered, is treated as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties 
on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action.,,, Aldape, 105 Idaho at 256, 668 P .2d at 132( quoting 
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., 575 F.2d at 535- 36). 
5 Outside of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant did not raise any factual issues challenging swnmary 
judgment, and the Defendant did not submit any affidavits or other eviden_ce to challenge summary judgment. 
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Monitor and First Capital were defendants in the First Action. One defense raised by 
Monitor and First Capital was the denial that the obligation owed by Michael Millward and 
M&S Development had been satisfied. Mr. Millward and M&S were the makers of the Deed of 
Trust Notes. However, Monitor and First Capital did not pursue any claims for relief in the First 
Action because they were prohibited from doing so under applicable bankruptcy laws. As 
makers of the Deed of Trust Notes, as modified, Mr. Millward and M&S were necessary parties 
to any claim to foreclose the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust Note and Modification. 
See IDAHO R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(2016).6 However, at the time of the First Action, Mr. Millward 
had already filed for bankrnptcy. Pursuant to Title 11, Section 362 of the United States Code 7, 
an automatic stay commenced on September 10, 2012. The Plaintiffs submit they were 
6 Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties 
(a) Persons Who May Join or be Joined. 
(I) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: 
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. 
(2) Defendants. Persons may be joined in one action as defendants if: 
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. 
7 (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,302, or 303 of this title, 
or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, 
applicable to all entities, of--
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over 
property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a 
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West). 
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prohibited by that bankruptcy stay from taking any action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, as 
amended, and foreclose the Deed of Trust securing that Trust Deed Note. According to the 
Plaintiffs, the automatic stay existed until the bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016. 
Thus, the pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy prevented Monitor and First Capital from asserting any 
foreclosure claims against Defendants Millward, M&S Development, and Wildlife Ridge in the 
First Action, and the amount of Monitor and First Capital's debt still owed was therefore never 
actually litigated. In responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant offered no 
evidence to dispute the fact that Monitor and First Capital could not have actually litigated a 
claim for foreclosure in the First Action because they were prohibited from pursuing such a 
claim against the makers of the Note based on the bankruptcy stay. As resjudicata is only a bar 
to the relitigation of claims that have already been decided, and the Plaintiffs made no "claim" 
for foreclosure in the First Action, res judicata cannot now prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing 
litigation regarding the amount of debt still owed. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the proceeding discussion regarding res judicata, no 
factual issues have been raised by the Defendant in challenging summary judgment. Under the 
governing standards, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must produce 
"evidence by way of affidavit or deposition ... to contradict the assertions of the moving party." 
Ambrose By & Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P .2d 
1088, 1091 (Idaho Ct. App. l 994)(intemal citations omitted). Such evidence must be anchored 
in something more than mere speculation. See id. A non-moving party's failure to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which 
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that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. See 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 295 
(1986). "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus, where 
the non-moving party has failed to make a showing of proof on any element for which it bears 
the burden at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; see 
also, Sparks v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505,509, 768 P.2d 768, 772 (1988). 
The Defendant here has failed to present any affidavits or evidence to challenge summary 
judgment or to support any defense to the foreclosure relief sought by the Plaintiffs. On the 
other hand, the Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits in support of summary judgment. Therefore, 
based on the governing standards, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must 
necessarily be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Cowt fwther 
finds there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust. Pursuant to the affidavit filed 
in support of the Plaintiffs' motion, "[a]s of the 1st day of April, 2017, there will be due, owing 
and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note, as modified, the sum of $6,814,076.41, together with 
interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per annum until date of Judgment herein, 
together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and expenses necessary to preserve 
Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter accruing." (Aff. in Supp. of 
Memorandum Decision and Order 20 
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/ 
Pls.' Foreclosure Decree at 6:6.) Based on that undisputed affidavit, this Court finds there 
remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust and owing to the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
$6,814,076.41. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit a proposed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
detailing the amount remaining on the unpaid debt and the description and reasonable value of 
the property still encumbered by that Deed of Trust for this Court's consideration and signature. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs may also submit an appropriate memorandum detailing the 
grounds for any claimed award of litigation costs and attorney fees. However, any decision 
regarding costs and fees will be made in a separate order after this Court is provided an 
opportunity to review such a request in detail. 
Based on the preceding discussion and this Cowt's .findings, no claims remain. As such, 
this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this I~ day of June 2017. 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
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Re: Def endant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Thi matter having come on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz 
presiding, and finding good cause therefore; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
I. Pursuant to the parties stipulation and this Court's Stipulated Order Approving 
Stipulations Consenting to the Sale of Real Property elated April 28 2017, Pioneer Title Company 
is hereby ordered to turn over to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., in care of 
their attorney of record, Ron Kerl of the firm of Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., 151 N. 3"1 Ave., Second 
Floor, Pocatello, Idaho, the net proceeds from the sale of the below described prope1ty, totaling 
$256,76 1.67. Said funds are currently deposited in the trust account of Pioneer Title Company. The 
net proceeds from the sale of the following property: 
Lot 2, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2- $44,195.82 
Lot 5, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,928.14 
Lot 7 & Lot 9, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DLVISION 2 - $86,749.80 
Lot 4, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $45,433.92 
Lot 6, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION I -$35,453.99 
2. The Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated 
December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") , executed and delivered by M&S Development LLC , to 
Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., recorded on the 3011, day of December, 2005, 
under Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, is a valid first 
lien on the below described real property seeming an indebtedness of $6,828,907.39, as of June 19, 
2017, plus any additional attorney fees and costs mvarded by the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54, 
and costs related to the enforcement of this Decree by Sheriffs Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest 
on the entire sum of the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree to and including the date 
of Sheriffs sale at the highest rate allowed by law; 
.l udgc111c11t and Decree of Foreclosure and Order or Sale - pg. 2 
249 of 325
The real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust is situated in the County of Bannock, 
State of Idaho, is more particularly described as follows : 
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2; and 
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1 
3. The Deed of Trust described in paragraph 2 is fo reclosed, and all interests which the 
Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Mil lward, M&S Development LLC, and 
Pioneer Title Company have in the above described real property, and any fixtures on the property, 
shal l be sold by the Sheriff of Bannock County Idaho, in the manner provided by law, payable in 
cash lawful money of the United States of America and in accordance with the practice of this Court. 
The reasonable value of said prope1ty as of the date of this Decree is as follows: 
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2- $50,000.00 
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION I -$50,000 
4. The proceeds of sale shall be app lied as follows: First, to the costs of sale; second, 
toward ' the satisfaction of the indebtedness owing to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Cap ital 
Funding, L.C. as set forth in paragraph 2 above; and third, any surplus thereafter remaining shall be 
paid into the District Court for further dcte1111ination regarding priority among those parties to thi s 
litigation whose rights are subordinate to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, LC .. 
5. The Defendants Wild life Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S 
Development LLC, and Pioneer Ti tle Company, and all persons claiming through or under them 
as purchasers, encumbrancers, or otherwise and all persons claiming to have acquired any equity or 
interest in said premises are foreclosed of all interests, liens, or claims in the real property herein 
above described, and every portion thereof, save and except such statutory rights of redemption as 
sa id parties or any of them may have. 
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6. The Plaintiff, with either a cash bid or a credit bid against the sum herein found to be 
due it, or any party to this suit may become the purchaser at the sale or said property, and the 
purchaser thereof sha ll be entitled to all of the rights and privileges of such a purchaser und..: r the 
laws of the State of Idaho. 
DATED This :1.fJ__ day of June, 2017. 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Jurlgcnwn! and Decree of Foreclosure nnd Order or Sale - pg. 4 
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs and Respondents Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First 
Capital Funding, L.C. ("First Capital"), by and through their attorneys of record, and pursuant to 
I.A.R. 28 designate the following additional documents for inclusion in the Clerk's Record on 
Appeal, in addition to the documents automatically included in the Clerk's Record pursuant to I.A.R. 
28 and those documents identified in paragraph 5. of the Appellant's Notice of Appeal fi led on July 
11 , 2017: 
1. Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl in Support of Summary Judgment and Opposing Motion 
for Reconsideration filed on May 8, 2017; and 
2. Memorandum Opposing Motion for Reconsideration and Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment Motion fi led on May 8, 2017. 
Respectfolly submitted this _15day of July, 2017. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHTD 
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital 
Funding, L. . 
Responclcnts' Des ignation Of Acldilional Record On Appeal - pg. 2 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY on the 18(" day of July, 2017, I served a trne and correct copy of the 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited) 
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL ) 




Plaintiffs/Respondents, ) Supreme Court No. 
) 
vs. ) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; ) 
Defendant/Appellant M&S DEVELOPMENT) OF 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) APPEAL 
Defendant ) 
) __________ ) 
) 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an ) 
Idaho Limited liability company; ) 
) 




MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited) 
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL ) 
FUNDING, LC., a Utah limited liability ) 
Company, ) 
) 
Counter-Defendants/Respondents) ) ________ ) 
Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County 
Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding 
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Bannock County Case No: CV-2016-3588-0C 
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order filed the 
2ih day of March, 2017, Memorandum Decision and Order filed the 14th day of 
June, 2017 and Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale filed the 20th 
day of June, 2017. 
Attorney for Appellant: Richard A. Hearn, Attorney HEARN LAW PLC, Pocatello 
Attorney for Respondent: Ron Kerl, Attorney COOPER & LARSEN, Chartered, 
Pocatello 
Appealed by: Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
Defendant/Appellant M&S Development, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
Appealed against: Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah limited liability company; and 
First Capital Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company. 
Notice of Appeal filed: July 11, 2017 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional records filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Name of Reporter: N/ A 
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? No 
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Attorneys for Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counter-claimant, 
V. 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability , 
Counter -defendants. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counter-claimant, 
V. 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Counter -defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE IN 
FORECLOSURE 
UNDER AND BY VIRTUE of a Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale 
entered in the above entitled action in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE IN FORECLOSURE - 1 
47559.000 1.7514672. I 
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of Idaho, in and for the County of Baimock on the 20th day of June, 2017, in which said action 
Plaintiffs Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C. obtained a Judgment, Decree of 
Foreclosure and Order of Sale for the sum of$6,828,907.39 as of June 20, 2017, plus any additional 
attorney fees and costs awarded by the Comi pursuant to I.R.C.P . Rule 54, and costs related to the 
enforcement of this Decree by Sheriffs Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest on the entire sum of 
the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree to and including the date of Sheriffs sale 
at the highest rate allowed by law; and 
Pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued by the Clerk of the above entitled Court on the 27'h 
day of June, 2017, I, the Sheriff of Bannock County, Idaho, am commanded to sell ce1iain lots, 
pieces or parcels of land situated and lying and being in Bannock County, State of Idaho, said 
property being more paiiicularly described as follows, to-wit: 
Lot 1, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 and 
Lot2,B1ock3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1 
PUBLIC NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on Wednesday , the 30th_ day of 
August , 2017, at the hour of 10:00 a .m., at the Bannock County She1iffs Office, 5800 S. 
5th Ave., in Pocatello, Idaho, I will, in obedience to said Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and 
Order of Sale and Execution issued pursuant thereto, sell the said prope1iy above described, or so 
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the indebtedness due the Plaintiffs, with interest, costs 
and accruing costs at public auction to the highest bidder for cash, lawful money of the United 
States of Amelica. 
You are notified that the Plaintiffs, Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., 
may purchase the property by making a credit bid against the amount due to them pursuant to the 
Judgment. 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE IN FORECLOSURE - 2 
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You may contact Ron Kerl , whose address 151 N. Third , Pocatello, Idaho 83205, and 
whose telephone number is (208) 235-1145, for specific information regarding the location of the 
property and the foreclosure. 
As of June 20, 2017, there remained unpaid upon said Judgment a total amount due of 
$6,828,907.39, plus accrued and accruing legal interest at the rate of 5.375% per arurnm from June 
20, 2017 and costs pennitted by law. 
DATED This~ day of July , 2017. 
BANNOCK COUNTY SHERIFF 
By~ --='D~·~Ar==m=s=tr~on=g..,_~~~~~~~ 
Deputy Sheriff 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE IN FORECLOSURE - 3 
47559.0001 .75 14672.J 
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ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 45275-2017 














An ORDER CONDITIONALLY DlSMI.SSlNG APPEAL was issued by this Court on August 
22, 20 I 7, as it appeared· the JUDGMENT, DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE 
entered by Distdct Judge Robert C. Naftz and filed on June 20, 2017, did not comply with I .. R.C.P. 
54(a). This appeal was suspended for entry of a final judgment in the District Court, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
WHEREAS, there having been no final judgment entered in the District Court, pursuant to 
l.R.C.P. 5.4(a), and Appellant having filed no Response with this Co.urt . to the Order Conditionally 
Dismissing }\ppeal entered by thiS'Court on August 22, 2017; therefore, 
IT HEREBY 1.z~RED that this appeal be, and hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED.this %'' day of September, 2017. 
. . 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge Robert C. Naftz 
K 
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In the Supr.eme· Court of the State of Idaho 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 





WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 




M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendant. 
An ORDER CONDITIONALLY DlSMI.SSING APPEAL was issued by this Court on August 
22, 2017, as it appeared· the JUDGMENT, DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE 
entered by Dist.rict Judge Robert C. Naftz and filed on June 20, 2017, did not comply with 1 ..R.C.P. 
54(a). This appeal was suspended for entry of a final judgment in the District Court, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
WHEREAS, there having been no final judgment entered in the District Court, pursuant to 
l.R.C.P. 54(a), and Appellant having filed ·no Response with this Court_to the Order Conditionally 
Dismissing Appeal entered by this·court on Augus.t 22, 2017; therefore, 
IT HEREBY 1.z~RED that this appeal be, and hereby is, DISMISSED . . 
DATED.this g'' day of September, 2017. . . } . 
. For the SuP1e Cou 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court C1erk 
District Judge Robert C. Naftz 
K 
ORDER DlSMISSJNG APPEAL - Docket No. 45275-2017 
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WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C 
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WILDLIFE RIDGE EST A TES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 





MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAP IT AL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 
Utah limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counter-defendant, ) 
_ _ _ _ _______ _ _ ) 
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Judgment is entered against M & S Development, LLC for the sum of $6,728,907.39, as of 
June 19, 2017, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate set by LC.§ 28-22-104, to wit: 5.625% 
per annum. 
DATED This f O day of October, 20 17. 
Judgment - Pg. 2 
~fe:fr C -( r.{3t 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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A. Bruce Larson 
Hearn & Wood LLP 
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Ron Kerl 
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M&S Development, LLC 
c/o Michael Millward, Registered Agent 
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Pocatello, ID 83204 
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A. Brnce Larson (ISB#: 2093) 
Richard A. Heam (ISB# 5574) 
HEARN LAW PLC 
P.O. Box 70 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
Telephone: (208) 904-0004 
Facsimile: (208) 904-1816 
Email: larson@heamlawyers.com 
heam@heamlawyers.com 
Attorney for Defendant/Applellant, 
Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C. , a Utah limited liability 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
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WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, Defendant/ Appellant; 
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, Defendant. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Claimant/ Appellant; 
V 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Counter-defendants/Respondents. 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, First Capital Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD, Ron Kerl of the firm Cooper & 
Larsen, Chartered, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I. Designation of Appeal: That the above-named Appellant, Wildlife Ridge Estates, an 
Idaho limited liability company, appeals against the above-named Respondents to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the following appealable judgments and orders, attached 
hereto, issued by the District Court in this matter pursuant to I.A.R. 11 (a): 
a. Memorandum Decision and Order dated March 27, 2017, Honorable Robert C. 
Naftz presiding; 
b. Memorandum, Decision & Order dated June 13, 2017, Honorable Robert C. Naftz 
presiding; 
c. Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale dated June 20, 2017, 
Honorable Robert C. Naftz presiding; and, 
d. Judgment dated October 10, 2017, Honorable Robe1t C. Naftz presiding. 
2. Issues: 
a. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
Respondent, dismissing Appellant's Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim and 
in issuing its subsequent orders referenced hereinabove; 
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b. The District Com1 erred in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing the Affinnative Defenses and Counterclaim of Appellant in that there 
are disputed mate1ial issues of fact and issues of law; 
c. The District Comt's determinations on the Respondents' Motions for Summary 
Judgment were not based upon a proper legal basis or supported by substantial 
undisputed evidence; 
d . The District Court erred in determining that the Respondents ' Trnst Deed should 
be judicially foreclosed , in that there are legal issues and disputed materials issues 
of fact that would preclude the entry of summary judgment allowing the 
foreclosure; and, 
e. Such other issues that may be identified subsequent to the filing of this Notice of 
Appeal. 
3. Jurisdictional Statement: Under and pursuant to I.AR. 11, Appellant has the right to 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court the aforementioned appealable orders under and 
pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(a) . 
4. Transcript: There was no trial or recorded testimony and, therefore, Appellant does not 
request a rep011er's transcript of any court proceedings. 
5. Record: The documents to be included in the clerk's record in addition to those 
automatically included pursuant to I.AR. 28 are: 
a. Respondents' two Motions for Summaiy Judgment and Supporting Memoranda; 
b. Respondents' Affidavits and affidavit exhibits filed in supp011 of the motions for 
Summary Judgment; 
c. Appellant's Memoranda in opposition to the motions for Summary Judgment; 
Notice of Appeal - Page 3 
268 of 325
d. Appellant's Motion to Reconsider and Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Motion for Reconsideration; 
6. Exhibits: No exhibits were offered or admitted. 
7. Sealed Record: No order has been entered sealing any part of the record or transcript. 
8. I hereby certify that: 
a. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Couit Reporter of these 
proceedings, no reporter's transcript has been requested; 
b. The Clerk of the District Com1 has been paid the estimated fee for the preparation 
of the reporter's transcript pursuant to I.A.R. 24; 
c. That all appellate filing fees have been paid; and, 
d. That service has been made upon all pa11ies required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20. 
DA TED this* day of October, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of October, 2017, I served a ttue and con-ect 
copy of the above and foregoing documen he following person(s) as follows: 
Ron Kerl 
COOPER & LARSEN, Chattered 
151 North Third A venue, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
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[ ] U.S. Mail - Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 208-235-1182 
[,JJ Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited ) 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL ) 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; M&S 













) ________________ ) 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 











MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited ) 
limited liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL ) 




Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C. 
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·-· 
("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC2, filed an Answer 
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and 
injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs have now submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as 
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs also submitted a Motion to Amend the Complaint, 
which was scheduled for a hearing date separate from the motion for partial summary judgment. 
In support of partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs submitted a written brief and the Affidavit 
of Ron Kerl, including exhibits. Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge responded with an 
opposing brief and the Affidavit of Richard A. Hearn, with attached exhibits. The Plaintiffs then 
followed up with a reply brief and the Second Affidavit of Ron Kerl, including exhibits. 
Oral arguments were conducted on February 21, 2017. At the outset of the hearing, the 
parties addressed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint. Although that motion was set 
to be heard at a later date, counsel for the Defendants indicated they had no objection to the 
amendment of the Complaint. Therefore, in a ruling from the bench, this Court granted the 
Plaintiffs' request to add a new defendant based upon stipulation of the parties. 
Having reviewed the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the 
arguments made by the parties, this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1. \.Vhether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
1 Collectively referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs". 
2 Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant". 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
56( c )(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. 
Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. 
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 
90, 867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when 
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case 
upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P .2d 
at 1037-38; Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing 
the summary judgment motion ''may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2016) 
( emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following pertinent facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence, with all 
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the Defendant. Bus hi v. Sage Health Care, P LLC, 146 
Idaho 764,768,203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009)("All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006)).3 
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real property described in the Deed of 
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust. 
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed its initial Complaint seeking to quiet title in that 
property against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First 
Action"). 4 (See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by 
Monitor and First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 
12, 2015 . (Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, 
Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of 
Trust free and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from 
3 The background infonnation was extracted from the parties' briefs and the submitted affidavits and exhibits. 
4 Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the fi lings and outcome of 
the First Action. 
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the district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust 
Deed Note ("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been 
satisfied. (Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, a Judgment dismissing the 
First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.) 
DISCUSSION 
As explained above, the case presently before this Court was initiated by a Complaint to 
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed against Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC and 
M&S Development, LLC. Wildlife Ridge filed an Answer to Complaint and a Counterclaim 
against the Plaintiffs for fraud and declaratory and injunctive relief. In an earlier action, Wildlife 
Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free 
and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the 
district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification had been 
satisfied. That case was dismissed with prejudice. In seeking partial summary judgment, the 
Plaintiffs argue that all defenses and claims now raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the 
current lawsuit are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
a. Law 
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court 
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon 
the same claim. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the doctrine of res judicata, or claim 
preclusion, as follows: 
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Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this 
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous 
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original 
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the 
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943,951 (2012) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent 
relitigation of a claim previously asse1ied, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating 
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v. 
Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 (2002). As such, "in an action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes 
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim 
but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic 
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10 
(l 993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. A1urphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 
208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922). As further explained by Idaho courts, because the transactional 
concept of a claim is broad, "the bar of claim preclusion may apply even where there is not a 
substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence 
relating to those theories." Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,259,668 P.2d 130, 135 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1983)(cited with approval by Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho at 437, 849 P.2d at 110.) Thus, "a valid 
and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 
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at 437, 849 P.2d at 110; see also Diamond v. Farmers Ins., 119 Idaho 146,150,804 P.2d 319, 
323 (1990). 
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the 
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 
(Ct.App.1983)). 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613,617 (2007). 
b. Analysis 
The Plaintiffs argue the First Action already addressed the enforceability of the same 
Deed of Trust Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust at issue here. Because that lawsuit was 
dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants are now prevented from 
presenting any defense or claim challenging the enforceability of the debt which might have and 
should have been litigated in that First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Swnm. J. Mot. Filed by 
Monitor and First Capital ("Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J."), Jan. 6, 2017, 3-4.) The Plaintiffs have 
therefore asked this Court to strike and dismiss the affirmative defenses and the Counterclaim 
raised by the Defendant. 
In response, the Defendant argues res judicata is not a bar to the defenses and/or 
counterclaim it has raised in the present lawsuit because none of those issues were "actually 
litigated in the Quiet Title Action and they could not have been litigated." (Def. Wildlife 
Ridge's Resp. to Pls. Monitor Finance L.C.'s and First Capital L.C.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 
("Def.'s Resp."), Feb. 6, 2017, 12.) For example, Wildlife Ridge first argues that "[t]he entity 
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that appeared in the Quiet Title Action as Monitor Financial L.C. was not a real party in interest 
to the transactions that were the subject matter of that action or the present action." (Def. 's Resp. 
at 6.) In support of that allegation, the Defendant points to the fact that the Monitor Finance, 
L.C. that was named as a party to the Note and Deed of Trust expired on September 17, 2012, 
and was never renewed. Instead, " [a] new entity bearing the same name Monitor Financial L.C. 
was established on January 23, 2015 nearly two months after the Quiet Title Action was filed on 
December 3, 2014." (Id.) Thus, the Defendant argues that one of the plaintiffs in this case, 
Monitor Finance, L.C., which entity was named as a defendant in the First Action to quiet title 
filed by Wildlife Ridge, was not a real party in interest in that case because it had been 
administratively dissolved before the First Action was filed. The Defendant further argues that 
its pending counterclaim and affirmative defenses for fraud were not raised and could not have 
been litigated in the quiet title action because neither M&S Development, LLC ("M&S"), or 
Michael Millward were named parties. 5 (See id.) While the Defendant notes that M&S and Mr. 
Millward were referenced in both the initial complaint and the amended complaint to quiet title, 
the Defendant argues that neither M&S nor Mr. Millward were named parties in the quiet title 
action and "there were no allegations made by any party in the Quiet Title Action that either 
M&S or Millward had done anything wrong." (Id.) The Defendant thus argues: "As Millward 
and M&S would have been necessary parties to any fraud claim brought against Plaintiffs, 
5 "On December 30, 2005, M&S Development, LLC and Michael Millward signed a promissory note with First 
Capital Funding, L.C. and Monitor Finance, L.C. for $244,000.00." (Ex. C, attached to Kerl Aff., Am. Comp!. to 
Quite Title ("First Action"), March 16, 20 16, 7; see also Ex. B, attached to Kerl Aff., Comp!. to Quiet Title, Dec. I, 
2014, §§7-8.) 
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Wildlife Ridge had no duty to bring its claim for fraud against Plaintiffs, Millward and M&S in 
association with its Quiet Title Action." (Def. 's Resp. at 8.) Finally, the Defendant argues that 
the Modification of Trust Deed Note was never mentioned in the pleadings filed in the quiet title 
action. (Id. at 7.) The Defendant argues the Modification is "central" to the foreclosure action 
and Wildlife Ridge's counterclaim for fraud, and is another example of a claim that could not 
have been brought in the First Action. (Id.) 
First, this Court must reject the Defendant's argument that Monitor Finance, L.C. , while a 
named defendant in the First Action, was nonetheless not a real party in interest to that lawsuit 
because it had been previously administratively dissolved. Dissolution of a corporation does not 
prevent the commencement of legal proceedings against that corporation in its corporate name. 
Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, NA., 1999 UT 91, ~ 14,991 P.2d 584,587; see also 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-lOa-1405 (West).6 Because the debt owed existed prior to any 
6 § 16-IOa-1405. Effect of dissolution 
(I) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that 
appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs. 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorizatioQ. to dissolve may provide for closing the 
corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8, Directors and 
Officers; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceed ing bv or against the corporation in its corporate name; 
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dissolution and Monitor Finance was sued during the winding down process to invalidate that 
debt, Monitor Finance was a legitimate party in interest and a named defendant in the First 
Action. 
This Court further rejects the Defendant's argument that M&S and Michael Millward 
were indispensable parties for a complete resolution regarding Wildlife Ridge's claim that the 
debt due to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. Whether a party is "indispensable" is governed by 
IRCP _ 19( a)( 1 ). 7 Under that rule, a party shall be joined if: 
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing 
paiiies; or 
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that disposing of the action in the person's absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the 
interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing par1y subjecl to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. l 9(a). In this case, complete relief could have been granted to Wildlife Ridge if 
the court in the quiet title action had determined that the debt had been satisfied. If that had been 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or &gainst the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) tenninate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-lOa-1405 (West)(emphasis added). 
7 Rule 19. Required joinder of parties 
(a) Persons Required to be Joined if Feasible. 
(I) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party in the action if: 
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or 
(8) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in 
the person's absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or 
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations because of the interest. 
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the outcome, the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust would have no debt to secure, and title to the premises 
could have been quieted in Wildlife Ridge, free and clear of that encumbrance. No matter the 
basis for such a finding, that outcome would not have adversely affected either M&S or Mr. 
Millward since the debt they were personally liable for would no longer be enforceable. In 
addition, there was no risk of double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations since M&S 
and Mr. Millward would have been bound by a decree finding that the debt owed was 
unenforceable, no matter whether the basis of such a decree was that the debt had been satisfied 
or that the debt was unenforceable based on a statute of limitations or fraud argument. As such, 
M&S and Mr. Millward were not indispensable parties to Wildlife Ridge's quiet title action 
and/or Wildlife Ridge's attempt to have the debt deemed unenforceable. 
This Court must also reject the Defendant's arguments regarding the Modification. The 
Defendant argued the Modification dated March 3, 2008, was fraudulent and the "statute of 
limitations claim is related directly to the validity and effect of the claimed Modification." 
(Def.'s Resp. at 10.) The Defendant argued that because the Modification of Trust Deed Note 
was "never mentioned" in the pleadings filed in the quiet title action, the issues surrounding the 
Modification could not have been litigated and therefore cannot now be barred by res judicata. 
However, the record shows the Defendant was aware of the Modification during the First Action, 
since the Modification was produced to Wildlife Ridge tlu-ough discovery. (Ex. 2, First Capital 
Funding, L.C.'s Resp. to Pl.'s First Set of Discovery, attached to Second Aff. of Ron Kerl in 
Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., ~i4-5, 
Feb. 14, 2017.) As such, any claims pertaining to the Modification could have been raised in the 
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First Action, and this Court has also already determined that M&S and Mr. Millward were not 
indispensable parties to the Quiet Title Action necessary to any fraud allegation attempting to 
show the debt owed to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. 
Therefore, based on the above findings and the undisputed facts in this case, all of the 
Defendant's claims that could have challenged the enforceability of the debt secured by the Deed 
of Trust should have been litigated in the quiet title action. There is no dispute that in the First 
Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title to the property described in Monitor 
Finance's and First Capital's Deed of Trust free and clear of that Deed of Trust by claiming there 
was no enforceable debt which could be secured because the applicable promissory note had 
been satisfied by previous payments made to the Plaintiffs. Thus, the gravamen of the first quiet 
title action was that there was no enforceable debt left to be secured by the Plaintiffs' 
encumbering the Deed of Trust. Furthermore, there is no question that both the First Action and 
this matter involve the same parties and the same Deed of Trust. There is also no question that 
the First Action was finally resolved and dismissed with prejudice by entry of a final judgment 
rejecting the Defendant's attempt to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the 
Modification, and the Deed of Trust. As explained, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not 
only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of 
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have 
been made. No matter the theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the 
dismissal of the First Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was 
available in the First Action to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the 
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Modification, and the Deed of Trust in this case. A careful reading of Wildlife Ridge's Answer 
and Counterclaim show that the affirmative defenses and claim of fraud all challenge the 
enforceability of the same Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed 
of Trust at issue in the First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First 
Action. The Defendant has not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented from presenting 
in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised. This Court has found there to be no 
question of fact that those claims, including any statute of limitations defense, the equitable 
doctrines of laches and unclean hands, and the claim of fraud all relate to and arose prior to the 
dismissal of the First Action. 
Therefore, because the First Case ended in a final judgment on the merits, because this 
case involves the same parties as the First Case, and because all of the claims in this case arise 
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Case, the affirmative 
defenses and counterclaim now raised by the Defendant are barred_ by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Court 
has determined the Defendant's affirmative defenses and fraud claim are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. Therefore, all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as 
well as the Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this~ day of March 2017. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST At£· .. \ 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; M&S 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL 
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Counterdefendants, 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C. 
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC2, filed an Answer 
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
On January 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as 
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was 
granted, and all of the affinnative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the 
Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Mem. Decision and Order, 
March 27, 2017, 13.) 
On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, along 
with a brief and affidavits. Defendant Wildlife Ridge opposed the Motion for Summary 
Judgment by submitting a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reversal ofthis Court's prior 
entry of summary judgment granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's affirmative 
defenses and Counterclaim. The Defendant's brief addressed both the Motion for 
Reconsideration and opposed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant did 
not submit any affidavits or other evidence. 
Oral arguments regarding both motions were heard on May 15, 2017. Having reviewed 
the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the arguments made by the parties, 
this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1 Collectively referred to herein as ''the Plaintiffs". 
2 Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant". 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real prope1ty described in the Deed of 
Trnst attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust. 
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed a Complaint seeking to quiet title in that property 
against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First Action").3 
(See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor and 
First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 12, 2015. 
(Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, Wildlife Ridge 
sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free and 
clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the district 
court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust Deed Note 
("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been satisfied. 
(Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, a 
Judgment dismissing the First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.) 
The dismissal of the First Action was followed by the Plaintiffs' present lawsuit to judicially 
foreclose the Deed of Trust. 
As explained, this Court previously granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. In seeking partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs argued that all of the defenses 
and claims raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the current lawsuit were barred by the 
3 Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of 
the First Action. 
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doctrine of res judicata based on the dismissal of the First Action. In granting that motion, this 
Court determined that the First Action ended in a final judgment on the merits and that the 
present case involves the same parties as the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order, March 27, 
2017, 13.) This Court further determined that because all of the claims in this case arise out of 
the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Action, the affirmative 
defenses and counterclaim raised by the Defendant were barred by res judicata. (Id.) Therefore, 
all of the affinnative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the Defendant's 
Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Id.) A Judgment to that effect was entered 
on March 27, 2017. Then, on March 30, 2017, Default was entered against Defendant M & S 
Development, LLC ("M&S"), for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Subsequently, Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County filed a waiver of its right to 
respond fw1her to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and consented to the entry of a Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant to the Amended 
Complaint. 
The Plaintiffs then filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. By that motion, the 
Plaintiffs are seeking a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against Defendant Wildlife Ridge 
on the basis of this Court's prior Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Wildlife Ridge's 
affirmative defenses and counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, as well as the fact that Defendant 
Pioneer Title Company waived its right to respond and consented to the entry of a Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure. 
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1. Whether to grant the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
2. Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DISCUSSIO 
It is necessary for this Court to first address the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, 
as resolution of that motion necessarily resolves the question of summary judgment. 
Motion for Reconsideration 
a. Standard of Review 
Rule l l .2(b)(1)4 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") governs motions for 
reconsideration. Under that rule, "[a] motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered 
before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a 
final judgment." 
In explaining motions for reconsideration, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "A 
motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court-when new law is applied to 
previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or any 
combination thereof-to reconsider the conectness of an interlocutory order." Johnson v. N 
Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012). "[T]he most important consideration is 
the conectness of the interlocutory order." Id. Thus, "[a]fter a final judgment, a party has one 
more chance under [Rule 1 l.2(b)(l)] to ask the court to decide the law and facts conectly." 
Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,913, 332 P.3d 815, 825 (2014). That rule "allows 
4 Prior to 2016, this rule was labeled as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). 
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the trial court to reconsider facts in light of any new or additional facts that are submitted in 
support of the motion. This ensures the district court decides a case on the proper law and facts." 
Id. (internal citation omitted.) Therefore, the district court should consider any new facts and 
new evidence presented by the moving party bearing on the correctness of the interlocutory 
order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 
1026, 1037 (1990); Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., 152 Idaho 207,210,268 P.3d 1159, 1162 
(2012). "The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts." 
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. A trial court is not required "to 
search the record to determine if there is any new information that might change the specification 
of facts deemed to be established." Id. However, while Rule 1 l .2(b)(l) ''permits a party to 
present new evidence when a motion is brought under lhat rule, [the rule] does not require that 
the motion be accompanied by new evidence." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472, 147 
P.3d 100, 104 (Idaho Ct.App. 2006). Thus, this Court is not precluded from reconsidering an 
interlocutory decision on the grounds of the initial evidence. Id. at 473, 147 P.3d at 105. 
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). This 
Court is being asked to reconsider the granting of a partial motion for summary judgment. 
Therefore, this Court "must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of 
material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id. 
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As explained, this Court previously dismissed the Defendant's affirmative defenses and 
collllterclaim on the basis of res judicata. This Court specifically determined that the First 
Action between the parties ended in a final judgment on the merits, that case involved the same 
patiies as the First Action, and all of the claims in this case arise out of the same transaction or 
series of transactions as decided in the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order at 13.) Because 
"the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously 
asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which 
were actually made or which might have been made", this Court ruled that "[n]o matter the 
theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the dismissal of the First 
Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was available in the First Action 
to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the Modification, and the Deed of 
Trust in this case." (Id. at 12.) This Court further determined that all of the affirmative defenses 
and the counterclaim raised by Wildlife Ridge challenged ''the enforceability of the same 
Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed of Trust at issue in the 
First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First Action." (Id. at 13.) 
This Court found that the Defendant had "not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented 
from presenting in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised." (Id.) As such, this 
Court folllld there were no questions of fact regarding the Defendant's defenses or counterclaim, 
and the defenses and counterclaim were necessarily stricken and dismissed. (Id.) 
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Through the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant specifically challenges the 
dismissal of the statute of limitations defense, arguing that defense was not available in the First 
Action and therefore should not have been barred by this Court under the theory of res judicata. 
(Mero. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Swnm. J. and in Supp. ofDef.'s Mot. for Reconsideration 
("Mero. in Opp'n"), May 1, 2017, 2.) Wildlife Ridge, the Defendant in this action, was the 
Plaintiff in the First Action to quiet title filed against Monitor and First Capital, now the 
Plaintiffs in the present case. The Defendant argues that during the time of the First Action, 
Wildlife Ridge had no standing to quiet title and raise a claim that the statute of limitations 
prohibited Monitor and First Capital from enforcing the debt secured by, and foreclosing, the 
Deed of Trust. (See id. at 2-3.) In support of that argument, the Defendant cited to Idaho Code§ 
5-214A, which provides a five-year slatute of limitations for the commencement of an action for 
the foreclosure of a mortgage. The Defendant also cited to one sentence from a 1952 Idaho 
Supreme Court case pertaining to that statute of limitations. Quoting from Trusty v. Ray, 73 
Idaho 232,249 P.2d 814 (1952), the Defendant argued: "In Idaho, a 'mortgagor or his successor 
in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains unpaid, 
although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage."' (Id. at 2.) 
The Plaintiffs dispute the Defendant's analysis of Trusty as being too broad. The 
Plaintiffs agree that the Idaho Supreme Court in the Trusty case concluded that the "mortgagor or 
his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains 
unpaid, although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage." 
(Mero. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration and Reply Mem. in Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. ("Mem. 
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Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration"), May 8, 2017, 4.) However, the Plaintiffs argue that 
"simple statement" did not prohibit Wildlife Ridge "from bringing all available claims for relief 
other than one for quieting title to the property" in the First Action. (Id.) Thus, the Plaintiffs 
argue that even if quiet title was not available to Wildlife Ridge in the First Action, there is 
nothing about the Trusty case that prevented the Defendant from pursuing other, still available 
avenues of relief, such as seeking a permanent injunction stopping any enforcement of the deed 
of trust by foreclosure. The Plaintiffs point out, for example, that the Defendant raised different 
forms for relief other than quiet title in responding to this action. (See id.) The Plaintiffs argue 
that because Wildlife Ridge did not pursue those other avenues of relief in the First Action, the 
Defendant is barred under the theory of res judicata from "now rais[ing] additional claims for 
relief which could have been raised in the First Quiet Title Action." (Id.) Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs maintain that this Court was correct in its decision granting partial summary judgment 
because "[r Jes judicata 's subparts, issue and claim preclusion, ... cover not only the theory of 
recover[y] advanced in the first action (here, 'Quiet Title') but any theory of recovery at law or 
inequity [sic) which could have been raised in the first action." (Id.) 
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court 
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon 
the same claim. "[R)es judicata is an umbrella term for different but related concepts: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion." Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Ttab Decide Your Next 
Infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38 (2016); see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 
128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 15 5 (2008). "Separate tests are used to determine whether 
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claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 
157 P.3d 613,617 (2007)(intemal citation omitted). 
Pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment bars a party from re-
litigating that same claim, regardless of whether the subsequent litigation involves new or 
different issues. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171. The Idaho Supreme Court further 
explained claim preclusion as follows: 
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this 
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous 
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original 
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the 
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent 
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating 
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v. 
Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes 
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim 
but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic 
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436- 37, 849 P.2d 107, 109- 10 
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. 1\1urphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549,553, 
208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922) . Similarly, "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars 'successive litigation of an 
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issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the 
prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 
892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (internal citation omitted). Thus, when a court finally determines an 
issue in one case that is essential to that judgment, a litigant is barred from raising the issue again 
in another lawsuit. 
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if th~ same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the 
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 
(Ct.App.1983 )). 
Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617; see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,892, 128 
S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). 
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same pru.iies of 
a prior litigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review. 
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). Res judicata is an 
affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 890, 841 
P.2d 413,420 (1992). 
Id. at 122, 157 P.3d at 616. 
In its decision granting partial summary judgment, this Court determined that the doctrine 
of res judicata applied to not only the theory of recovery advanced by Wildlife Ridge in the First 
Action, but to any theory of recovery at law or equity which could have been raised in that First 
Action. Thus, Wildlife Ridge should have asserted every legal rule and/or equitable remedy to 
establish that the Deed of Trust Note was unenforceable. The Defendant's new reliance on the 
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Trusty case does not support the Defendant's argwnent that it was prohibited in the First Action 
from bringing all available claims for relief other than a claim for quieting title. Wildlife Ridge 
was not required to limit its requested relief to simply seeking a decree quieting title to the land. 
However, having selected that solitary claim for relief, the doctrine of resjudicata prohibits 
Wildlife Ridge from now adding new or additional claims for relief that were available at the 
time of the First Action, which action was indisputably litigated to a final judgment. When the 
First Action was dismissed, Wildlife Ridge lost the ability to relitigate any other theories of 
recovery arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions which were actually made 
or which might have been made in the First Action. Unfortunately, Wildlife Ridge limited itself 
by seeking a relief that was too narrow, and this Court can find no error of fact or law in its 
previous decision to that effect. 
The Defendant additionally argued reconsideration should be granted because the 
Plaintiffs are simply barred from "the commencement of a foreclosure action in this matter" 
because "[a]n action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property must be commenced 
within five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such 
mortgage." (Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) Citing to the Trust Deed Note attached to the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, the Defendant argued: 
The Deed of Trust being foreclosed is subject to the mandatory maturity date 
contained in the Trust Deed Note. The note specifically states that "2. The term of this 
Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This Trust Deed Note shall 
fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the 'Maturity Date')." 
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(Id. at 3.) The Defendant argues there was no stay on the statute of limitations, and the five-year 
timeframe for commencing an action for the foreclosure of the subject mortgage has expired 
based on the maturity date of June 28, 2006. Therefore, the Defendant claims the Plaintiffs are 
now time-barred from enforcing their rights under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification. 
(See Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) The Plaintiffs dispute that contention, arguing that ''the record before 
the Court and applicable law supports a finding that the subject obligation is not time barred by 
any applicable statute of limitations." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 9.) 
As mentioned earlier, Idaho Code§ 5-214A provides a five-year statute oflimitations for 
the commencement of an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage. That statute states: 
An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property must be commenced within 
five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such 
mortgage. If the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a 
maturity date, then the date of the accrual of the cause of action giving rise to the right to 
foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness. 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-2 l 4A (West). Idaho Code § 45-1515 adopts the same five-year statute of 
limitations for the foreclosure of deeds of trust. That statute states: 
The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale shall be made and the 
foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedure shall be commenced within the time 
limited by the same period and according to the same provisions including extensions as 
provided by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1515 (West) . The Defendant points to the maturity date stated in the 
Deed of Trust Note, which is June 28, 2006. (See Ex. A, Trust Deed Note, attached to Compl. to 
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust, Oct. 7, 2016.) That date is not in dispute, and the Complaint 
to foreclose the Deed of Trust was not filed until 2016. However, the Plaintiffs argue the statute 
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of limitations was restarted by a partial payment made on November 8, 2012, "extending the 
maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, and the right to foreclose that Deed 
ofTrnst, to November 8, 2017." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10.) 
In support of the extension argument, the Plaintiffs direct this Court to Idaho Code§ 5-
238, which pertains to the effect of partial payments. That statute provides: 
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract by 
which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in 
some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but any payment of principal or 
interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue of the 
debt. 
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-238 (West)(emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has found that 
payments of interest or principal serve to restart the statute of limitations on all installments on 
the note pursuant to IC§ 5-238. Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879,881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140 
(2007). There is no dispute in this case that on November 8, 2012, the Plaintiffs "received a 
payment on the Deed of Trust Note in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that payment to the 
principal due on the obligation." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10; see also, 
Supplemental Aff. in Supp. of Pis.' Foreclosure Decree, May 8, 2017, 13.) As such, the partial 
payment made on the Deed ofTrnst in this case on November 8, 2012, restarted the five-year 
statute of limitations, extending the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of 
Trust, including the right to foreclose that Deed of Trust, to November 8, 2017. The Complaint 
to Judicially Foreclose the Deed of Trust was filed on October 7, 2016, within the five-year limit. 
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the partial payment extending the maturity date was made 
after Wildlife Ridge had acquired the subject property and was therefore made with the 
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Defendant's full knowledge and consent. Thus, under the provisions ofIC § 5-238, the partial 
payment to the Plaintiffs constituted "a new promise in writing", extending the statute of 
limitations found in IC§§ 5-214A and 45-1515 for an additional five years. As such, the 
Plaintiffs' action to foreclose the Deed of Trust, filed on October 7, 2016, was timely filed, and 
the Plaintiffs are not barred by the statute of limitations from commencing this action. 
Therefore, the Defendant's statute of limitation argument does not provide a valid basis for this 
Court to reconsider its prior decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiffs. 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment seeking a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure against Wildlife Ridge. As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' request is supported by 
this Court's previous entry of partial summary judgment and the subsequent Default entered 
against Defendant M & S Development, LLC, for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County has also consented to the 
ent1y of a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant 
to the Amended Complaint. Based on that procedural history, the Plaintiffs argue this Court 
need now only make a determination that there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of 
Trust, and make a further finding as to the description and reasonable value of the property still 
encumbereq by that Deed of Trust. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot., April 13, 2017, 4.) 
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a. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file , together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. Crv. P. 
56( c )(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. 
Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact , then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. 
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) . 
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90, 
867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the 
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon 
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P .2d at 
1037-38; Bade!! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing the 
summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56( e )(2016) 
(emphasis added). 
b. Analysis 
In opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argued the amount of the 
debt cannot be re litigated because the amount of the debt was already raised and litigated in the 
First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at 4.) The Defendant stated: "[T]he 
amount of the debt was raised and litigated in the first quiet title action the result was a joint 
stipulation dismissing the action." (Id.) Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, the Defendant 
contends that the issue of whether a debt was owed was already litigated in the First Action, and 
based on the joint stipulation entered there, the Plaintiffs are now barred from relitigating the 
debt owed. 5 
This Court has already extensively set forth the law regarding res judicata in the 
proceeding sections, as well as in its prior Memorandum Decision and Order. There is no need 
to repeat that discussion in great depth here. It is sufficient to note that under principles of res 
judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an 
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim. A judgment, 
"once rendered, is treated as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties 
on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action."' Aldape, 105 Idaho at 256,668 P.2d at 132(quoting 
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., 575 F.2d at 535-36). 
5 Outside of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant did not raise any factual issues challenging summary 
judgment, and the Defendant did not submit any affidavits or other evidence to challenge sununary judgment. 
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Monitor and First Capital were defendants in the First Action. One defense raised by 
Monitor and First Capital was the denial that the obligation owed by Michael Millward and 
M&S Development had been satisfied. Mr. Millward and M&S were the makers of the Deed of 
Trust Notes. However, Monitor and First Capital did not pursue any claims for relief in the First 
Action because they were prohibited from doing so under applicable bankruptcy laws. As 
makers of the Deed of Trust Notes, as modified, Mr. Millward and M&S were necessary parties 
to any claim to foreclose the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust Note and Modification. 
See IDAHO R. Crv. P. 20(a)(2)(2016).6 However, at the time of the First Action, Mr. Millward 
had already filed for bankruptcy. Pursuant to Title 11, Section 362 of the United States Code 7, 
an automatic stay commenced on September 10, 2012. The Plaintiffs submit they were 
6 Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties 
(a) Persons Who May Join or be Joined. 
(!) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: 
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. 
(2) Defendants. Persons may be joined in one action as defendants if: 
(A) any right to reliefis asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. 
7 (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,302, or 303 of this title, 
or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, 
applicable to all entities, of--
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over 
property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a 
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West). 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
18 
305 of 325
prohibited by that bankruptcy stay from taking any action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, as 
amended, and foreclose the Deed of Trust securing that Trust Deed Note. According to the 
Plaintiffs, the automatic stay existed until the bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016. 
Thus, the pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy prevented Monitor and First Capital from asse1iing any 
foreclosure claims against Defendants Millward, M&S Development, and Wildlife Ridge in the 
First Action, and the amount of Monitor and First Capital's debt still owed was therefore never 
actually litigated. In responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant offered no 
evidence to dispute the fact that Monitor and First Capital could not have actually litigated a 
claim for foreclosure in the First Action because they were prohibited from pursuing such a 
claim against the makers of the Note based on the bankruptcy stay. As res judicata is only a bar 
to the relitigation of claims that have already been decided, and the Plaintiffs made no "claim" 
for foreclosure in the First Action, res judicata cannot now prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing 
litigation regarding the amount of debt still owed. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the proceeding discussion regarding res judicata, no 
factual issues have been raised by the Defendant in challenging summary judgment. Under the 
governing standards, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must produce 
"evidence by way of affidavit or deposition ... to contradict the assertions of the moving party." 
Ambrose By & Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 
1088, 1091 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994)(intemal citations omitted). Such evidence must be anchored 
in something more than mere speculation. See id. A non-moving party's failure to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which 
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that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. See 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S . 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 295 
(1986). "In.such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322- 23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus, where 
the non-moving party has failed to make a showing of proof on any element for which it bears 
the burden at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; see 
also, Sparks v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505,509, 768 P.2d 768, 772 (1988). 
The Defendant here has failed to present any affidavits or evidence to challenge summary 
judgment or to support any defense to the foreclosure relief sought by the Plaintiffs. On the 
other hand, the Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits in support of summary judgment. Therefore, 
based on the governing standards, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must 
necessarily be granted. 
CONCLUSlON 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Court further 
finds there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust. Pursuant to the affidavit filed 
in support of the Plaintiffs' motion, "[a]s of the 1st day of April, 2017, there will be due, owing 
and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note, as modified, the sum of $6,814,076.41, together with 
interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per annum until date of Judgment herein, 
together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and expenses necessary to preserve 
Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter accruing." (Aff. in Supp. of 
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Pls.' Foreclosure Decree at 6:6.) Based on that undisputed affidavit, this Court finds there 
remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust and owing to the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
$6,814,076.41. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit a proposed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
detailing the amount remaining on the unpaid debt and the description and reasonable value of 
the property still encumbered by that Deed of Trust for this Court's consideration and signature. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs may also submit an appropriate memorandum detailing the 
grounds for any claimed award of litigation costs and attorney fees. However, any decision 
regarding costs and fees will be made in a separate order after this Court is provided an 
opportunity to review such a request in detail. 
Based on the preceding discussion and this Court's findings, no claims remain. As such, 
this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 12> day of June 2017. 
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This maltcr having come on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz 
presiding, and finding good cause therefore; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
I. Pursuant to th e parties stipulation and this Court's Stipulated Order Approving 
St ipulations Consenting to the Sale of Real Property dated April 28, 2017, Pioneer Title Company 
is hereby ordered to turn over to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., in care of 
their attorney of record, Ron Kerl of the firm of Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., 151 N. 3'd Ave., Second 
Floor, Pocatello, Idaho, the net proceeds from the sale of the below described prope1ty, totaling 
$256,761.67. Said funds are currently deposited in the trust account of Pioneer Title Company. The 
net proceeds from the sale of the following property: 
Lot 2, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2- $44,195.82 
Lot 5, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,928.14 
Lot 7 & Lot 9, Block 3 WILDLirE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $86,749.80 
Lot 4, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $45,433.92 
Lot 6, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION I - $35,453.99 
2. The Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated 
December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") executed and delivered by M&S Development LLC , to 
Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., recorded on the 301h day of December, 2005, 
under Rccordcr1s instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, is a valid first 
lien on the below described real property securing an indebtedness of $6,828,907 .39, as of June 19, 
2017. plus any additional attorney fees and costs awarded by the Court pursuant to l.R.C.P. Ruic 54, 
and costs related to the enforcement of this Decree by Sheriff's Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest 
on the entire sum of the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree io and including the date 
of Sheri ft's sale at the highest rate allowed by law; 
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The real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust is situated in the County of Bannock, 
State of Idaho, is more particularly described as follows: 
Lot l, I3lock 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES DIVISION 2; and 
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION l 
3. The Deed of Trust described in paragraph 2 is foreclosed, and all interests which the 
Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S Development LLC, and 
Pioneer Title Company have in the above described real property, and any fixtures on the property, 
shall be sold by the Sheriff of Bannock County, Idaho, in the manner provided by law, payc1b lc in 
cash lawful money oft he United States of America and in accordance with the practice of this Court. 
The reasonable value of said property as of the date of this Decree is c1s fo llows: 
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $50,000.00 
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION I - $50,000 
4. The proceeds of sale shall be applied as fol lows: First, to the costs of sale; second, 
towards the satisfaction of the indebtedness owing to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital 
Funding, L.C. as set forth in paragraph 2 above; and third, any surplus thereafter remaining shall be 
paid into the District Court for further dctennination regarding priority among those parties to this 
litigation whose rights are subordinate to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capitc1l Funding, L.C .. 
5. The Ddendants \Vild_l ife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S 
Development LLC, and Pioneer Tit le Company, and all persons claiming through or under them 
as purchasers, encumbranccrs, or otherwise and all persons claiming to have acquired any equity or 
interest in said premises are foreclosed of all interests, liens, or claims in the real property herein 
above described, and evc1y portion thereof, save and except such statutory rights of redemption as 
said parties or any of them may have. 
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6. The Plaintiff, with either a cash bid or a credit bid against the sum here in found to be 
due it, or any party to thi s suit may become the purchaser at the sale of said properly, and the 
purchaser thereof shall be entitled to nil of the rights and privileges of such a purchaser under the 
laws of the State of Idaho. 
DATED This 1fJ_ day of June, 2017. 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz \J 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Judgement and Dl'crcc or Forl'closurc ancl Order of Sale - pg. -I 
314 of 325
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY on the~ day of Ju ne , 20 17, l served a true and correct copy of 
th e foregoing document as follows : 
A. Bruce Larson 
Hearn Law, P~LP . 6( L. ,· 
·P:D. Box '7'0. 106 5. 2i'- ·f\ vU 
Poca tel lo, ID 8320 I 
Ron Kerl 
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd . 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205 
[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932- l 083 
[ ] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com 
[x] U.S . Mai l, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932- 1083 
[ ] Email to: ron@cooper-
larsen.com 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Jutl :;c 111 cnt and Deere~ or Forl'tlosurc and Orcll'r or Sa le - pg . S 
315 of 325
Designation of Appeal - 1 (d) 
316 of 325
Ron Kerl, Esq. - !SB #1768 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Email: 1•·1.1.:, 1,.'r•,·:_ .. 11· :1 , ,· 1111· 
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C. 
,, 1J~ o('j·-
Lu, 1 Li ; O F'/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C. , a ) 






WILDLIFE RIDG E ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; M&S DEVELOPM ENT, LLC, an ) CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C 
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER TITLE ) 





WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 





MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability ) 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a ) 
Utah limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counter-defendant, ) _ _ _____________ ___ ) 
Judgment - Pg. 1 
r;; • , ... . ... 
0• Ub 
317 of 325
Judgment is entered against M & S Development, LLC for the sum of $6,728,907.39, as of 
June 19, 2017, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate set by J.C. § 28-22-104, to wit: 5.625% 
per annum. 
DATED This 
Judgment - Pg. 2 
day of October, 2017. 
Hon. Robert C. Naftz 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT·OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
V 
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, Defendant/ Appellant; 
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Claimant; 
V 
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Counter-defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the Judgment dated October 10, 2017, and all 
prior paiiial Judgments and Orders entered in this action, it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance 
with Rule 54(b ), LR.C.P ., that the court has determined that there is no just reason for delay of 
the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE - Page I 
322 of 325
judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may 
be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
r,. 
DATED this ~j .r J, day of November, 2017. 
Robert C. Naftz 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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